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Results for “Reality Testing”

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At least 433 records · Page 24Linked to original sources
PubMed1993

Three syndrome concept of schizophrenia. A factor analytic study.

One hundred and fifty-five DSM-IIIR schizophrenic patients were assessed for positive and negative symptoms using Andreasen's Scale for Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS) and the Scale for Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS). Interrelationships of individual positive and negative symptoms were examined using a factor analysis. Results of the factor analysis are consistent with Liddle's proposition that there are three syndromes underlying symptomatology in schizophrenia: disorganization; psychomotor poverty and reality distortion.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1995

The development and reliability of the Mental Health Research Institute Unusual Perceptions Schedule (MUPS): an instrument to record auditory hallucinatory experience.

The Mental Health Research Institute Unusual Perceptions Schedule (MUPS) is a comprehensive instrument developed to record subjects' experiences of auditory hallucinations as completely as possible. The Schedule comprises a semi-structured interview and documents the physical characteristics of auditory hallucinations such as their onset and course, number, volume, tone, location, as well as other phenomena associated with them such as delusions. In addition, other aspects of hallucinations, such as coping strategies, contributing factors and subjects' personal views and reactions are also explored. In a sample of 100 subjects drawn primarily from the in-patient wards at Royal Park Hospital the MUPS was found to be an acceptable instrument to subjects in the field. Interrater reliability assessed in a subsample of 30 subjects was found to be high at the level of the individual items. Whether used in whole or part, the MUPS provides a reliable and acceptable method of assessing patients' experience of auditory hallucinations.

Adaptation, Psychological↗
PubMed2001

Distinguishing obsessive features and worries: the role of thought-action fusion.

Obsessions are a key feature of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), and chronic worry is the cardinal feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). However, these two cognitive processes are conceptually very similar, and there is a need to determine how they differ. Recent studies have attempted to identify cognitive processes that may be differentially related to obsessive features and worry. In the current study we proposed that (1) obsessive features and worry could be differentiated and that (2) a measure of the cognitive process thought-action fusion would distinguish between obsessive features and worry, being strongly related to obsessive features after controlling for the effects of worry. These hypotheses were supported in a sample of 173 undergraduate students. Thought-action fusion may be a valuable construct in differentiating between obsessive features and worry.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Reality monitoring and metacognitive beliefs related to cognitive confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder.

The present study investigated general reality monitoring ability, and selective reality monitoring ability for anxiety relevant actions in a group of individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and a group of non-anxious controls. In addition, reality monitoring confidence was assessed, as well as specific meta-cognitive beliefs related to cognitive confidence (by means of the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ)). No differences were found between both groups in actual reality monitoring ability. Unlike previous studies, the reality monitoring task included actions that were related to the individual concerns of the OCD patients and were ideographically selected. Nevertheless, no differential reality monitoring effect was observed for the anxiety relevant stimuli. Data from the MCQ, however, revealed that OCD patients had less overall confidence in their memory for actions and their reality monitoring ability. Analysis of the confidence ratings of the reality monitoring task showed that this reduced confidence was restricted to the neutral actions. No differences were observed for patients that reported low or high frequencies of checking behaviour. The whole of these data do not support memory deficit models of OCD, but are in line with recent emphasis on the importance of memory confidence and other meta-cognitive beliefs in OCD.

Adult↗
PubMedDate not supplied

The predelusional state: a conceptual history.

The predelusional state (PDS) is defined as the set of psychopathologic events preceding the crystallization of delusions, and includes strange cognitions, moods, conations, and motor acts that may be fleeting and defy description. This review exclusively deals with the historic aspects of PDS. It is noted that during PDS the patient is expected to report experiences for which, on account of their novelty, he may not even have a name. Thus, it is quite likely that according to culture and personal codes and to the conceptual brief of the interviewer, similar experiences might be reported as depersonalization, bodily sensations, dysphoria, changes in perception of reality or time, dissolution of "ego boundaries," etc. It is therefore not surprising that since the 19th century, PDS has been considered a disorder of cognition, emotions, volition, and consciousness.

Consciousness Disorders↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Dissociative detachment relates to psychotic symptoms and personality decompensation.

Previous studies have addressed the prominence of psychotic symptoms in conjunction with multiple personality disorder (now dissociative identity disorder). The present study examines the relation between psychotic symptoms and a more pervasive form of dissociative disturbance, namely dissociative detachment. Two hundred sixty-six women in inpatient treatment for severe trauma-related disorders completed the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES), and 102 of these patients also completed the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI-III). A factor analysis of the DES yielded two dimensions of dissociative detachment: detachment from one's own actions and detachment from the self and the environment. Each of these DES dimensions relates strongly to the thought disorder and schizotypal personality disorder scales of the MCMI-III. We propose that severe dissociative detachment, by virtue of loosening the moorings in inner and outer reality, is conducive to psychotic symptoms and personality decompensation.

Adult↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Underconstrained perception: a theoretical approach to the nature and function of verbal hallucinations.

We do not see the world as it is. Perception forms a subjective image of the world in a language that has proven to be adaptive to our interaction with the external world. Perception is mainly determined by current needs of the organism and goals of behavior. Sensory processing itself does not culminate in perception and is not essential for perception, since perception derives from representations of internal symbols and their features. The current stimulation of sensory organs does, however, constrain our perception. Perception might be less constrained by the external world in cases of (1) increased attention, (2) decreased sensory stimulation, or (3) facilitated formation of cortical associations between representations of expectations and internal symbols. Hallucinations are perceptions that are underconstrained by external sensory stimulation. Verbal hallucinations that allow the patient to infer about his self-image might constitute the core psychopathology in a subset of schizophrenia. Commenting and discussing voices might be perceived under the pressure of increased attention to environmental factors that relate to the patient's social fears and wishes. Secondarily, delusions about the possession of thoughts and disorders of self-experience may develop.

Association↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Origins of theory of mind, cognition and communication.

There has been a revolution in our understanding of infant and toddler cognition that promises to have far-reaching implications for our understanding of communicative and linguistic development. Four empirical findings that helped to prompt this change in theory are analyzed: (a) Intermodal coordination--newborns operate with multimodal information, recognizing equivalences in information across sensory-modalities; (b) Imitation--newborns imitate the lip and tongue movements they see others perform; (c) Memory--young infants form long-lasting representations of perceived events and use these memories to generate motor productions after lengthy delays in novel contexts; (d) Theory of mind--by 18 months of age toddlers have adopted a theory of mind, reading below surface behavior to the goals and intentions in people's actions. This paper examines three views currently being offered in the literature to replace the classical framework of early cognitive development: modularity-nativism, connectionism, and theory-theory. Arguments are marshaled to support the "theory-theory" view. This view emphasizes a combination of innate structure and qualitative reorganization in children's thought based on input from the people and things in their culture. It is suggested that preverbal cognition forms a substrate for language acquisition and that analyzing cognition may enhance our understanding of certain disorders of communication.

Age Factors↗
PubMed2003

When can children handle referential opacity? Evidence for systematic variation in 5- and 6-year-old children's reasoning about beliefs and belief reports.

Five- and 6-year-olds (N=51) heard stories in which a character sorted items into two locations. Either the character had a false belief about one of the items (e.g., thought a tin contained biscuits, not Lego), or was only partially informed of an item's dual identity (e.g., did not know that a tie was a present). Children found it easier to reject a report of the character's belief that described the true state of affairs when the character had a false belief (e.g., Is Fred's uncle thinking "where shall I put this Lego?"), than to reject one in which an object known to the character was described using a term of which she was ignorant (e.g., Is Mum thinking "where shall I put this present?"). Similarly, children found it easier to predict the character's incorrect sorting of the target items for false belief (with food not toys) than for dual identity (in the wardrobe not with things to take on a visit). Correct reasoning about beliefs and reports of beliefs that misrepresent an object does not imply mastery of the fact that beliefs represent an object in a particular way.

Child↗
PubMed1992

Cognitive components of naming in children: effects of referential uncertainty and stimulus realism.

The ease of picture naming in children was assessed as a function of two stimulus characteristics: (a) the number of available correct names for a picture (referential uncertainty) and (b) the degree to which a picture realistically represents the depicted object (stimulus realism). Two experiments employing different methods demonstrated that: (a) children named low uncertainty objects (those with a single dominant name, e.g., key, elephant) faster than high uncertainty objects (those with multiple possible correct names, e.g., lamp/light, stove/oven) and (b) this uncertainty effect arose at a stage of naming subsequent to object identification. Possible underlying mechanisms for the uncertainty effect include passive diffusion of activation over multiple object-name pathways or active inhibition among competing candidate names. Stimulus realism (colored photographs vs uncolored line drawings) did not consistently influence naming performance. Implications for understanding children's naming behavior are discussed.

Attention↗
PubMed2003

Neurophysiological correlates of memory for experienced and imagined events.

Changes in slow cortical potentials within EEG were monitored while autobiographical memories of experienced and imagined event were generated and then held in mind for a short period. The generation of both kinds of memory led to significantly larger negative dc shifts over left versus right frontal regions, and this was interpreted as a reflection of substantial left frontal activation. The generation phase was also associated with greater right versus left negative dc shifts over posterior occipital regions. This pattern replicates and extends previous findings from our laboratory. In addition, however, experienced memories were associated with significantly larger negative dc shifts over occipito-temporal regions than imagined events. Furthermore, during the hold-in-mind period, imagined events led to larger negative dc shifts over left frontal regions than experienced events. These findings suggest that memories for imagined and experienced events may share control processes that mediate construction of memories but that they differ in the types of content of the memories: memories of experienced events contain sensory-perceptual episodic knowledge stored in occipital networks whereas memories for imagined events contain generic imagery generated from frontal networks.

Adult↗