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PubMed1989

Developing theories of the mind: children's and adults' concepts of mental activities.

8-year-olds', 10-year-olds', and adults' concepts of mental activities involved in acts of knowing were examined in an attempt to gain insight into developmental changes in underlying theories of mind. Subjects rated the similarity of how the mind is used in a variety of common activities, each of which primarily involved either memory, comprehension, attention, or inference. Analyses of conceptual structure revealed 2 developmental changes. Between 8 and 10 years of age, children came to see the most important relation among mental activities to be the degree to which they involved memory. Between 10 years of age and adulthood, Comprehension and Attention first appeared as distinct, coherent concepts. At all ages, Memory and Inference were seen as distinct types of mental activities. These findings suggested that a sophisticated understanding of the representational nature of the mind might not be acquired before the latter part of middle childhood and might be mediated by an understanding of the central role played by memory.

Adult↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Relations between maternal input and theory of mind understanding in deaf children.

This study investigates the relationship between theory of mind (ToM) skills in deaf children and input from their hearing mothers. Twenty-two hearing mothers and their deaf children (ages 4-10 years) participated in tasks designed to elicit talk about the mind. The mothers' mental state talk was compared with that of 26 mothers with hearing children (ages 4-6 years). The frequency of mothers' mental talk was correlated with deaf children's performance on ToM tasks, after controlling for effects of child language and age. Maternal sign proficiency was correlated with child language, false belief, and mothers' talk about the mind. Findings are discussed in relation to experiential accounts of ToM development and roles of maternal talk in children's social understanding.

Child↗

PubMed2006

It's the thought that counts: specific brain regions for one component of theory of mind.

Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that representing the contents of other people's thoughts and beliefs depends on a component of reasoning about other minds (theory of mind) that is distinct from the earlier-developing mental-state concepts for goals, perceptions, and feelings. To provide converging evidence, the current study investigated the substrate of the late-developing process in adult brains. Three regions--the right and left temporo-parietal junction and the posterior cingulate--responded selectively when subjects read about a protagonist's thoughts, but not when they read about other subjective, internal states or other socially relevant information about a person. By contrast, the medial prefrontal cortex responded equivalently in all of these story conditions, a result consistent with a broader role for medial prefrontal cortex in general social cognition. These data support the hypothesis that the early- and late-developing components of theory of mind rely on separate psychological and neural mechanisms, and that these mechanisms remain distinct into adulthood.

Adult↗

PubMed1989

The autistic child's theory of mind: a case of specific developmental delay.

In previous tests of the lowest level of a "theory of mind" (i.e. first-order belief attribution), 80% of autistic children were found to be impaired relative to a non-autistic mentally-handicapped control group. The present study examines the 20% of autistic children who have a theory of mind at the lowest level, and tests their ability to use a theory of mind at higher levels (i.e. second-order belief attribution). This autistic subgroup, in comparison to Down's Syndrome and normal control groups, was found to be severely impaired at the higher level. Autism is discussed as a possible case of specific developmental delay.

Adolescent↗

PubMed1996

Theory of mind in non-retarded children with autism and Asperger's syndrome. A research note.

In the present study, 20 non-retarded children with autism and 20 non-retarded children with Asperger's syndrome, individually matched to the group of children with autism, participated. No statistically significant differences between the groups were found in the theory of mind tasks. In fact, the two groups performed almost as well as a group of normal children. These findings suggest that the theory of mind model has its limitations in explaining autism and that children with Asperger's syndrome are not more competent in theory of mind tasks than children with autism within the normal range of intelligence.

Adolescent↗

PubMed1997

Another advanced test of theory of mind: evidence from very high functioning adults with autism or asperger syndrome.

Previous studies have found a subgroup of people with autism or Asperger Syndrome who pass second-order tests of theory of mind. However, such tests have a ceiling in developmental terms corresponding to a mental age of about 6 years. It is therefore impossible to say if such individuals are intact or impaired in their theory of mind skills. We report the performance of very high functioning adults with autism or Asperger Syndrome on an adult test of theory of mind ability. The task involved inferring the mental state of a person just from the information in photographs of a person's eyes. Relative to age-matched normal controls and a clinical control group (adults with Tourette Syndrome), the group with autism and Asperger Syndrome were significantly impaired on this task. The autism and Asperger Syndrome sample was also impaired on Happé's strange stories tasks. In contrast, they were unimpaired on two control tasks: recognising gender from the eye region of the face, and recognising basic emotions from the whole face. This provides evidence for subtle mindreading deficits in very high functioning individuals on the autistic continuum.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2006

Temperature dependence of MinD oscillation in Escherichia coli: running hot and fast.

We observed that the oscillation period of MinD within rod-like and filamentous cells of Escherichia coli varied by a factor of 4 in the temperature range from 20 degrees C to 40 degrees C. The detailed dependence was Arrhenius, with a slope similar to the overall temperature-dependent growth curve of E. coli. The detailed pattern of oscillation, including the characteristic wavelength in filamentous cells, remained independent of temperature. A quantitative model of MinDE oscillation exhibited similar behavior, with an activated temperature dependence of the MinE-stimulated MinD-ATPase rate.

Adenosine Triphosphatases↗

PubMed1990

Minicell-forming mutants of Escherichia coli: suppression of both DicB- and MinD-dependent division inhibition by inactivation of the minC gene product.

We have determined the nucleotide sequence of the minB operon of 10 min mutants of Escherichia coli, characterized by impaired inhibition of polar divisions. These mutants were either sensitive or resistant to the division inhibitor DicB. All the mutations were found to lie in minC or minD, confirming the requirement of both gene products in the process of inhibition of polar sites. Mutations conferring resistance to inhibitor DicB were found exclusively in minC. In agreement with de Boer et al. (P. A. J. de Boer, R. E. Crossley, and L. I. Rothfield, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 87:1129-1133, 1990), these results provide evidence that, in addition to promoting division inhibition with MinD, protein MinC acts in concert with DicB to inhibit division by a second, MinD-independent process.

Alleles↗

PubMed2000

Analysis of MinC reveals two independent domains involved in interaction with MinD and FtsZ.

In Escherichia coli FtsZ assembles into a Z ring at midcell while assembly at polar sites is prevented by the min system. MinC, a component of this system, is an inhibitor of FtsZ assembly that is positioned within the cell by interaction with MinDE. In this study we found that MinC consists of two functional domains connected by a short linker. When fused to MalE the N-terminal domain is able to inhibit cell division and prevent FtsZ assembly in vitro. The C-terminal domain interacts with MinD, and expression in wild-type cells as a MalE fusion disrupts min function, resulting in a minicell phenotype. We also find that MinC is an oligomer, probably a dimer. Although the C-terminal domain is clearly sufficient for oligomerization, the N-terminal domain also promotes oligomerization. These results demonstrate that MinC consists of two independently functioning domains: an N-terminal domain capable of inhibiting FtsZ assembly and a C-terminal domain responsible for localization of MinC through interaction with MinD. The fusion of these two independent domains is required to achieve topological regulation of Z ring assembly.

Adenosine Triphosphatases↗

PubMed2005

Henri Ey's neojacksonism and the psychopathology of disintegrated mind.

The French psychiatrist Henri Ey developed his organo-dynamic theory of the mind function and consciousness 50 years ago incorporating Hughling Jackson's thinking, along with psychiatric and philosophical theorizations by Janet and Bergson. This model has not received the attention it deserved, but recent advances in neuroscience rekindled interest for Ey's theory. By overcoming the Cartesian mind-body dualism and treating the mind-body unit as an inseparable whole, this model opens the way for the integrated treatment of mental disorders. Ey's conceptualization of consciousness as being simultaneously both synchronous and diachronic anticipates current theories of consciousness (Damasio, Edelman, Mesulam).

Consciousness↗

PubMed1981

Eccles's physiological evidence for a self-conscious mind.

Eccles cites three items of physiological evidence for a self-conscious mind: experiments by Libet, showing that consciousness can antedate sensory experience; slow build-up of the readiness potential, showing that the mind is weak; that brain events are scattered, but consciousness is a unity. I argue that none of the three items has any significance: the first is a confusion about the experimental evidence; the second indicates weak physical forces, no mind; the third replaces visible structures by intangible influences. Thus, these physiological arguments do not support the contention that non-physical influences are at work.

Brain↗

PubMed2001

Are we losing our mind?

The individual mind of the patient, and how it works, are the central topics of this plenary address. In psychoanalysis we are always dealing with a mind--a mind with its own particular structure--and this is a fact of singular importance in how we listen to, understand, and communicate with patients. Techniques geared to this view are presented. The author reflects on and challenges some contrasting current views of psychoanalysis as primarily coconstructed or as a relational matrix. Technique according to this view highlights the analyst's subjectivity and actions as central to treatment.

Fear↗

PubMed1996

Children's developing theory of mind.

Studies from the developmental research perspective inform analytic understanding of the neuropsychological preconditions necessary for children's increasing awareness of their own and others' mental lives. Conversely, psychoanalytically informed observations of children's early development demonstrate how the child's emerging understanding of other minds is contextualized in the earliest interactions between parent and child. The notion of a gradually developing understanding of mind that becomes most evident in observational studies between 4 and 6 years of age provides a developmental context for considering children's capacity for internalization, their creation of an inner, psychic reality, and their response to therapeutic interventions during an analytic hour. Significant for psychoanalytic work with children is the suggestion that only after children are able to understand how their own and other's mental states are constructed and how such states are behind all actions and language can they then reflect upon their own thoughts and mental life. Developing a theory of the mind of the other integrates psychoanalytic notions of self-other differentiation, of the development of internalized representations of others, and ultimately of the capacity for self-reflection.

Child, Preschool↗

PubMed1997

Does the mind fall apart in multiple personality disorder? Some proposals based on a psychoanalytic case.

A psychoanalytic study of some of the phenomena of multiple personality disorder (MPD), this paper takes issue with the view that a falling apart, fragmentation, or disaggregation of the mind is at the bottom of MPD's characteristic symptoms. Since first proposed by Janet in 1889, the view that ordinarily integrated parts of the mind separate from the center, accounting for the appearance of separate "selves," has prevailed among workers in this field. The close psychoanalytic study of a case of MPD suggests that, to the contrary, the appearance of multiplicity may derive from an essentially unitary but nonetheless powerful set of organizing fantasies centering on the idea that one's body and mind can be taken over and controlled by persons other than oneself. The data of the case under study suggest, further, that certain of the details of these patients' histories of childhood sexual and physical abuse may be of great importance in explaining the extraordinary organizing power of their fantasies of being occupied and controlled. In this connection, special attention is directed to the very commonly reported experiences of forced violation and the involuntary filling and emptying of their bodies during childhood.

Adult↗

PubMed2005

Integrating mindfulness meditation with cognitive and behavioural therapies: the challenge of combining acceptance- and change-based strategies.

Recent innovations in psychological treatments have integrated mindfulness meditation techniques with traditional cognitive and behavioural therapies, challenging traditional cognitive and behavioural therapists to integrate acceptance- and change-based strategies. This article details how 2 treatments, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy and dialectical behaviour therapy, have met this challenge. We review the integration rationale underlying the 2 treatments, how the treatments combine strategies from each modality to accomplish treatment goals, implications for therapist training, and treatment effectiveness. In addition, we discuss the challenges of assessing the benefits of incorporating acceptance-based strategies. Both therapies have integrated acceptance-based mindfulness approaches with change-based cognitive and behavioural therapies to create efficacious treatments.

Behavior Therapy↗

PubMed2005

Philosophy of mind in the Yogacara Buddhist idealistic school.

After some general introduction remarks on Indian philosophy, this essay deals with the structure of mind in the Yogacara Buddhist idealist school. Mind can be conceived as having two 'parts': the receptacle consciousness, constituted by the vasanas, or 'marks' left by any individual experience, which 'remains' in the mind in an unconscious state; and the function consciousness, constituted by these same vasanas transforming themselves into conscious ideas and representations, which are either of a cognizing ego or of congnized objects and beings and similar to the experiences that gave rise to them. Since a beginningless eternity, vasanas have been produced without anything real corresponding to them, in a fantasmagorical process.

Buddhism↗

PubMed2004

Advanced mind-reading in adults with Asperger syndrome.

This study investigated the mind-reading abilities of 19 adults with Asperger syndrome and 19 typically developing adults. Two static mind-reading tests and a more naturalistic empathic accuracy task were used. In the empathic accuracy task, participants attempted to infer the thoughts and feelings of target persons, while viewing a videotape of the target persons in a naturally occurring conversation with another person. The results are consistent with earlier findings. The empathic accuracy task indicated significant between-group differences, whereas no such differences were found on the static mind-reading tasks. The most innovative finding of the present study is that the inference ability of adults with pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) and controls depends on the focus of the target's thoughts and feelings, and that the empathic accuracy of adults with Asperger syndrome and control adults might be different in terms of quantity and quality.

Adult↗

PubMed2006

Theory of mind and central coherence in adults with high-functioning autism or Asperger syndrome.

The study investigated theory of mind and central coherence abilities in adults with high-functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger syndrome (AS) using naturalistic tasks. Twenty adults with HFA/AS correctly answered significantly fewer theory of mind questions than 20 controls on a forced-choice response task. On a narrative task, there were no differences in the proportion of mental state words between the two groups, although the participants with HFA/AS were less inclined to provide explanations for characters' mental states. No between-group differences existed on the central coherence questions of the forced-choice response task, and the participants with HFA/AS included an equivalent proportion of explanations for non-mental state phenomena in their narratives as did controls. These results support the theory of mind deficit account of autism spectrum disorders, and suggest that difficulties in mental state attribution cannot be exclusively attributed to weak central coherence.

Adult↗