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Cerebral death.

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Brain Death↗

The role of beneficence in clinical genetics: non-directive counseling reconsidered.

The popular view of non-directive genetic counseling limits the counselor's role to providing information to clients and assisting families in making decisions in a morally neutral fashion. This view of non-directive genetic counseling is shown to be incomplete. A fuller understanding of what it means to respect autonomy shows that merely respecting client choices does not exhaust the duty. Moreover, the genetic counselor/client relationship should also be governed by the counselor's commitment to the principle of beneficence. When non-directive counseling is reexamined in light of both these principles, it becomes clear that there are cases in which counselors should attempt to persuade clients to reconsider their decisions. Such attempts are consistent with non-directive counseling because, while respecting the clients' decision-making authority, they insure that clients act with full knowledge of the moral consequences of their decisions.

Beneficence↗

Death by non-feeding: not in the baby's best interests.

It has recently been suggested that doctors have a duty to act in their patient's best interest and that this duty demands that life-sustaining treatment--including food and fluids--should sometimes be withheld or withdrawn and the patient allowed to die. In this article, the author explores the scope of the 'best interests principle' in the context of treatment decisions for seriously handicapped newborn infants. She argues that those who hold that it is permissible to starve or dehydrate an infant to death are mistaken to think that this course of action is in the infant's best-interests. While it may be true that there are times when death is, everything considered, in an infant's best interests, a slow and distressing method of bringing death about is not. Since death by dehydration and starvation is not benign, the withholding of food and fluids is generally not in an infant's best interests. The author concludes by suggesting that whenever the withdrawal or non-employment of life-sustaining means imposes a heavy burden on the infant, the 'best interests principle' would demand that the infant be killed rather than allowed to die.

Brain Diseases↗

Some ways that technology and terminology distort the euthanasia issue.

Technology and terminology often detract from a reasoned appraisal of the euthanasia option, especially in those discussions that argue for euthanasia's incorporation into a beneficence-based medical model. "Beneficent euthanasia," assuming there is such a thing, poses special challenges to the traditional provider-patient relationship. These challenges argue for well-defined limits of beneficence and a more equitable distribution of responsiblity between participants. We should not allow technology and terminology to generate an unrealistic portrayal of patient death and its ramifications. Participants need to acknowledge their roles in the decision to kill and the obligations that those roles entail. Perhaps we can reach ethical consensus concerning euthanasia by first reasserting our span of control over the technology that can extend the near-death period and by openly discusssing euthanasia's implications.

Altruism↗

Letting and making death happen, withholding and withdrawing life-support: morally irrelevant distinctions.

The author argues that there is no morally relevant distinction between letting and making death happen, and between withholding and withdrawing life-support. There is a discussion of possible adverse consequences in believing that there are moral distinctions. And then he shows that acknowledging the absence of such a distinction does not necessarily imply any endorsement of active euthanasia.

Ethical Analysis↗