Are you ready for the next outbreak? An exercise in legal preparedness.
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Public health affords important and exciting career opportunities for veterinarians. The Epidemic Intelligence Service Program (EIS) of the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC) is a two-year post-graduate program of service and on-the-job training for health professionals, including veterinarians, who are interested in careers in epidemiology and public health. EIS serves as a major point of entry into the public health arena. Veterinarians applying to the program must have a Master of Public Health or equivalent degree, or demonstrated public health experience or course work. EIS officers are assigned to positions at CDC headquarters or in state and local health departments. During two-year assignments, they are trained in applied epidemiology, biostatistics, conducting outbreak investigations, emergency preparedness and response, and scientific communications. They conduct epidemiologic outbreak and other investigations, perform applied research and public health surveillance, serve the epidemiologic needs of state health departments, present at scientific and medical conferences, publish in the scientific literature, and disseminate vital public health information to the media and the public. EIS officers apply their training and skills to actual public health problems and issues, establish mentorships with recognized experts from CDC and other national and international health agencies, and travel domestically and internationally. Since 1951, 195 veterinarians have graduated from the program and gone on to make substantial contributions to public health in positions with federal, state, or local governments, academia, industry, and non-governmental organizations.
The emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases since the eradication of smallpox has had a direct impact on preparedness for a deliberately-caused smallpox outbreak, should one occur. The emergence of HIV has placed restrictions on the safe and effective use of smallpox vaccines and made the need for vaccinia immune globulin important for outbreak control. At the same time, the threat of international spread of emerging and re-emerging infections has prompted global investments in surveillance and response mechanisms such as the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), a mechanism that would enhance the world's collaboration in smallpox containment as it did during the recent outbreak of SARS. Though global preparedness for a deliberately-caused smallpox outbreak has increased with the creation of GOARN, it does not replace the need for increased national public health investment to expand surge capacity for the management of patients and their contacts and to strengthen emergency communication networks to ensure effective response.
Vaccination of susceptible animals against foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a well established strategy for helping to combat the disease. Traditionally, FMD vaccine has been used to control a disease incursion in countries where the disease has been endemic rather than in countries considered free of the disease. In 2001, the use of vaccine was considered but not implemented in the United Kingdom (1), whereas vaccine was used to help to control FMD in The Netherlands (2,3). Canadian contingency plans provide for the use of vaccine; Canada is a member of the North American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank, which could supply vaccine if needed. This article explains why Canada might use FMD vaccine to combat an outbreak and the factors that are relevant to the disposal of vaccinated animals and their products. It concludes that vaccination is an important mechanism in Canada's preparedness for an outbreak of FMD and that products from vaccinated animals are safe for human consumption.
In Singapore, the military was actively involved in the containment of the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) last year. The outbreak started in February 2003 with three Singapore travellers to Hong Kong. At that time, nothing was known about the aetiological agent of the atypical pneumonia that was termed SARS. Unfortunately one of the travellers was a super-spreader, defined as a person with high efficiency for virus transmission, and was responsible for the expansion of the national outbreak. Not only was the Singapore military involved in contact tracing of personnel and enforcement of home quarantine, military-affiliated research institutes were also involved in providing diagnostic support. This review reconstructs the events that took place during the SARS outbreak, focusing on the special support arising from complementing the military-affiliated laboratory with the public health laboratory. A description of the diagnostic findings is provided in chronological order. The review ends with lessons Singapore learnt from the SARS crisis, stressing the importance of national preparedness for future outbreaks.
Marburg virus disease (MVD) is re-emerging across Africa as a high-consequence zoonosis shaped by expanding ecological suitability, repeated spillover, and uneven surveillance capacity. This review synthesizes current evidence on the ecological, epidemiological, and operational determinants of contemporary Marburg virus (MARV) emergence. We conceptualize MVD as an ecological-emergence system produced by interactions among reservoir-host biology, environmental change, human exposure, health-system readiness, and mobility, rather than as a series of isolated outbreaks. Recent detections in multiple African regions indicate wider enzootic circulation than previously recognized and support repeated, reservoir-associated introductions from distributed ecological foci. Spillover risk is heightened where mining, land-use change, agricultural encroachment, settlement growth, climate-sensitive habitat disruption, and population movement increase contact with Egyptian rousette bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus) and contaminated roost environments. Following primary spillover, diagnostic delays, fragmented surveillance, limited laboratory decentralization, healthcare-associated transmission, and mobility-linked exposure can enable outbreak amplification and delayed recognition. Serological findings further suggest possible "shadow epidemiology," with unrecognized or mild MARV infections occurring outside confirmed outbreak chains. Critical preparedness gaps persist in ecological risk mapping, longitudinal reservoir surveillance, decentralized molecular diagnostics, genomic sequencing, data integration, and cross-border early warning. Future preparedness should move beyond reactive containment toward integrated One Health approach combining predictive ecological surveillance, rapid community-level detection, real-time genomics, infection prevention, risk communication, and regional coordination to identify spillover early and prevent human transmission.
BACKGROUND: Monkeypox (mpox), caused by monkeypox virus (MPXV), re-emerged as a major global public health concern in 2022, resulting in widespread transmission beyond traditionally endemic regions. As of March 2026, 181,164 confirmed cases and 492 deaths had been reported across 144 countries globally. The unprecedented geographic spread of the outbreak highlighted important knowledge gaps in disease surveillance, prevention, and control. Given the ongoing global circulation of MPXV and the risk of future outbreaks, this review provides a comprehensive synthesis of current evidence on MPXV and mpox. METHODS: The literature, surveillance data, and public health reports available up to March 2026 were systematically reviewed and synthesized. The review comprehensively assesses viral biology, genetic diversity, epidemiology, transmission dynamics, clinical manifestations, pathogenesis, laboratory diagnosis, infection during pregnancy, host immune responses, immune evasion mechanisms, therapeutic interventions, and prevention strategies. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: Globally, the decline in public immunity following the cessation of routine smallpox vaccination, together with ongoing viral evolution, may have contributed to the resurgence of mpox. Advances in genomic surveillance, diagnostics, and public health preparedness have strengthened outbreak response; however, important gaps remain in understanding long-term immunity and optimal treatment strategies. This review summarizes current evidence on MPXV and mpox and highlights priorities for future research and public health interventions.
Enterovirus D68 (EV-D68) has re-emerged over the past decade as a significant respiratory pathogen associated with severe respiratory disease and acute flaccid myelitis. Its circulation has typically followed a biennial pattern, with predominance in late summer and early fall, a pattern that was temporarily disrupted during the COVID-19 pandemic. Surveillance in 2025 revealed off-season circulation of EV-D68. This study describes the genomic characteristics of the 2025 EV-D68 viruses and the clinical features of affected patients. Between May and December 2025, remnant respiratory specimens positive for rhinovirus/enterovirus were screened for EV-D68 and subjected to whole-genome sequencing. Phylogenetic analyses were performed using maximum-likelihood methods. Recombination was assessed using subgenomic phylogenies, SimPlot similarity and BootScan analyses, and read-level inspection. Among 1,321 patients tested, 147 (11.1%) were EV-D68-positive, and 119 (81.0%) yielded complete genomes. EV-D68 positivity increased in July 2025, peaked in August (~21%), and remained elevated through September and October, exceeding levels observed in 2024. Patients had a median age of 36 years, with infections disproportionately affecting older adults. Phylogenetic analysis demonstrated exclusive circulation of subclade A2. Five genomes formed a distinct recombinant lineage (A2-Re). Subgenomic phylogenies showed clustering with A2 viruses in the P1 region and with B3 viruses in the P2-P3 regions. SimPlot and BootScan analyses identified a recombination breakpoint near the 2A/2B junction (~nt 3,700). The recombinant lineage was associated with temporally clustered cases in September-October. These findings demonstrate recombination between distinct EV-D68 subclades and underscore the importance of whole-genome surveillance for accurate viral characterization. Continued genomic monitoring is essential for detecting emerging variants with potential implications for transmissibility, pathogenicity, and public health preparedness.IMPORTANCEThis study highlights an increased off-season circulation of Enterovirus D68 (EV-D68) and a higher burden of disease in adults in 2025. The identification of a novel A2-B3 recombinant lineage provides evidence of ongoing viral evolution through recombination, a mechanism that may alter transmissibility, virulence, or immune responses. Detection of this lineage in temporally clustered cases suggests local transmission and underscores the potential for rapid spread of newly emerged variants. These findings emphasize the limitations of partial genomic approaches and the critical role of whole-genome sequencing in accurately characterizing circulating strains and identifying recombination events. Enhanced genomic surveillance is essential to detect emerging variants in real time, inform diagnostic assay performance, and support public health responses. Continued monitoring of EV-D68 evolution will be important for anticipating changes in disease burden, guiding clinical awareness, and strengthening preparedness for future outbreaks.
The generation of data through disease surveillance and notification system is critical to appropriate planning and implementation of disease control programmes, outbreak investigation, emergency preparedness and response. Health workers therefore need to be trained, retrained and updated on the principles and practice of disease surveillance and notification. This quasi-experimental study compared a study and control group "before and after" an intervention (training programme) in the study group. The Experimental and control LGA's were selected using a multistage, stratified random sampling technique. Overall, three LGA's were selected and enrolled in each of the groups. In each of the selected LGA's, all functional health facilities and personnel that fulfilled the inclusion criteria were then included in the study. The total number of participants in the experimental and control groups were 73 and 71 respectively at baseline. The proportion of personnel who were aware of the surveillance system increased from 35.6% to 91.9% (p=0.00) and the mean knowledge score increased from 0.85+/-1.38SD to 6.152.64SD (p=0.00) post intervention in the experimental group. The percentage completeness was 2.3% before and 52.0% after (p-0.00), while the percentage timeliness was 0.0% before and 42.9% after (p=0.00) in the experimental group. These statistically significant differences were however not demonstrated in the control group. Training therefore had a positive effect on health personnel knowledge, reporting requirement and the timeliness and completeness of the disease surveillance and notification system.
The involvement and expertise of infectious disease physicians, microbiologists, and public health practitioners are essential to the early detection and management of epidemics--both those that are naturally occurring, such as the 1999 outbreak of West Nile virus (WN virus) in New York City, and those that might follow covert acts of bioterrorism. The experience with the WN virus outbreak offers practical lessons in outbreak detection, laboratory diagnosis, investigation, and response that might usefully influence planning for future infectious disease outbreaks. Many of the strategies used to detect and respond to the WN virus outbreak resemble those that would be required to confront other serious infectious disease threats, such as pandemic influenza or bioterrorism. We provide an overview of the critical elements needed to manage a large-scale, fast-moving infectious disease outbreak, and we suggest ways that the existing public health capacity might be strengthened to ensure an effective response to both natural and intentional disease outbreaks.
Viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) is defined as virus infections that usually cause pyrexia and hemorrhagic symptoms with multiple organ failure. VHF includes following viral infections: Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF), Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF), Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF) and Lassa fever. In particular, the causative agents of EHF, MHF, CCHF, and Lassa fever are Ebola, Marburg, CCHF, Lassa viruses, respectively, and regarded as biosafety level-4 pathogens because of their high virulence to humans. Recently, relatively large outbreaks of EHF and MHF have occurred in Africa, and areas of EHF- and MHF-outbreaks seem to be expanding. Although outbreaks of VHF have not been reported in Japan, there is a possibility that the deadly hemorrhagic fever viruses would be introduced to Japan in future. Therefore, preparedness for possible future outbreaks of VHF is necessary in areas without VHF outbreaks.
Responding to agricultural bioterrorism with pathogenic agents that are communicable from animals to humans (zoonotic diseases) requires effective coordination of many organizations, both inside and outside of government. Action must be simultaneously taken to address public health concerns, respond to the agricultural dimensions of the event, and carry out the necessary law enforcement investigation. As part of a project focused on examining public health preparedness in Georgia, an exercise was carried out in July 2005 examining the intentional introduction of avian influenza (H5N1) in commercial poultry operations. The attack scenario, which was written to occur during an already severe human influenza season, enabled exploration of a range of issues associated with public health preparedness for major disease outbreaks including pandemic influenza, coordination of a multiagency response operation at multiple levels of government, and effective management of interdisciplinary response activities. The exercise is described and broader policy lessons regarding preparedness planning are discussed.
AIMS: This paper aims to summarise the growing literature concerning an imminent future influenza pandemic, from the primary care perspective. METHODS: Sources of literature were scanned and relevant material short-listed for further study from: (1) WHO and CDC websites; (2) PUBMED; and (3) papers mentioned in references of full-text papers. RESULTS: Outbreaks of avian influenza in Asia and elsewhere indicate that the world may be moving towards a pandemic influenza outbreak. The WHO Global Influenza Preparedness Plan 2005 unifies the world with the vision of tackling the next pandemic influenza outbreak as a global effort that includes healthcare provider and patient alike. CONCLUSIONS: We need to update ourselves and keep our staff and patients informed to make infection control measures part of our daily activities. In areas where there are contacts with animal reservoirs of influenza A, patients need to be reminded that they need to protect themselves from being infected.
A recent surge in the general awareness of the extent of disasters has increased concern over the adequacy of our state of preparedness for these events. Outbreaks of infectious disease after a disaster may have significant societal impacts. In preparation, rescuers must anticipate and identify infectious risks, isolate and treat the individuals with infections, and institute measures that will prevent the further spread of infectious diseases. Epidemiological factors may contribute to the spread of infectious disease after a given disaster. A simple microbiological laboratory in the field may be helpful in attempting to direct therapy at specific infectious etiologies. Prior post-disaster experience suggests that mass immunization may not always be valuable in protecting against disease spread acutely, although immunizations may be considered in a limited number of situations. Disaster medical personnel should prepare themselves with appropriate vaccinations and remain in good health; new pathogens must not be brought in by well-meaning relief personnel. Disasters often occur in a Third-World setting where resources are limited and often compromised. Complete recovery from infectious disease outbreaks and restoration of infection control practices may take years when a Third-World population has suffered a major disaster.
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While advances in molecular epidemiology and computational modeling have enhanced our capacity to track pathogen evolution, the accurate reconstruction of spatiotemporal transmission dynamics remains essential for developing epidemic preparedness frameworks and implementing outbreak response measures. Structured coalescent models offer a phylogeographic framework by restricting lineage coalescence events to geographically proximate host populations. Although the Bayesian structured coalescent approximation (BASTA) provides a tractable approach, contemporary phylogeographic analyses involving dozens of geographic localities and hundreds to thousands of viral genomes substantially exceed the computational capacity of existing implementations. The BASTA likelihood scales cubically with deme count and quadratically with sequence count due to matrix exponentiation and pairwise coalescent probability calculations. Here, we introduce a comprehensive algorithmic restructuring of the structured coalescent likelihood that eliminates redundancies, optimizes memory access, and exposes parallelization opportunities. Our approach reorganizes computations along three dimensions: (i) independent calculation of deme-transition probability matrices across time intervals; (ii) simultaneous evaluation of partial likelihood vectors within temporal slices; and (iii) concurrent aggregation of coalescent probabilities. Algorithmic restructuring cuts average coalescent likelihood computation by 7-8 fold, and parallelization further boosts performance to 10-26 fold, enabling joint phylogeographic analyses of dengue virus across 10 South American countries and H5N1 avian influenza across 20 Eurasian regions to finish in a fraction of prior time. This computational efficiency also enables comparison between backward-in-time structured coalescent approximations and forward-in-time phylogeographic methods, revealing that the former provides appropriately conservative posterior estimates, particularly at intermediate phylogenetic depths. We integrate our implementation into the popular BEAST X and BEAGLE software packages, with an accompanying interface in BEAUti X to easily set up the analyses, providing researchers with an accessible and scalable tool for real-time phylogeographic surveillance of rapidly evolving pathogens.
Smallpox has played a notorious role in human history. It has been the cause of millions of deaths throughout the centuries, yet, it was the first infectious disease that was ever eradicated thanks to a worldwide program. Smallpox vaccine, manufactured from the vaccinia virus, was the first vaccine ever produced. Recent bioterrorism events in the USA have brought smallpox back into the limelight, both medically and politically, because of the fear of the return of this horrific disease through the unscrupulous actions of terrorists who might spread variola virus. This article presents the history of smallpox, emphasizing its clinical variants. We also review the treatment of the disease, especially the vaccine--its efficacy and its disadvantages, and the public health measures that must be taken in order to control the disease. In conclusion, we will discuss the possibility of the resurgence of smallpox and global preparedness for such an outbreak.
The outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, clearly signaled an end to the days when physicians and researchers could work in relative obscurity on problems of international importance, and it provided many lessons to the international public health and scientific communities. In particular, the outbreak signaled a need for stronger infectious disease surveillance and control worldwide, for improved international preparedness to provide support when similar outbreaks occur, and for accommodating the needs of the press in providing valid information. A need for more broad-based international health regulations and electronic information systems within the World Health Organization also became evident, as did the realization that there are new and more diverse partners able to rapidly respond to international outbreaks. Finally, a need for continued and coordinated Ebola research was identified, especially as concerns development of simple and valid diagnostic tests, better patient management procedures, and identification of the natural reservoir.