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PubMed2002

Euthanasia, double effect, and proportionality.

I discuss the Principle of Double Effect (PDE) as a means of exploring aspects of the motivation of active voluntary euthanasia (a.v.e). It is argued that the objective of a.v.e. is not death but the relief of suffering. Nor is death the means, it is a concomitant. I entertain no hope of convincing the typical proponent of PDE that a.v.e. is morally acceptable. However, I point out that a central strength of the PDE is its insistence on due proportionality between outcomes. When a.v.e. is appropriate, as sometimes it is, death is not out of proportion to the relief of suffering.

Double Effect Principle↗
PubMed1998

The double effect of pain medication: separating myth from reality.

The principle of double effect is used to justify the administration of medication to relieve pain even though it may lead to the unintended, although foreseen, consequence of hastening death by causing respiratory depression. Although a review of the medical literature reveals that the risk of respiratory depression from opioid analgesic is more myth than fact and that there is little evidence that the use of medication to control pain hastens death, the belief in the double effect of pain medication remains widespread. Applying the principle of double effect to end-of-life issues perpetuates this myth and results in the undertreatment of physical suffering at the end of life. The concept of double effect of opioids also has been used in support of legalization of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia.

Analgesics, Opioid↗
PubMed1998

Laying down one's life for oneself.

Roman Catholicism has long opposed suicide. Although Scripture neither condones nor condemns suicide explicitly, cases in the Bible that are purported to be suicides fall into several different categories, and the Roman Catholic tradition can show why some of these should be considered morally wrong and some should not. While Christian martyrdom is praised, it is not correct to argue that this Christian outlook invites suicide, or that it recommends physician-assisted suicide for altruistic motives. Church Tradition, from its earliest days, has clearly distinguished martyrdom from suicide. The principles of double effect and cooperation, mainstays in Roman Catholic moral theology, enable one to see the moral difference between martyrdom and suicide, and to appreciate why physician-assisted suicide is wrong for both patient and physician.

Altruism↗
PubMed2006

The devil's choice: re-thinking law, ethics, and symptom relief in palliative care.

Health professionals do not always have the luxury of making "right" choices. This article introduces the "devil's choice" as a metaphor to describe medical choices that arise in circumstances where all the available options are both unwanted and perverse. Using the devil's choice, the paper criticizes the principle of double effect and provides a re-interpretation of the conventional legal and ethical account of symptom relief in palliative care.

Analgesics, Opioid↗
PubMed1993

A polemic on principles: reflections on the Pittsburgh protocol.

The Pittsburgh protocol relies heavily on traditional moral distinctions, particularly the principle of double effect, to justify "managing" the dying process of a prospective organ donor in order to yield viable organs for transplantation. These traditional moral distinctions can be useful, particularly in casuistic or case-specific moral analysis, but their invocation here is unpersuasive, and potentially dangerous. The protocol relies on elaborate apologetics to avoid a candid confrontation with the moral challenge it poses--society's willingness to bring about the death of one patient (in isolation and with potential discomfort) in order to benefit another patient. Not only will this protocol fail to solve the problem it purports to address, it threatens to undermine the delicate social accommodations by which we distinguish the living from the dead, permissible "allowings to die" from impermissible killings, and those from whom organs may be removed from those whose bodies must remain inviolate.

Cause of Death↗
PubMed2001

End-of-life issues in intensive care units: a national random survey of nurses' knowledge and beliefs.

OBJECTIVE: To investigate the knowledge, beliefs, and ethical concerns of nurses caring for patients dying in intensive care units. METHODS: A survey was mailed to 3000 members of the American Association of Critical-Care Nurses. The survey contained various scenarios depicting end-of-life actions for patients: pain management, withholding or withdrawing life support, assisted suicide, and voluntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia. RESULTS: Most of the respondents (N = 906) correctly identified the distinctions among the end-of-life actions depicted in the scenarios. Almost all (99%-100%) agreed with the actions of pain management and withholding or withdrawing life support. A total of 83% disagreed with assisted suicide, 95% disagreed with voluntary euthanasia, and 89% to 98% disagreed with nonvoluntary euthanasia. Most (78%) thought that dying patients frequently (31%) or sometimes (47%) received inadequate pain medicine, and almost all agreed with the double-effect principle. Communication between nurses and physicians was generally effective, but unit-level conferences that focused on grief counseling and debriefing staff rarely (38%) or never (49%) occurred. Among the respondents, 37% had been asked to assist in hastening a patient's death. Although 59% reported that they seldom acted against their consciences in caring for dying patients, 34% indicated that they sometimes had acted against their conscience, and 6% had done so to a great extent. CONCLUSIONS: Intensive care unit nurses strongly support good pain management for dying patients and withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining therapies to allow unavoidable death. The vast majority oppose assisted suicide and euthanasia. Wider professional and public dialogue on end-of-life care in intensive care units is warranted.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

[Ethical aspects of treatment in patients with advanced oncologic diseases].

Ethical aspects of treatment are discussed from the aspect of medical objectives and the doctor-patient relationship. The authors draws attention to various dangers of incorrect approaches which may ensue for the patient: unnecessary and excessively burdening antitumourous treatment, inadequate treatment--in particular of pain, queer views on palliative treatment, a paternalistic approach of the physician with insufficient respect for the patient's wishes, inadequate information provided to the patient, "abuse" of patients for different experimental treatments etc. The author discusses in detail the double effect principle and draws attention to classification of means into ordinary and extraordinary with regard to the patient's own evaluation.

Ethics, Medical↗
PubMed1998

[Decisions about life and death. An empirical study of the position of Danish physicians concerning end-of-life decisions].

In a postal questionnaire investigation of experiences and attitudes concerning end-of-life decisions among Danish physicians, most of the respondents reported having made decisions involving the hastening of a patient's death, and considered this acceptable. Such decisions were more frequent, and were considered ethically more acceptable, when made with the patient's informed consent than without. Of the respondents, two per cent had participated in assisted suicide, and five per cent had administered a lethal injection at the patient's request, practices considered ethically acceptable by 37 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively, of the respondents. The most frequently cited reasons for opposing such practices were double effect principle, the active killing/allowed-death distinction, and the sanctity of life; and the most frequently cited justifications were respect for the patient's autonomy, the avoidance of unnecessary suffering, and the patient's right to a death with dignity.

Decision Making↗
PubMed1993

Non-heart-beating donors of organs: are the distinctions between direct and indirect effects & between killing and letting die relevant and helpful?

This essay analyzes the principle of double effect and, to a lesser extent, the distinction between killing and letting die in the context of the Pittsburgh protocol for managing patients who may become non-heart-beating donors or sources of organs for transplantation. It notes several ambiguities and unresolved issues in the Pittsburgh protocol but concludes that neither the principle of double effect nor the distinction between killing and letting die (with the prohibition of the former and the allowance of the latter under some circumstances) erects insurmountable obstacles to the implementation of the protocol. Nevertheless, the requirement of the principle of double effect that the intended good effects outweigh the unintended side effects necessitates careful attention to the probable overall impact of the proposed policy on organ procurement, particularly because public mistrust plays such a significant role in limiting the number of organ donations.

Cause of Death↗
PubMed1994

Induced delivery of anencephalic fetuses: a response to James L. Walsh and Moira M. McQueen.

James Walsh and Moira McQueen accurately conclude that the early delivery of anencephalic fetuses is morally acceptable, but the reasoning they use to reach that conclusion is flawed. First, the principle of double effect does not require a weighing of good and evil, but rather seeks a sufficient reason for tolerating the physical evil indirectly intended. Second, the principle of double effect requires a clear distinction between physical and moral causality. Third, the Catholic moral tradition will not admit direct and intended killing of the innocent. Rather, early delivery of anencephalic fetuses is permissible because of the pathology associated with delivery of anencephalic fetuses at full term. Thus, the early delivery of an anencephalic infant is acceptable if the purpose of the moral act is avoiding a pathological condition on the part of the mother.

Anencephaly↗
PubMed2004

The double life of double effect.

The U.S. Supreme Court's majority opinion in Vacco v. Quill assumes that the principle of double effect explains the permissibility of hastening death in the context of ordinary palliative care and in extraordinary cases in which painkilling drugs have failed to relieve especially intractable suffering and terminal sedation has been adopted as a last resort. The traditional doctrine of double effect, understood as providing a prohibition on instrumental harming as opposed to incidental harming or harming as a side effect, must be distinguished from other ways in which the claim that a result is not intended might be offered as part of a justification for it. Although double effect might appropriately be invoked as a constraint on ordinary palliative care, it is not clear that it can be coherently extended to justify such practices as terminal sedation. A better approach would reconsider double effect's traditional prohibition on hastening death as a means to relieve suffering in the context of acute palliative care.

Double Effect Principle↗
PubMed2005

[Euthanasia and the doctrine of double effect].

Direct active euthanasia is prohibited in most countries while passive and indirect is not. However, many arguments against the legalization of voluntary active euthanasia are flawed. Ethical differences between active and passive or indirect euthanasia are difficult to maintain especially when the passivity of the actor causes death. The crucial point is not activity or passivity but respect for the autonomy of individual human beings. In particular there appears to be little ethical difference between active and indirect euthanasia. Indirect euthanasia has often been justified by the principle of double effect, which traces back to Thomas Aquinas. But resorting to this rule contains a logical fallacy. The principle of double effect does not allow foreseen and unwanted adverse effects of an action to occur when they are avoidable. In terminal sedation, an example for indirect euthanasia, hypoxemia and dehydration can easily be prevented by respirator therapy and fluid administration. Therefore the rule of double effect is not applicable. Indirect and direct active euthanasia cannot be ethically distinguished by resorting to the principle of double effect.

Double Effect Principle↗
PubMed2002

Response to Ronald M Perkin and David B Resnik: the agony of trying to match sanctity of life and patient-centred medical care.

Perkin and Resnik advocate the use of muscle relaxants to prevent the "agony of agonal respiration" arguing that this is compatible with the principle of double effect. The proposed regime will kill patients as certainly as smothering them would. This may lead some people to reject the argument as an abuse of the principle of double effect. I take a different view. In the absence of an adequate theory of intention, the principle of double effect cannot distinguish between the intentional and merely foreseen termination of life, and cannot rule out end-of-life decisions that are often regarded as impermissible. What Perkin and Resnik are in effect saying is that there are times when physicians have good reasons to end a patient's life--deliberately and intentionally--for the patient's (and the family's) sake. Why not say so--instead of going through the agony of trying to match sanctity of life and patient-centred medical care?

Attitude to Death↗
PubMed1998

Sterilizations reconsidered?

Cowdin and Tuohey argue for a rethinking of Catholic bioethical principles and the Church's moral authority. Citing the Second Vatican Council for support, they argue that if the Church were to respect the proper autonomy of medicine, it would allow sterilizations. In this essay I argue against Cowdin and Tuohey's understanding that the Church has derived its moral laws independent of consultation with medicine and that it treats medicine simply as a source of technical expertise. I also argue that they misunderstand that nature of autonomy as well as the Church's position regarding the type of autonomy they request for medicine. I will especially argue against their understanding of the principles of totality and double effect as "dispensations" from the moral order. I conclude that they have provided no grounds to cause the Church to reconsider its condemnation of all sterilizations.

Catholicism↗