Lie detection and language comprehension.
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Generations of brain-imaging studies have provided increasingly detailed information about the complexity of human behavior, but few lines of investigations better illustrate the intricacy of the brain's workings than the neural processes involved in lying or deceiving. And perhaps none make clearer the difficulty of accurately distinguishing between truthfulness and untruthfulness with new imaging technology. Moreover, we must ask ourselves if we are laying a foundation of risk regarding the very idea of creating brain maps of behavior and personal identity and whether these maps are ready for such real-world applications as law, employment, and insurance. When technology of this kind moves out of the hands of researchers and becomes available for practical uses, the lives of individuals and future of our society may be profoundly affected.
In Experiment 1, we examined whether three interview styles used by the police, accusatory, information-gathering and behaviour analysis, reveal verbal cues to deceit, measured with the Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) and Reality Monitoring (RM) methods. A total of 120 mock suspects told the truth or lied about a staged event and were interviewed by a police officer employing one of these three interview styles. The results showed that accusatory interviews, which typically result in suspects making short denials, contained the fewest verbal cues to deceit. Moreover, RM distinguished between truth tellers and liars better than CBCA. Finally, manual RM coding resulted in more verbal cues to deception than automatic coding of the RM criteria utilising the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software programme. In Experiment 2, we examined the effects of the three police interview styles on the ability to detect deception. Sixty-eight police officers watched some of the videotaped interviews of Experiment 1 and made veracity and confidence judgements. Accuracy scores did not differ between the three interview styles; however, watching accusatory interviews resulted in more false accusations (accusing truth tellers of lying) than watching information-gathering interviews. Furthermore, only in accusatory interviews, judgements of mendacity were associated with higher confidence. We discuss the possible danger of conducting accusatory interviews.
Proponents of vocal stress analysis systems argue that they are able to detect spoken deception by analysis of "stress" in the voice signal. Presumably, they do so by examining traces made by laryngeal microtremors which, they claim exist in the voice, are associated with stress, and ultimately are associated with lying. However, most research that seeks to identify the relationships between microtremors and laryngeal function has produced negative results, and data on the ability of voice analyzers to detect stress from speech--or to identify spoken deception--have been negative or "mixed" in nature. Since perspectives based on available results leave a number of questions unanswered, a series of experiments has been undertaken. The first was focused on the basic acoustic/temporal correlates of stress in voice (the subject of an earlier report), the second on examination of stress by commercial voice analyzers, and the third on the detection of relatively high-risk lies by this same type of voice analysis procedure. It was found that correct stress/nonstress identifications occurred only at chance levels; the lie/nonlie identification scores were quite similar with professional "examiners" performing at about the same level of accuracy as other auditors. The following review is divided into two parts: a history of the controversy and a presentation of the two cited experiments.
Detection of deception and confirmation of truth telling with conventional polygraphy raised a host of technical and ethical issues. Recently, newer methods of recording electromagnetic signals from the brain show promise in permitting the detection of deception or truth telling. Some are even being promoted as more accurate than conventional polygraphy. While the new technologies raise issues of personal privacy, acceptable forensic application, and other social issues, the focus of this paper is the technical limitations of the developing technology. Those limitations include the measurement validity of the new technologies, which remains largely unknown. Another set of questions pertains to the psychological paradigms used to model or constrain the target behavior. Finally, there is little standardization in the field, and the vulnerability of the techniques to countermeasures is unknown. Premature application of these technologies outside of research settings should be resisted, and the social conversation about the appropriate parameters of its civil, forensic, and security use should begin.
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Ninety-nine police officers, not identified in previous research as belonging to groups that are superior in lie detection, attempted to detect truths and lies told by suspects during their videotaped police interviews. Accuracy rates were higher than those typically found in deception research and reached levels similar to those obtained by specialized lie detectors in previous research. Accuracy was positively correlated with perceived experience in interviewing suspects and with mentioning cues to detecting deceit that relate to a suspect's story. Accuracy was negatively correlated with popular stereotypical cues such as gaze aversion and fidgeting. As in previous research, accuracy and confidence were not significantly correlated, but the level of confidence was dependent on whether officers judged actual truths or actual lies and on the method by which confidence was measured.
The ability to detect lying was evaluated in 509 people including law-enforcement personnel, such as members of the U.S. Secret Service, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, Drug Enforcement Agency, California police and judges, as well as psychiatrists, college students, and working adults. A videotape showed 10 people who were either lying or telling the truth in describing their feelings. Only the Secret Service performed better than chance, and they were significantly more accurate than all of the other groups. When occupational group was disregarded, it was found that those who were accurate apparently used different behavioral clues and had different skills than those who were inaccurate.
Adults are poor deception detectors when examining lies told by adults, on average. However, there are some adults who are better at detecting lies than others. Children learn to lie at a very young age, a behavior that is socialized by parents. Yet, less is known about the ability to detect children's lies, particularly with regard to individual differences in the ability to detect this deception. The current study explored adult raters' ability to discern honesty in children who lied or told the truth about committing a misdeed. Results showed that adults are no better at detecting children's lies than they are with adult lies. In particular, adults were very poor at identifying children's honest statements. However, individual differences did emerge, suggesting that the ability to detect lying in children might be facilitated by relevant experience working with children. Implications for legal and mental health contexts are discussed.
Deception is a cognitive process in humans and animals which is not well understood. Most studies on lie detection have focused on emotional components associated with deception. We employed transcranial magnetic stimulation of the motor cortex in conjunction with a constrained question answer protocol for the first time to show increased cortical excitability in generating deceptive responses, in contrast with truthful responses. This may be due to increased cognitive activity in the motor and premotor connections. Our findings corroborate functional imaging studies and may have future implications in evaluating lie detection.
Most people are unable to detect accurately when others are lying. Many explanations for this inability have been suggested but the cognitive heuristics involved in lie detection have received little attention. The present study offers evidence from two experiments, based on two different groups of observers, judging two different kinds of lies, presented in two different testing situations, that the fundamental attribution error significantly undermines the ability to detect honesty and deception accurately. Trait judgments of trustworthiness were highly correlated with state judgments of truthfulness, leading, as predicted, to positive correlations with honest detection accuracy and negative correlations with deception detection accuracy. More accurate lie detectors were significantly more likely than less accurate lie detectors to separate state and trait judgments of honesty. The effect of other biases, such as the halo effect and the truthfulness bias, also are examined. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.
Researchers have found that facial appearance influences social judgments. For example, evidence has shown that facial babyishness and age affect perceivers' impressions of the stimulus person's veracity. In this experiment, the researchers examined whether these variables also influenced the credibility attributed to written statements purportedly made by these people in addition to several topics of interest in deception-detection research. Undergraduates (N = 270) were presented babyfaced or mature-faced photographs that depicted a child, an adult, or an older individual, in addition to a written truthful or deceptive statement purportedly made by the person in the photograph. Results showed that, as predicted, when the statements were accompanied by babyfaced pictures, participants tended to judge them as truthful, but only if the pictures did not depict children. Also, when the statements were accompanied by childen's pictures, participants tended to judge them as deceptive, but only if the pictures depicted a babyish face. Overall detection accuracy was close to chance and did not correlate with either judgmental confidence or with the respondents' estimated lie-detection accuracy. However, confidence and estimated ability were significantly correlated. Also, more confidence was placed in judgments of truthfulness than in judgments of deceptiveness. Respondents' truth bias and the existence of a veracity effect in the diverse experimental conditions were examined as well.
We analyze the accuracy of deception judgments, synthesizing research results from 206 documents and 24,483 judges. In relevant studies, people attempt to discriminate lies from truths in real time with no special aids or training. In these circumstances, people achieve an average of 54% correct lie-truth judgments, correctly classifying 47% of lies as deceptive and 61% of truths as nondeceptive. Relative to cross-judge differences in accuracy, mean lie-truth discrimination abilities are nontrivial, with a mean accuracy d of roughly .40. This produces an effect that is at roughly the 60th percentile in size, relative to others that have been meta-analyzed by social psychologists. Alternative indexes of lie-truth discrimination accuracy correlate highly with percentage correct, and rates of lie detection vary little from study to study. Our meta-analyses reveal that people are more accurate in judging audible than visible lies, that people appear deceptive when motivated to be believed, and that individuals regard their interaction partners as honest. We propose that people judge others' deceptions more harshly than their own and that this double standard in evaluating deceit can explain much of the accumulated literature.
Professionals conclude that child molesters (CMs) hold offense-supportive beliefs (or cognitive distortions) from CMs'questionnaire responses. Because questionnaires are easily faked, we asked 32 CMs to complete a cognitive distortion scale under standard conditions (Time 1). A week later (Time 2), the same CMs completed the scale again. This time, approximately one half of CMs were attached to a pseudo lie detector (a bogus pipeline), and the rest completed the scale again under standard conditions (controls). At Time 1, CMs showed low cognitive distortion scores, seeming to indicate that they were faking good. At Time 2, bogus pipeline CMs seemed to believe that the apparatus could detect lies. However, this did not encourage more distorted belief disclosure compared with (a) their own previous scores and (b) controls. Furthermore, the bogus pipeline appeared to reduce cognitive distortion endorsements. The results stand in marked contrast to the common view that most CMs hold distorted beliefs.
The accuracy of polygraphic lie detection in real life applications is very little better than chance. Yet, at least in the United States, many agencies and the polygraphers themselves have great faith in the technique. The reasons why polygraph examiners, and their clients, genuinely believe in the myth of the polygraph are explained and illustrated. A more plausible method of polygraphic interrogation, the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT), is described and it is shown how the GKT, but not the lie test, might have resolved doubts about the case of Demjanjuk, the alleged "Ivan the Terrible."
The study investigated conditions that produce strong social pressures on posthypnotically amnesic Ss to remember more before being given the cue to remove amnesia. Highly susceptible Ss who passed posthypnotic amnesia were classified as voluntary or involuntary (having high or low control over recall). Test Ss were serially subjected to 3 pressure situations before being given the cue to lift amnesia: (a) instructions to be honest, (b) lie detection, and (c) a replay of a video of the session. Control Ss sat for the same amount of time and were only asked if they could remember anything else while the experimental Ss received the pressure recalls. All but 1 S breached in the experimental condition. Only the voluntary Ss breached in the control condition. Results are discussed as they relate to breaching amnesia and the voluntary dimension.
In 5 studies, the authors investigated the effects of comparison with an individual versus comparison with the statistical average on self-evaluations of performance and ability. In Studies 1 and 2, participants took a test of lie detection ability and were provided with the average score and the score of an individual coactor. Both types of feedback significantly affected self-evaluations of performance, but only comparison with the coactor significantly affected self-evaluations of ability. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that the presence of a coactor moderated the effect of aggregate social comparison on self-evaluations of ability. The results provide preliminary support for the contention that minimizing the impact of comparison with the average is a self-serving strategy that is facilitated by the presence of others.