PubMed2000
In the aftermath of World War II, several influences were paramount in forcing academic psychology to recognize, albeit reluctantly, the coming professionalization of psychology. The federal government, wishing to avoid a repeat of blunders following World War I that led to significant dissatisfaction among veterans, took proactive steps to ensure that mental health needs of the new veterans would be met. The USPHS and the VA were mandated to expand significantly the pool of mental health practitioners, a direction that led not only to the funding of the Boulder conference but also to the development of APA's accreditation program, funded practical and internship arrangements with the VA, and the USPHS grants to academic departments for clinical training. The GI Bill, amended to include payment for graduate education, created tremendous interest in graduate programs in psychology. As a result, psychology programs were inundated with funded applicants, most of whom were interested in the application of psychology to clinical and other applied fields. Graduate psychology departments were mixed in their views of this "blessing." The reality of a separate curriculum for professional training in psychology was a bitter pill for some academic psychologists to swallow. Graduate departments feared that control of their programs would be taken over by external forces and that they would lose their right to determine their own curriculum. Further, they feared the domination of clinical training within their own departments and the effects of such educational emphasis on their traditional experimental programs. The Boulder conference brought together these disparate needs and concerns, although one can argue about how well some points of view were represented with respect to others. It was a time of high anticipation and fear. The conference could easily have ended in failure, with such diverse interests being unable to reach any consensus. There are many letters in the correspondence of committee members that suggest disagreements serious enough to prevent the development of any single model of training. Instead, by most yardsticks that one could apply, the conference succeeded, perhaps beyond the dreams of many of those in attendance who were most invested in a model for professional training. In evaluating the legacy of Boulder, several points are apparent. First, the conference succeeded because 73 individuals were able to agree to some 70 resolutions in 15 days, creating the scientist-practitioner model of professional training. Such consensus was arguably a remarkable achievement. The endorsement of the model by academic units followed with little evident resistance, although it is clear that some Boulder-model programs were developed that bore little resemblance to the model's insistence on significant training in both research and practice. Second, as a response to social and political needs, the conference was clearly a success. The cooperation of the APA, the USPHS, and the VA benefited all three entities. Clinical psychology was given the financial support and backing to advance it as a profession, and the federal government was able to begin the process of securing the personnel needed to address the mental health needs of the nation. The architects of Boulder were clear that their vision of training for professional psychology should be viewed as dynamic and experimental rather than fixed and prescribed. Certainly there are several variants of professional training extant today, yet the overwhelming majority of currently accredited programs in psychology label themselves as "Boulder-model" programs or "scientist-practitioner" programs. Still, new national conferences on professional training in psychology occur with some regularity as participants seek to resolve many of the same concerns debated by those at Boulder. The grand experiment goes on.