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Compensating for biased selection in health insurance.
The focus of interest in HMOs is shifting from simple encouragement of their growth to the design of systems allowing for choice among alternative plans. Problems of adverse and favorable selection of enrollees may prevent effective multiple choice. A trial system, including enrollee surveys and risk pools, is proposed to create incentives for delivery systems to compete on the basis of efficiency and services rather than on selection.
Measuring the impact of health insurance with a correction for selection bias--a case study of Ecuador.
This article develops and uses methodologies to evaluate the impact of publicly-financed health insurance programmes on the use of health care. Using univariate and bivariate probit estimation techniques, the study tests and corrects for endogeneity resulting from selection bias. Potential endogeneity arises from the choice to be insured, eligibility for insurance, and differences in individuals' health status. The setting for the study is the country of Ecuador. The General Health Insurance (GHI) programme, which primarily covers workers in the formal sector of the economy, is found to have a strong positive association with the use of curative health care after correcting for selection bias, but no significant effect on the use of preventive care. Individuals with severe illnesses who are eligible for GHI have a preference for private health care, and self-select out of the GHI programme. The Seguro Campesino Social (SSC) programme, directed at farming populations, has positive but insignificant associations with both curative and preventive care.
The role of risk adjustment in national health reform.
Efforts to contain health insurance costs through competitive strategies are undermined by the economic incentive facing buyers and sellers to avoid high-risk individuals. To deal with this problem, proponents of competitive strategies, in which cost containment would be achieved by having consumers move to the most efficient health plans, suggest developing risk-assessment methods and using them to make transfer payments from plans enrolling relatively healthier people to plans with relatively sicker ones. Effective risk adjustment is also of interest to payers such as Medicare, large employers offering multiple-choice programs, and risk-bearing providers seeking fair compensation. So far, however, the ability to predict the variability of future medical costs on an individual basis is very limited. In a market in which individuals are free to change plans annually, the potency of current risk-adjustment technology would leave plans with ample incentive to attract healthier people and to avoid sicker people. The state of current risk-assessment methods leads some analysts to advocate a mixed payment system, partly based on a risk-adjusted prospective payment and partly based on retrospective adjustments made once competing plans' actual experiences are known. New York State is trying such an approach. Many analysts emphasize the importance of other insurance reforms and the institutional framework in which risk adjustments might be made as key factors in helping such a process succeed.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)
Patients at risk: health reform and risk adjustment.
The Clinton proposal recognizes the need for successful risk adjustment and calls for the National Health Board to promulgate a risk adjustment formula by 1 April 1995. Unfortunately, risk adjustment technology is primitive; using observable characteristics such as age only slightly ameliorates the flawed incentives of not adjusting at all. Without major improvements in risk adjustment technology we face a trade-off between giving plans an incentive to select good risks and an incentive to produce at lowest cost. Pure capitation maximizes both incentives; pure fee-for-service minimizes both. I suggest experimentation with paying plans partly on the basis of risk-adjusted capitation and partly on the basis of a fee schedule reflecting actual use (partial capitation). In the draft Clinton plan, the option given to alliances not to offer plans priced above 120 percent of the weighted average premium appears to assume better risk adjustment ability than is now possible. This option should be relaxed or abandoned.
Implicit pooling of workers from large and small firms.
Risk pools for small employers have become an integral part of proposals for national health care reform and have been implemented by a number of states. These explicit attempts to pool small employers are occurring at the same time that many small-firm employees obtain health insurance through implicit pooling arrangements as the dependent of a policyholder insured by a large firm. We use data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey to document the extent of implicit pooling arrangements, to examine whether small-firm employees and their dependents are adverse health risks, and to assess the cost implications of pooling small- and large-firm employees and dependents.
Basic health benefits: deciding what to cover.
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Risk selection in the Massachusetts State employee health insurance program.
Using the Diagnostic Cost Group (DCG) model developed from a national sample, we examine biased selection among one fee-for-service (FFS) plan, one preferred provider organization, and several health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in Massachusetts. The proportions of enrollees in low-risk groups are higher in the HMO plans and lower in the FFS plan. The average age in the FFS plan is 9 years greater than that in the HMO plans. Actual premiums are not consistent with risk levels among HMO plans, resulting in gains in some HMO plans and losses in others as high as 20% compared to expected expenses as computed by the DCG model.
Who switches from Medigap to Medicare HMOs?
OBJECTIVE: To determine the factors affecting whether Medigap owners switch to Medicare managed care plans. DATA SOURCES: The primary data were the 1993-1996 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) Cost and Use Files. These were supplemented by data available from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) website. STUDY DESIGN: Individuals on the MCBS files with Medigap coverage in the period 1993-1996 were included in the study. The person-year was the unit of analysis. We used multivariate logistic regression analysis to determine whether or not a Medigap owner switched to a Medicare-managed care plan during a particular year. Independent variables included measures of affordability, need for services, health insurance benefits, sociodemographics, and supply of managed care plans. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We did not detect strong evidence that beneficiaries in poorer health were more likely than others to switch from Medigap coverage to Medicare-managed care. In addition, higher Medigap premiums did not appear to induce beneficiaries to switch into managed care. CONCLUSIONS: We examined selection bias in joining managed care plans among the subset of Medicare beneficiaries who have Medigap policies. No strong evidence of selection bias was found in this population. We conclude that there was no evidence that the Medigap market is becoming prohibitively expensive as a result of unfavorable selection.
A plan for 'responsible national health insurance'.
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A payment method for health insurance purchasing cooperatives.
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Biased selection under an experimental enrollment and marketing Medicare HMO broker.
All studies conducted to date suggest that nearly all Medicare HMOs have experienced favorable risk selection in their Medicare HMO enrollments. While there is little definitive empiric knowledge about the extent to which Medicare HMOs can and do encourage favorable selection through marketing and enrollment activities, it has been speculated that centralizing all such functions through an independent broker could reduce enrollment selection bias. In 1985, the Health Care Financing Administration initiated a three-year demonstration of a HMO broker model in Portland, Oregon, known as Health Choice, Incorporated (HCI). This study reports empiric findings that provide no evidence to support claims of the efficacy of an enrollment brokerage function in reducing Medicare HMO enrollment selection bias.
Design of health insurance purchasing cooperatives.
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Why do we need health alliances?
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Adjusting contributions to address selection bias: three models for employers.
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Genetics revolution hampered by insurance fears.
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Selection bias in HMOs: a review of the evidence.
Early reviews found that health maintenance organizations (HMOs) attracted healthier beneficiaries in the Medicare program and healthier employees in the market for employer-based insurance. This review finds that HMOs still attract healthier Medicare beneficiaries, that HMOs no longer attract healthier employees, and that HMOs attract healthier Medicaid recipients. This review also found conflicting evidence about whether Medicare HMOs are overpaid, no evidence that HMOs are overpaid in the market for employer-based insurance, and evidence that concerns about overpaying Medicaid HMOs have diminished because many states are adopting mandatory programs.
Adjusting the AAPCC (adjusted average per capita cost) for selectivity and selection bias under Medicare risk contracts.
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