Search PubMed⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search PubMed

Results for “Antitrust Laws”

Search indexed PubMed citations on genomics, clinical trials, systematic reviews and public health. Explore titles, authors and supplied subject terms, then open the PubMed record.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 361 records · Page 20Linked to original sources

Ambulatory surgery centers--current legal issues 2004 (Part 2).

This article covers several of the emerging issues related to ASCs, the anti-kickback statute and safe harbors, other regulations and relevant court decisions. The ASC Safe Harbors raise several concerns either because they are vague, silent, or provide little guidance as to their requirements. Perhaps the most challenging question under the ASC safe harbor relates to the handling of physicians who do not comply with the various safe harbor tests. As discussed, an ASC should address early on whether physicians who fail to meet or comply with the safe harbor will be redeemed from the venture. In redeeming such physicians, it is important to consider whether the company's operating agreement or shareholder agreement provides for redemption upon such event and whether the redemption will lead to litigation or compliance risks. Along the same lines, since it is illegal to provide any form of value in exchange for referrals under the anti-kickback statute, share sales at below fair market value may be viewed as an illegal kickback in exchange for referrals. Thus, in terms of adding physician owners, a number of guidelines should be followed. An ASC should also carefully consider situations in which it waives or discounts co-payments or deductibles. The safest course for a provider remains to collect the entire co-payment and deductible amounts from patients. Moreover, in the case of Medicare and Medicaid patients, an ASC should never waive or discount co-payments and deductibles unless the patient demonstrates financial hardship. Either way, such a waiver or discount should only be in accord with an applicable charity care or discount policy. A new issue involving the anti-kickback statue, state and federal self referral laws, and Medicare regulations, has gained attention as ASCs are increasingly finding themselves approached by third party vendors to enter into an arrangement, where the vendor owns the equipment and bills a third-party payor for the technical component of the procedure performed with the equipment, and the vendor then pays the ASC a fee for its lease of ASC space to house the equipment. These types of relationships can raise several legal compliance concerns. An ASC should understand that the arrangement could jeopardize its state ASC license and its Medicare certification even though the arrangement does not involve Medicare certified procedures or Medicare patients. Furthermore, this type of business venture might not comply with state and federal self referral laws. ASCs are also increasingly facing situations where a provider performs a procedure for which there is no facility charge for the ASC, but the physician is receiving a professional fee from Medicare. In this situation, ASCs should implement a policy, similar to the example provided in this article, to avoid even the appearance of providing an inducement or reward for referrals of Medicare or Medicaid business by requiring physicians to pay the Center a fee, consistent with fair market value, for the use of the Center for non-Covered Procedures or for performing multiple procedures within the same operative session. Lastly, as touched upon by this article, in the joint venture context, ASCs must take into account several guidelines in order to steer clear from risks associated with tax-exempt entities as an investor and antitrust price fixing issues. Whether a joint venture, of which a tax exempt entity is an investor, is deemed organized and operated in furtherance of the charitable purposes of a tax-exempt partner as set forth in Section 501(c)(3) of the Code depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Generally, a joint venture will satisfy the guidelines if the tax-exempt investor in the joint venture retains sufficient control over the joint venture to ensure that the joint venture furthers the charitable purposes of the tax-exempt investor and adequately serves the community. In the ASC physician hospital joint venture arena, the principal antitrust concern relates to potential claims of price fixing. Where a hospital is a partner in a joint venture, the hospital and joint venture must take action to assure that the pricing and negotiations of the hospital and the ASC are handled separately. In all of these situations, ASCs and their investors must pay close attention and stay current of the safe harbor concepts, as well as the other regulations, guidelines, and court decisions discussed in this article in order to avoid potential regulatory and litigation risks.

Ambulatory Surgical Procedures↗

Learning to love the state action doctrine.

The state action doctrine receives relatively little attention in the Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice 2004 report on competition in the health care sector. Not surprisingly, the report focuses primarily on urging states to reconsider specific laws that tend to restrict competition in health care markets but that are clearly shielded by the state action doctrine. Relatively little attention is given to the interpretation of the doctrine itself. This article employs the twin themes of institutional choice and market failure to evaluate a number of interpretive proposals affecting the state action doctrine that were available to, but not taken up by, the agencies. It also proposes using the state action doctrine to ease the burden on courts in market-failure cases in which there is an obvious threat to competition and the alternative of publicly accountable regulatory action is available.

Antitrust Laws↗

The Evanston initial decision: is there a future for patient flow analysis?

This Article analyzes the October 2005 Initial Decision of the Federal Trade Commission Administrative Law Judge ordering Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation to divest Highland Park Hospital on the grounds that the January 2000 merger of the entities violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In particular, this Article focuses on the ALJ's discussion of the use of patient flow analysis and the Elzinga-Hogarty test in defining relevant markets in hospital merger cases. Despite the ALJ's explicit rejection of the Elzinga-Hogarty Test and patient flow analysis as irrelevant and inappropriate in defining markets in the highly differentiated Hospital market, the author concludes that the ALJ's rejection of patient flow analysis likely was a response to misplaced and over-reliance on patient flow analysis by a number of courts in past prospective government challenges to hospital mergers as evidenced by the fact that the ALJ's analysis of competition and competitive effects relied upon, and thereby implicity endorsed, the use of patient flow analysis for certain purposes. Finally, the author concludes that patient flowanalysis, when used appropriately, should continue to be used as a preliminary step in geographic market definition and competitive effects analysis.

Antitrust Laws↗

Tacit collusion among hospitals in price competitive markets.

Horizontal and vertical mergers, and coalition and network building activity have recently escalated in the US hospital industry in response to actual and threatened increases in competition. Parties to this industry's consolidation state that increased efficiency is the primary motive. However, increased consolidation may lead to increased awareness of inter-dependence, and facilitate 'conscious parallelism', or tacit collusion. In conjunction with this, selective contracting practices by payors with hospitals for negotiated prices may have increased the awareness of interdependence among price-competing hospitals. We posit that cost asymmetries arising from first-mover advantages to merged hospitals and multihospital chain members may be used strategically in local markets to facilitate tacit arrival at profit maximizing prices. Thus, hospital mergers and acquisitions which enhance efficiency in the short run may not yield net gains to society in the long run, as they may alter incentives which parameterize the potential for implicit cooperation. This outcome depends upon mitigating local market conditions, such as capacity utilization and market power held by payors. The current view that safeguarding emerging price competition is important necessitates careful analysis of how merger is likely to affect bargaining power between hospitals and purchasers. This complexity precludes the use of simple antitrust rules or guidelines in this industry.

Antitrust Laws↗

Health economics research and antitrust enforcement.

Antitrust analysis is typically very fact intensive, and enforcement outcomes always depend on the circumstances in particular markets. Nonetheless, there are issues of broad antitrust significance, and it is in these areas that health economics can make important contributions to enforcement policy. Indeed, health economics has already provided valuable guidance to antitrust enforcers in some areas. For example, when antitrust was first applied to hospital mergers in the early 1980s, it was sometimes argued that competition among hospitals was inherently perverse, inflating rather than restraining costs and prices. But studies of the 'California experience' with selective contracting and more careful assessment of the 'medical arms race' hypothesis provided persuasive support for applying standard antitrust presumptions to health care markets. Important new issues continue to arise. Some come from new challenges of standard presumptions in antitrust analysis, while others are attributable to changes in the rapidly evolving health care markets. These issues present new opportunities for health economists to provide guidance to antitrust enforcers and the courts. Guidance is most valuable when researchers recognize the key issues and understand the methodology with which antitrust analysts tackle competitive problems. The accompanying articles in this special issue are important contributions in these regards. In this article, we point to two recently litigated cases to highlight still other issues in which additional theoretical and empirical work by health care economists could be helpful in informing antitrust decision makers.

Antitrust Laws↗

Emerging issues in the antitrust definition of healthcare markets.

Managed care has shifted purchasing decisions from patients towards payers. While this shift has been associated with increased price competition in provider markets, we believe that it may enhance the potential for consumer injury from mergers in geographic markets previously considered immune to antitrust concerns (e.g. suburban components of large metropolitan areas). In addition, recent changes also increase concerns about mergers in product submarkets such as tertiary care.

Antitrust Laws↗

HMO mergers and Medicare: the antitrust issues.

This paper presents a theoretical framework to predict the effects that may arise from mergers in the rapidly-growing Medicare HMO market. We argue that mergers of large Medicare HMOs should be targeted for antitrust investigation because there are significant barriers into this market. The recent merger of PacifiCare and FHP is used to illustrate the potential antitrust issues raised by Medicare HMO mergers.

Antitrust Laws↗

Exclusive contracts between hospitals and physicians: the antitrust issues.

Exclusive contracts between hospitals and physicians are common. In most instances they raise no anticompetitive concerns. However, especially in rural markets, exclusive contracts may be used to foreclose actual and potential competitors and thereby decrease competition. The courts should weigh the benefits and costs of exclusive contracts in these areas.

Antitrust Laws↗

Do competition and managed care improve quality?

In recent years, the US health care industry has experienced a rapid growth of managed care, formation of networks, and an integration of hospitals. This paper provides new insights about the quality consequences of this dynamic in US hospital markets. I empirically investigate the impact of managed care and hospital competition on quality using in-hospital complications as quality measures. I use random and fixed effects, and instrumental variable fixed effect models using hospital panel data from up to 16 states in the 1992-1997 period. The paper has two important findings: First, higher managed care penetration increases the quality, when inappropriate utilization, wound infections and adverse/iatrogenic complications are used as quality indicators. For other complication categories, coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant. These findings do not support the straightforward view that increases in managed care penetration are associated with decreases in quality. Second, both higher hospital market share and market concentration are associated with lower quality of care. Hospital mergers have undesirable quality consequences. Appropriate antitrust policies towards mergers should consider not only price and cost but also quality impacts.

Antitrust Laws↗

Consumer information, price, and nonprice competition among hospitals.

The results of the empirical analysis in this paper indicate that broadly defined hospital quality declines in more concentrated markets. The direction of the effect of concentration on hospital charges is smaller and the direction is less clear. Prices are little, if any, lower in more concentrated markets. Hospital price-cost margins are higher in more concentrated markets. Higher concentration discourages price competition. The data do not support the increasing monopoly theory. Further, since hospital price-cost margins do not appear to remain constant, we must reject the redundant resources theory as well, though its stress on nonprice competition rings true. The empirical results are consistent with the traditional antitrust theory. In addition, consumer information plays a surprisingly important role. Consumer information is important in explaining hospital prices, and less important in hospital quality. Consumers are not passive; they do play a role in hospital choice. It is likely that more recent innovations in health insurance will increase consumer awareness. With an increase in consumer copayments, and more active insurer contracting, it is likely that future hospital competition is more likely to stress price, and future antitrust activity could lead to price reductions in addition to declining hospital price-cost margins.

Antitrust Laws↗

Antitrust and peer review.

An antitrust action against a physician is unlikely if the following guidelines are followed: Do not agree with competing independent doctors on any terms of price, quantity, or quality, or the patients one is willing to serve, the location from which one is permitted to draw patients, or where one will locate offices. Also, do not agree to refuse to offer services to alternate delivery systems. Generally, those who serve on peer review committees are protected if decisions are reached after effort has been made to obtain the facts of the case, after adequate notice and fair hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved, and when the action has been warranted by the facts and is in the furtherance of health care. An attorney who specializes in antitrust should be engaged. Members of peer review committees should not be in a position to benefit from the decision. They should document all transgressions of the accused, treat the accused fairly, and give him or her the opportunity to have due process.

Antitrust Laws↗

The competitive effects of horizontal mergers in the hospital industry: a closer look.

Woolley (1989) attempted to analyze the competitive impact of horizontal hospital mergers using the 'event study' method. Woolley characterized his results as consistent with traditional 'oligopoly' theories of market behavior. We scrutinize in detail a large number of his events, however, and find that most either generated concentration increases too small to plausibly produce market power, or could not have conferred monopoly returns on firms improperly characterized as rivals. Accordingly, any observed abnormal returns are likely attributable to some other cause; we suggest some alternative interpretations of his results. Our paper highlights the need for care in the selection of events and the identification of rivals when applying the event study method to the analysis of mergers.

Antitrust Laws↗