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PubMed2000

An examination of graduate students' statistical judgments: statistical and fuzzy set approaches.

The present study examined how statistical significance levels are treated and interpreted by graduate students who use hypothesis-testing in their scientific investigation. To test underlying psychological aspects of hypothesis-testing, the idea of fuzzy set theory was employed to identify the uncertain points in judgments. 34 graduate students in a psychology department made judgments about hypothetical statistical decisions. The results indicated that (1) the majority of these students treated significance levels on a continuum and rated them according to the magnitude of statistical significance; (2) the subjects shifted their decisions based on the types of hypothetical scenarios but not by the sample sizes; instead, they interpreted a smaller sample size as being less reliable. (3) The subjects frequently chose formally used statistical terms, e.g., Significant and Not Significant, more than graduated verbal expressions, e.g., Marginally Significant and Borderline Significant; and (4) the Fuzziness (degree of confidence in decision-making) was dependent on individuals and existed more in the critical points of transition where judgments are most difficult. The Fuzziness Index illustrated the subtle shifts of human decision-making patterns in statistical judgments. Underlying decision uncertainties and difficulties can be illustrated by functions generated from fuzzy set theory, which may more closely resemble human psychological mechanism. This integrative study of fuzzy set theory and behavioral measurements appears to provide a technique that is more natural for examining and understanding imprecise boundaries of human decisions.

Adult↗
PubMed2005

On the speed of intuition: intuitive judgments of semantic coherence under different response deadlines.

Intuition is the ability to judge stimulus properties on the basis of information that is activated in memory but not consciously retrieved. We investigated one central feature of intuitive judgments--namely, their speed. Participants judged whether or not three clue words were coherent in the sense that they were weakly associated with a common fourth concept. To restrict the time available for conscious deliberation of possible solution words, participants had to synchronize their judgments with a response signal appearing at different lags after the clue words. In two experiments, participants discriminated coherent and incoherent triads reliably better than chance, even when they did not consciously retrieve the solution word and the lag between clue words and response signal was as short as 1.5 sec. Results indicate that intuitive judgments can indeed be made very fast and without extended conscious deliberation. Possible mechanisms underlying intuitive judgments are discussed.

Association Learning↗
PubMed2005

How bad is a 10% chance of losing a toe? Judgments of probabilistic conditions by doctors and laypeople.

We presented a Web questionnaire to 139 physicians and medical researchers and 109 laypeople. The subjects made judgments of badness and importance of prevention for eight medical conditions at each of seven different probability levels. By assuming that the response to each of the 56 risks was monotonically related to transformations of the probability and of the disutility of the condition, we could assess the relative effect of probability and disutility on each subject's judgments. Physicians' judgments were more sensitive than laypeople's judgments to changes in probability. Older and female laypeople were less sensitive to probability (and correspondingly, more responsive to differences in severity among medical conditions). Laypeople varied more than physicians in their responsiveness to probability. These results point to general individual differences in the effect of probability on evaluations of medical risks. They may also provide insight into causes and noncauses of physician-patient miscommunication.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2001

Time-to-passage judgments on circular trajectories are based on relative optical acceleration.

Current theories of arrival time have difficulty explaining performance in the common but neglected case of nonlinear approach. Global tau, a variable supposed to guide time-to-passage (TTP) judgments of objects approaching on linear trajectories, does not apply to circular movement. However, TTP judgments are surprisingly accurate in such cases. We simulated movement through a three-dimensional cloud of point-lights on various circular trajectories. Arrival-time judgments were found to be above chance when observers had to determine which of two expansionless targets would pass them first. Similar to the inside bias observed in heading studies on circular trajectories, observers showed a strong bias to select the target on the inside of their own curved motion path as passing by first. Analysis of the projected target motion revealed that targets on the inside had lower optical velocities and relatively high optical acceleration rates. Empirical TTP judgments agreed best with a strategy based on relative optical velocity changes.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

Interevent relationships and judgment under uncertainty: structure determines strategy.

A fundamental empirical question regarding judgments about events is whether experienced absolute frequencies or relative frequencies are relied on when the likelihood of a particular occurrence is judged. The present research explicates the conditions under which people rely on remembered raw absolute frequencies versus on inferred relative frequencies or proportions when making predictions. Participants saw opinion poll results for candidates prior to an election and, on the basis of these, made judgments concerning the likelihood of each candidate's winning this election. Certain candidates demonstrated a high absolute frequency of winning in the polls, whereas other candidates had high relative win frequencies. The results indicated that adults are cognitively flexible with regard to the inputs used in this judgment. Certain stimulus event configurations induced reasoning by way of absolute frequencies, whereas other configurations elicited judgments based on relative frequencies. More specifically, as the relational complexity of the event structure increased and more inferences were required to make predictions, the tendency to rely on absolute, as opposed to relative, frequencies also increased.

Humans↗
PubMed2005

A dissociation between causal judgment and outcome recall.

It has been suggested that causal learning in humans is similar to Pavlovian conditioning in animals. According to this view, judgments of cause reflect the degree to which an association exists between the cause and the effect. Inferential accounts, by contrast, suggest that causal judgments are reasoning based rather than associative in nature. We used a direct measure of associative strength, identification of the outcome with which a cause was paired (cued recall), to see whether associative strength translated directly into causal ratings. Causal compounds AB+ and CD+ were intermixed withA+ and C- training. Cued-recall performance was better for cue B than for cue D; thus, associative strength was inherited by cue B from the strongly associated cue A (augmentation). However, the reverse was observed on the causal judgment measure: Cue B was judged to be less causal than D (cue competition). These results support an inferential over an associative account of causal judgments.

Association↗
PubMed1989

Selectional processes in causality judgment.

Two experiments illustrate the way in which competition between potential causes occurs when subjects are asked to judge the extent to which an action is the cause of an outcome. In the first experiment, it was found that introducing occurrences of the outcome in the absence of the action reduced causality judgments, but this effect was attenuated if these outcomes were signaled by another stimulus. In the second experiment, a delay between the action and the outcome reduced judgments, but this could be abolished by inserting a stimulus between the action and the outcome. The results are discussed in terms of a view of causality judgment that assumes that such judgments are based on associations between the mental representations of the action and the outcome.

Association Learning↗
PubMed1998

The detection model of recognition using know and remember judgments.

The signal detection model for know and remember recognition judgments was tested in two experiments. In Experiment 1, two predictions of the model were tested: (1) that measures of memory sensitivity, A', are equivalent in value when based on either the recognition (know or remember) criterion or on the remember criterion; and (2) that there is a positive correlation between recognition bias and the proportion of know judgments that are hits, but no correlation between recognition bias and proportion of remember hits (Donaldson, 1996). Both predictions were supported by the data. In Experiment 2, the context of test items was manipulated to make it more or less similar to learning context. The detection model requires that memory sensitivity be the same for both recognition and remember judgments, regardless of test context. Alternatively, if remember judgments reflect only the retrieval of episodic information from memory, the two measures of memory sensitivity should become more disparate in value as learning and test context are made more similar. Memory sensitivity was generally the same in value for recognition and remember criteria but different across context conditions, thus supporting the detection model. The nature of the memory continuum used in detection theory is also discussed.

Adult↗
PubMed1990

An odd effect: lengthened reaction times for judgments about odd digits.

Eight experiments are reported that first establish and then explicate a serendipitous finding that judgments about whether digits are odd or even take longer for odd than for even digits. The slowing of judgments about odd digits is more pronounced when digit pairs or triples are used, but is still weakly present when a single digit must be classified. A similar effect is seen when judgments of nouns are based on whether the nouns are the names of living or dead objects. Nouns that name dead objects are judged more slowly than ones that name living objects. The concept "alive" is linguistically marked. Past research has shown that unmarked concepts are processed more rapidly than marked ones. The similarity in the pattern of results when digits and words are judged is used to argue that the slower judgments about odd digits are due to the fact that "odd" is a linguistically marked and "even" a linguistically unmarked concept.

Adult↗
PubMed1994

Preference gives more consistent judgments than oddity only if the task can be modeled as forced choice.

Earlier data showed that subjects presented with two samples of distilled water and one of tap water were significantly more consistent in choosing the tap water as preferred than in identifying it as the odd sample in the set. The results were sometimes interpreted as demonstrating greater sensitivity for hedonic judgments than for oddity judgments. They are now shown to be explained by the statistical properties of the decision rules followed in different judgment tasks. In a new experiment, oddity and preference judgements were obtained in a replication of the original task with extra conditions. In two of the new conditions, the decision structure of a preference task was the same as that for the oddity task; in these conditions, performance was no better than with explicit oddity responses. The Thurstone-Ura model of triangle judgments proposed by Frijters predicts the results as an outcome of the greater statistical power of three-alternative forced choice tests compared with triangular tests. An excellent fit to all the data is given by a model wherein all subjects have the same d' for the difference between the water types but 25% of them prefer distilled water to tap water.

Choice Behavior↗
PubMed1995

A model for realism of confidence judgments: implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination.

In a recent issue of this journal, Björkman, Justlin, and Winman (1993) presented a model of the calibration of subjective confidence judgments for sensory discrimination which they called "subjective distance theory." They proposed that there was a robust underconfidence bias in such judgments, that the model predicted such a bias, and that two different models were needed for the calibration of subjective confidence for cognitive judgments and for sensory ones. This paper addresses issues they raised. It points out that they have not presented a new model, but rather a portion of a more general one, the "decision-variable partition model" originally proposed in Ferrell and McGoey (1980). This paper explores properties of the model and shows, contrary to Björkman, Juslin, and Winman's hypotheses, that the model does not predict underconfidence, that the "hard-easy effect" can be observed with sensory discriminations, and that the model fits not only sensory, but also cognitive judgments.

Attention↗
PubMed1989

Vowel and consonant judgments are not independent when cued by the same information.

Despite many attempts to define the major unit of speech perception, none has been generally accepted. In a unique study, Mermelstein (1978) claimed that consonants and vowels are the appropriate units because a single piece of information (duration, in this case) can be used for one distinction without affecting the other. In a replication, this apparent independence was found, instead, to reflect a lack of statistical power: The vowel and consonant judgments did interact. In another experiment, interdependence of two phonetic judgments was found in responses based on the fricative noise and the vocalic formants of a fricative-vowel syllable. These results show that each judgment made on speech signals must take into account other judgments that compete for information in the same signal. An account is proposed that takes segments as the primary units, with syllables imposing constraints on the shape they may take.

Adult↗
PubMed1999

Remember-know judgments can depend on how memory is tested.

Remember-know judgments reflect the subjective state of awareness that accompanies episodic memory retrieval. We tested an old-new recognition condition, an old-new recognition followed by remember-know judgment condition, and a simultaneous remember-know-new judgment condition. These three conditions were tested for both a short (1-sec) and a long (4.5-sec) study duration. Reassuringly, results from the first two conditions did not differ from each other. Results from the third condition, however, differed from those in the first two conditions at both long and short study durations. Simultaneous consideration of all three alternatives resulted in a markedly liberal response bias, both in recognition detection and in the ascriptions of remember and know judgments. Discussion of the results is framed in terms of the single-process signal detection models that have been proposed to account for these subjective states of awareness.

Humans↗
PubMed1999

Aging and judgments of duration: effects of task complexity and method of estimation.

The effects of aging on judgments of short temporal durations were explored using the prospective paradigm and the methods of verbal estimation and production. Younger and older adults performed a perceptual judgment task at five levels of complexity for periods of 30, 60, and 120 sec. Participants either continued to perform the task for a specified interval (production) or were stopped and then verbally estimated the interval. Older adults gave shorter verbal estimates and longer productions than did younger adults. The methods of verbal estimation and production yielded approximately equal duration judgment ratios once range effects were taken into account. Task complexity had little effect. The major conclusion is that duration judgment ratios decrease from younger to older adults when the intervals are filled with a mental task.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1992

[Preschool children's prosocial judgments and their reasoning in the empathic situations].

The purpose of this study was to examine preschool children's prosocial judgments and their reasoning for prosocial episodes. One hundred children were individually asked to do prosocial judgments and their reasoning for three prosocial episodes: helping, sharing, and comforting. In the episode there was a crying or a normal facial expression of a person in distress under the condition of high and low empathic situations. The results indicated that the crying face and high empathic situation increased the rate of prosocial judgment more than the normal face and low empathic situation, respectively, and older children (5-year-olds) did prosocial judgment than younger ones (4-year-olds). Furthermore, the crying face induced the empathic reasoning, especially in the high empathic situation. These results supported that preschool children were able to use the empathic reasoning reflected in the negative facial expression and the cause of distress of the victim.

Child Behavior↗
PubMed2000

[Knowledge used in duration judgments of two moving objects].

Forty-nine undergraduates observed two cars traveling in the same direction on a CRT display for various duration. They then chose the car that they believed had run longer, and gave the reason for their choice. There were three types of tasks. Correct judgment was possible for the first type, by logically applying either of two pieces of knowledge about duration: "duration equals temporal end point minus temporal start point" (Knowledge alpha) or "duration equals distance divided by speed" (Knowledge beta). Knowledge alpha alone was useful for the second type, while only Knowledge beta led to correct judgment for the third. Main results were as follows: (1) Undergraduates were more likely to use Knowledge alpha than beta regardless of the types. (2) None of repeatedly making judgment, thinking about reasons for judgment, or receiving failure feedback was very helpful making participants become aware of necessity of using Knowledge beta for the third type. (3) Only some 20% of undergraduates were able to use proper knowledge specifically required for each type.

Adult↗
PubMed2004

[Effects of mere subliminal exposure on trait judgments and the role of stereotyped knowledge].

This study investigated the effects of repeated exposures to male and female targets on trait impressions and the role of stereotyped knowledge for the target's social category in impression formation process. The participants were repeatedly exposed to slides of male and female faces for subliminal durations. For each of 12 pairs containing both previously presented slide and newly presented slide, the participants made forced-choice liking judgments (Experiment 1), trait judgments (Experiment 2) and recognition judgments (Experiments 1 and 2). It was found that participants' attitude toward the targets became more positive, even though target recognition was not significantly greater than the chance level. Yet, when the dimension of judgment was stereotypically associated with the target's social category, exposure effects were obtained for the targets whose social category and its dimension were inferentially matched, but not obtained for the targets whose social category and its dimension were not inferentially matched. Some theoretical implications of the role of social category information in the mere exposure phenomenon are discussed.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

On being sad and mistaken: mood effects on the accuracy of thin-slice judgments.

A series of studies explored how sadness impacts the accuracy of social judgments. In Study 1, induced sadness led to reduced accuracy in judgments of teacher effectiveness from brief samples of nonverbal behavior (thin slices). In Study 2, sad participants showed reduced accuracy in judging relationship type from thin slices as well as diminished judgmental efficiency. Study 3 revealed that higher Beck Depression Inventory scores were associated with diminished accuracy on the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity. Finally, Study 4 tested the possibility that sadness impairs accuracy by promoting a more deliberative information-processing style. As expected, accuracy was higher among participants in a sad mood condition who completed the judgment task while simultaneously performing a distracting cognitive load task.

Affect↗