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Physicians' preparedness for bioterrorism and other public health priorities.

OBJECTIVES: Potential bioterrorism challenges policy makers to balance competing public health priorities. Earlier surveys showed low physician bioterrorism preparedness but did not assess physicians' general public health preparedness, compare the preparedness of emergency and primary care physicians, or assess temporal trends. METHODS: This was a national, cross-sectional, random-sample survey conducted in 2003. RESULTS: Overall, 744 of 1,200 eligible physicians responded (response rate, 62%). Of these, 58% of emergency physician respondents and 48% of primary care physician respondents reported having learned a lot about responding to bioterror since September 11, 2001 (p < 0.01). However, only 43% of emergency physicians and 21% of primary care physicians agreed they are generally "well prepared to play a role in responding to a bioterror attack" (p < 0.001). Beliefs about balancing public health priorities were similar among emergency and primary care respondents. Seventy-eight percent of respondents believed that local health care systems need to be prepared for bioterrorism, and 92% believed that local health care systems need to be prepared for natural epidemics. By contrast, only 23% and 46% of respondents reported that their local health care systems are well prepared for bioterrorism and natural epidemics, respectively. Meanwhile, 77% agreed that "influenza is a greater threat to public health than bioterrorism," and 21% reported that bioterrorism preparedness efforts are diverting resources from more important public health problems. CONCLUSIONS: In 2003, most emergency and primary care physicians reported that they and their local health care systems were not yet well prepared to respond to a bioterror attack, and many believed that more resources should go toward preparing for natural epidemics. These findings highlight the importance of expanding bioterrorism preparedness efforts to improve the public health system more broadly.

Attitude of Health Personnel↗

Defining bioterrorism preparedness for nurses: concept analysis.

AIM: This paper reports a concept analysis to define the concept of nursing bioterrorism preparedness. BACKGROUND: Nursing bioterrorism preparedness is necessary, yet no theoretical or operational definition exists. The concept is often misinterpreted as being synonymous with organizational preparedness or confused with the bioterrorism preparedness needs of other professions, such as medicine. There is no standardized definition of the concept that is specific to the profession of nursing. METHODS: A concept analysis was conducted using a systematic literature review; the Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature, Psych Info and Medline databases for years 1966-2005 were used. One hundred and eighteen references were identified, 41 of which were deemed relevant. Data from the 41 relevant articles were analysed and synthesized to develop a theoretical definition, defining attributes, antecedents, consequences and related concepts. FINDINGS: Nursing bioterrorism preparedness is the continual process of nurses becoming better prepared to recognize and respond to a bioterrorism attack. Nurses, regardless of their level of education, areas of expertise or practice settings must participate in at least one educational session and one exercise each year to meet the minimum requirements of engaging in the bioterrorism preparedness process. The antecedents are acceptance and readiness to change. Defining attributes include gaining knowledge, planning, practising response behaviours and evaluating knowledge level and content of response plan. Consequences include recognition of an event and implementation of appropriate response actions. CONCLUSION: Nursing bioterrorism preparedness is essential. To assess nurses' level of preparedness, a definition is needed of what bioterrorism preparedness means to the profession. The theoretical definition developed in this paper needs to be further refined and operationalized.

Bioterrorism↗

Systematic review: surveillance systems for early detection of bioterrorism-related diseases.

BACKGROUND: Given the threat of bioterrorism and the increasing availability of electronic data for surveillance, surveillance systems for the early detection of illnesses and syndromes potentially related to bioterrorism have proliferated. PURPOSE: To critically evaluate the potential utility of existing surveillance systems for illnesses and syndromes related to bioterrorism. DATA SOURCES: Databases of peer-reviewed articles (for example, MEDLINE for articles published from January 1985 to April 2002) and Web sites of relevant government and nongovernment agencies. STUDY SELECTION: Reports that described or evaluated systems for collecting, analyzing, or presenting surveillance data for bioterrorism-related illnesses or syndromes. DATA EXTRACTION: From each included article, the authors abstracted information about the type of surveillance data collected; method of collection, analysis, and presentation of surveillance data; and outcomes of evaluations of the system. DATA SYNTHESIS: 17,510 article citations and 8088 government and nongovernmental Web sites were reviewed. From these, the authors included 115 systems that collect various surveillance reports, including 9 syndromic surveillance systems, 20 systems collecting bioterrorism detector data, 13 systems collecting influenza-related data, and 23 systems collecting laboratory and antimicrobial resistance data. Only the systems collecting syndromic surveillance data and detection system data were designed, at least in part, for bioterrorism preparedness applications. Syndromic surveillance systems have been deployed for both event-based and continuous bioterrorism surveillance. Few surveillance systems have been comprehensively evaluated. Only 3 systems have had both sensitivity and specificity evaluated. LIMITATIONS: Data from some existing surveillance systems (particularly those developed by the military) may not be publicly available. CONCLUSIONS: Few surveillance systems have been specifically designed for collecting and analyzing data for the early detection of a bioterrorist event. Because current evaluations of surveillance systems for detecting bioterrorism and emerging infections are insufficient to characterize the timeliness or sensitivity and specificity, clinical and public health decision making based on these systems may be compromised.

Bioterrorism↗

Efficacy of an educational Web site for educating physicians about bioterrorism.

OBJECTIVES: To determine whether a Web-based educational intervention improves emergency physicians' knowledge about bioterrorism and to survey physicians' knowledge and sources of information on bioterrorism. METHODS: Prospective randomized controlled trial using pre- and postintervention testing in hospitals. Participants were general and pediatric emergency medicine attending physicians, fellows, and fourth-year emergency medicine residents. All participants completed a pretest and attended a lecture on bioterrorism. Participants were then randomized to the Web intervention group that received continuous access to a bioterrorism educational Web site with weekly exposure to case scenarios of diseases due to biological agents, or the control group. Participants were retested after one and six months and surveyed to identify their sources of information and assess their knowledge. RESULTS: Sixty-three physicians completed the pretest. There was no difference in mean +/- standard deviation (SD) pretest scores between Web intervention (45% +/- 10%) and control (44% +/- 10%) groups (mean difference: 1.9%; 95% confidence interval [CI] = -6.7% to 2.9%). There was no significant difference between pre- and posttest scores among groups at one month (Web intervention 48% +/- 10% vs. control 45% +/- 10%; mean difference: 3.3%; 95% CI = -8.5% to 2.0%) and six months (Web intervention 51% +/- 8% vs. control 47% +/- 9%; mean difference: 3.8%; 95% CI = -8.8% to 1.2%). More than 60% of physicians cited media reports as their primary source of information on bioterrorism and believed that their knowledge of bioterrorism was limited after one month. CONCLUSIONS: Providing physicians information on bioterrorism through simulated cases and continuous access to an educational Web site does not increase knowledge of bioterrorism. Physicians are more likely to use media reports for their primary source of information.

Attitude of Health Personnel↗

Infection control practitioners' perceptions and educational needs regarding bioterrorism: results from a national needs assessment survey.

BACKGROUND: The perceived threat that biological weapons will be used in an act of terror against the United States has escalated sharply since the discovery of anthrax-tainted letters after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These events underscore the critical nature of health care and public health preparedness and the need to augment infection control practitioner education and training. METHODS: Between October 2000 and August 2001 a national needs assessment was conducted by use of a 35-question survey. The survey measured infection control practitioners' (ICPs') perception of the risk for bioterrorism in the United States and in their community, the proportion of ICPs with prior training in bioterrorism preparedness, and preferences for delivery media of future bioterrorism education. RESULTS: The assessment of the perceived threat of bioterrorism in the United States during the next 5 years (P =.022) and in the ICPs' work community (P <.001) revealed significant regional differences. Only half (56%) of the respondents reported prior training in bioterrorism preparedness. Respondents reported that the 2 most common barriers to receiving training were lack of training opportunities (70.2%) or no dedicated work time for training (19.4%). CONCLUSIONS: The results of this study indicate an urgent need for more resources and opportunities for clinical education in bioterrorism preparedness that will provide continuing education credit. Successful bioterrorism education will require a variety of instructional designs and media delivery methods to address ICPs' preferences and needs.

Bioterrorism↗

Bioterrorism web sites for pharmacists.

OBJECTIVE: To identify Internet Web sites for ease of accessibility to bioterrorism-related information, comprehensive provision of bioterrorism-related information, and provision of bioterrorism information that specifically pertains to the pharmacy profession. DATA SOURCES: Web sites of national pharmacy organizations, US government agencies, and medical organizations, as well as Web sites related to bioterrorism. DATA SYNTHESIS: Pharmacists need access to relevant bioterrorism information in a timely manner. An evaluation of Web sites was performed to identify those that include a discussion of the potential infectious microorganisms and prevention and treatment methods, as well as unique features for pharmacy practice. RESULTS: The American Society of Health-System Pharmacists and American Pharmaceutical Association Web sites provide pharmacy-specific recommendations. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provides biological agent information and health department contact numbers. Additional agent-specific data are provided by the American Medical Association, The Johns Hopkins University, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Web sites. Information addressing food safety is provided by the FDA. CONCLUSIONS: Pharmacy-specific bioterrorism information is available only at selected national pharmacy organization Internet Web sites. However, other Web sites provide comprehensive bioterrorism information useful for pharmacists.

Bioterrorism↗

Perceptions of state public health officers and state veterinarians regarding risks of bioterrorism in the United States.

OBJECTIVE: To assess perceptions of state public health officers and state veterinarians in the United States regarding the risks of bioterrorism and determine the degree of support provided for activities related to bioterrorism. DESIGN: Cross-sectional survey. SAMPLE POPULATION: State public health officers and state veterinarians. PROCEDURE: A questionnaire was sent between April and June 2001 to the state public health officer and state veterinarian in each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. RESULTS: Perceptions of the risk of bioterrorism attacks were similar for state public health officers and state veterinarians. Veterinarians perceived the risks associated with foot-and-mouth disease and Newcastle disease to be higher than did physicians. State veterinarians perceived the risks associated with an anthrax hoax, brucellosis, and ricin toxicosis to be lower than did state public health officers. Risk posed by agents that affected animals exclusively was perceived to be higher than risk posed by agents that affected humans exclusively and zoonotic agents. Number of full-time-equivalent positions devoted to bioterrorism surveillance and percentage of the budget devoted to bioterrorism activities were significantly lower for offices run by state veterinarians than for offices run by state public health officers. State veterinarians were significantly less likely to have knowledge of bioterrorism incidents within their state or district than were state public health officers. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: Provision of additional resources to state veterinarians and explicit integration of their expertise and surveillance capabilities may be important to effectively mitigate the risk of bioterrorism.

Animals↗

Evaluation of an online bioterrorism continuing medical education course.

INTRODUCTION: Much of the international community has an increased awareness of potential biologic, chemical, and nuclear threats and the need for physicians to rapidly acquire new knowledge and skills in order to protect the public's health. The present study evaluated the educational effectiveness of an online bioterrorism continuing medical education (CME) activity designed to address clinical issues involving suspected bioterrorism and reporting procedures in the United States. METHODS: This was a retrospective survey of physicians who had completed an online CME activity on bioterrorism compared with a nonparticipant group who had completed at least 1 unrelated online CME course from the same medical school Web site and were matched on similar characteristics. An online survey instrument was developed to assess clinical and systems knowledge and confidence in recognition of illnesses associated with a potential bioterrorism attack. A power calculation indicated that a sample size of 100 (50 in each group) would achieve 90% power to detect a 10% to 15% difference in test scores between the two groups. RESULTS: Compared with nonparticipant physicians, participants correctly diagnosed anthrax (p = .01) and viral exanthem (p = .01), but not smallpox, more frequently than nonparticipants. Participants knew more frequently than nonparticipants who to contact regarding a potential bioterrorism event (p = .03) Participants were more confident than nonparticipants about finding information to guide diagnoses of patients with biologic exposure (p = .01), chemical exposure (p = .02), and radiation exposure (p = .04). DISCUSSION: An online bioterrorism course shows promise as an educational intervention in preparing physicians to better diagnose emerging rare infections, including those that may be associated with a bioterrorist event, in increasing confidence in diagnosing these infections, and in reporting of such infections for practicing physicians.

Attitude of Health Personnel↗

CDC's strategic plan for bioterrorism preparedness and response.

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has played a critical lead role over the past two years in fostering activities associated with the medical and public health response to bioterrorism. Based on a charge from Secretary Donna Shalala in 1998, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is leading public health efforts to strengthen the nation's capacity to detect and respond to a bioterrorist event. As a result of our efforts, federal, state, and local communities are improving their public health capacities to respond to these types of emergencies. For many of us in public health, developing plans and capacities to respond to acts of bioterrorism is an extension of our long-standing roles and responsibilities. These are stated in the CDC Mission Statement: to promote health and quality of life by preventing and controlling disease, injury, and disability, and the Bioterrorism Mission: to lead the public health effort in enhancing readiness to detect and respond to bioterrorism. CDC's infectious diseases control efforts are summarized below: --Initially formed to address malaria control in 1946; --Established the epidemic Intelligence Service in 1951; --Participated in global smallpox eradication and other immunization programs; --Estimated 800-1,000 + field investigations/year since late 1990s; --New diseases: Legionnaire's Disease, toxic shock syndrome, Lyme disease, HIV, hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, West Nile, etc. -- Today: focus on emerging infections and bioterrorism. Over the past 50 years, CDC has seen a decline in the incidence of some infectious diseases and an increase in some, whereas others continue to present on a more unpredictable basis (i.e., hantavirus). Outbreak identification, investigation, and control have been an integral part of what we do for more than 50 years. We estimate that 800 to 1,000 field investigations have occurred every year since the late 1990s. Today, however, we have a new focus on emerging infectious diseases and bioterrorism.

Anti-Infective Agents↗

Clinicians' knowledge, attitudes, and concerns regarding bioterrorism after a brief educational program.

We conducted this study to determine the knowledge, attitudes, and intended behaviors of New York City clinicians regarding bioterrorism-related diseases after a brief educational program. Data on clinicians' knowledge and attitudes toward bioterrorism and related diseases were collected using a self-administered questionnaire following a 3.5-hour educational program. Participants (n = 310, 82% response rate) reported increased confidence in recognizing symptoms of bioterrorism-related diseases (89%), in addressing patients' bioterrorism concerns (83%), and ability to treat bioterrorism victims (75%). Despite a high level of confidence in the efficacy of infection control precautions, participants' knowledge scores regarding safe work practices suggest that additional education is warranted. Educational programs are useful in enhancing the public health response to bioterrorism and its consequences.

Adult↗

A global network for early warning and response to infectious diseases and bioterrorism: applied epidemiology and training programs, 2001.

In many ministries of health, applied epidemiology and training programs (AETPs) are responsible for detecting and responding to acute health events, including bioterrorism. In November 2001, we assessed the bioterrorism response capacity of 29 AETPs; 17 (59%) responded. Fifteen countries (88%) had bioterrorism response plans; in 6 (40%), AETPs took the lead in preparation and in 6 (40%) they assisted. Between September 11 and November 29, 2001, 12 AETPs (71%) responded to a total of 3024 bioterrorism-related phone calls. Six programs (35%) responded to suspected bioterrorism events. AETPs play an important role in bioterrorism surveillance and response. Support for this global network by various health agencies is beneficial for all developed and developing countries.

Bioterrorism↗

Hawaii veterinarians' bioterrorism preparedness needs assessment survey.

The purpose of this study was to assess the objective bioterrorism-related knowledge base and the perceived response readiness of veterinarians in Hawaii to a bioterrorism event, and also to identify variables associated with knowledge-based test performance. An anonymous survey instrument was mailed to all licensed veterinarians residing in Hawaii (N = 229) up to three times during June and July 2004, using numeric identifiers to track non-respondents. The response rate for deliverable surveys was 59% (125 of 212). Only 12% (15 of 123) of respondents reported having had prior training on bioterrorism. Forty-four percent (55 of 125) reported being able to identify a bioterrorism event in animal populations; however, only 17% (21 of 125) felt able to recognize a bioterrorism event in human populations. Only 16% (20 of 123) felt they were able to respond effectively to a bioterrorist attack. Over 90% (106 of 116) expressed their willingness to provide assistance to the state in its response to a bioterrorist event. Veterinarians scored a mean of 70% correct (5.6 out of 8 questions) on the objective knowledge-based questions. Additional bioterrorism preparedness training should be made available, both in the form of continuing educational offerings for practicing veterinarians and as a component of the curriculum in veterinary schools.

Adult↗

Bioterror events: preemptive strategies for healthcare executives.

Today's healthcare executives face challenges that their predecessors have never known: bioterror events. To prepare their organizations to cope with new and emerging strategic threats of bioterrorism, these executives must consider preemptive strategies. The authors present courses of action to assist executives' internal, external, and cross-sectional organizational preparedness. For example, stakeholder groups, internal resources, and competencies that combine and align efforts efficiently are identified. Twelve preemptive strategies are provided to guide healthcare executives in meeting these formidable and unprecedented challenges. The reputation of the healthcare organization (HCO) is at risk if a bioterror event is not properly handled, resulting in severe disadvantages for future operations. Justifiably, healthcare executives are contemplating the value of prioritizing bioterror preparedness, taking into account the immediate realities of decreasing reimbursement, increasing numbers of uninsured patients, and staffing shortages. Resources must be focused on the most valid concerns and must maximize the return on investment. Healthcare organizations can reap the benefits of a win-win approach by optimizing available resources, planning, and training. Bioterror preparedness will transcend the boundaries of bioterrorism and prepare for myriad mass healthcare incidents such as the looming potential for an avian (bird) influenza pandemic.

Bioterrorism↗

On the front lines: family physicians' preparedness for bioterrorism.

OBJECTIVE: The events of September 11, 2001, and the nation's recent experience with anthrax assaults made bioterrorism preparedness a national priority. Because primary care physicians are among the sentinel responders to bioterrorist attacks, we sought to determine family physicians' beliefs about their preparedness for such an attack. STUDY DESIGN: In October 2001 we conducted a national survey of 976 family physicians randomly selected from the American Academy of Family Physicians' active membership directory. POPULATION: 614 (63%) family physicians responded to the survey. OUTCOMES MEASURED: Physicians' self-reported ability to "know what to do as a doctor in the event of a suspected bioterrorist attack, recognize signs and symptoms of an illness due to bioterrorism, and know where to call to report a suspected bioterrorist attack." RESULTS: Ninety-five percent of physicians agreed that a bioterrorist attack is a real threat within the United States. However, only 27% of family physicians believed that the US health care system could respond effectively to a bioterrorist attack; fewer (17%) thought that their local medical communities could respond effectively. Twenty-six percent of physicians reported that they would know what to do as a doctor in the event of a bioterrorist attack. Only 18% had previous training in bioterrorism preparedness. In a multivariate analysis, physicians reported that preparedness for a bioterrorist attack was significantly associated with previous bioterrorism preparedness training (OR 3.9 [95% CI 2.4-6.3]) and knowing how to obtain information in the event of a bioterrorist attack (OR 6.4 [95% CI 3.9-10.6]). CONCLUSIONS: Only one quarter of family physicians felt prepared to respond to a bioterrorist event. However, training in bioterrorism preparedness was significantly associated with physicians' perceived ability to respond effectively to an attack. Primary care physicians need more training in bioterrorism preparedness and easy access to public health and medical information in the event of a bioterrorist attack.

Adult↗

A population survey--would Australian general practice be the first point of contact during an anthrax bioterrorism event?

BACKGROUND: Anthrax bioterrorism is a new threat to Australians. How they would respond to an anthrax bioterrorism event is unknown. METHOD: A national telephone survey of Australian adults. RESULTS: We successfully interviewed 1001 Australian adults (response rate 63%). The threat of anthrax bioterrorism was of medium to high concern to 57% of survey participants. In the event of an anthrax bioterrorism event, the first point of care would be GPs for 60% of survey participants, and 71% were confident in their doctor's ability to recognise anthrax. Most would accept vaccination if anthrax bioterrorism cases were reported locally, or even elsewhere in Australia. DISCUSSION: Australian GPs should be included in any bioterrorism planning to respond to such threats.

Anthrax↗

Bioterrorism and the people: how to vaccinate a city against panic.

Bioterrorism policy discussions and response planning efforts have tended to discount the capacity of the public to participate in the response to an act of bioterrorism, or they have assumed that local populations would impede an effective response. Fears of mass panic and social disorder underlie this bias. Although it is not known how the population will react to an unprecedented act of bioterrorism, experience with natural and technological disasters and disease outbreaks indicates a pattern of generally effective and adaptive collective action. Failure to involve the public as a key partner in the medical and public-health response could hamper effective management of an epidemic and increase the likelihood of social disruption. Ultimately, actions taken by nonprofessional individuals and groups could have the greatest influence on the outcome of a bioterrorism event. Five guidelines for integrating the public into bioterrorism response planning are proposed: (1) treat the public as a capable ally in the response to an epidemic, (2) enlist civic organizations in practical public health activities, (3) anticipate the need for home-based patient care and infection control, (4) invest in public outreach and communication strategies, and (5) ensure that planning reflects the values and priorities of affected populations.

Bioterrorism↗

Bioterrorism risk perceptions and educational needs of public health professionals before and after September 11, 2001: a national needs assessment survey.

The study objectives were to compare local public health professionals' bioterrorism risk perceptions, the extent of bioterrorism preparedness training, and to describe preferred methods for delivery of preparedness education in the United States. National needs assessments were conducted via a mailed survey to 3,074 local public health departments in October 2000 and November 2001. Compared to a survey conducted in October 2000, the perceived risk of a bioterrorism attack in the United States increased dramatically after September 11 (p < 0.0001); however, 57% of respondents believed one was unlikely to occur within their own community. Public health professionals perceive their own communities to be at low risk for a bioterrorism event. Ongoing, updated, standardized bioterrorism preparedness education is needed.

Bioterrorism↗

Posttraumatic stress disorder in rural primary care: improving care for mental health following bioterrorism.

CONTEXT: Recent bioterrorism attacks have highlighted the critical need for health care organizations to prepare for future threats. Yet, relatively little attention has been paid to the mental health needs of rural communities in the wake of such events. A critical aspect of bioterrorism is emphasis on generating fear and uncertainty, thereby contributing to increased needs for mental health care, particularly for posttraumatic stress disorder, which has been estimated to occur in 28% of terrorism survivors. PURPOSE: Prior experience with natural disasters suggests that first responders typically focus on immediate medical trauma or injury, leaving rural communities to struggle with the burden of unmet mental health needs both in the immediate aftermath and over the longer term. The purpose of the present article is to draw attention to the greater need to educate rural primary care providers who will be the frontline providers of mental health services following bioterrorism, given the limited availability of tertiary mental health care in rural communities. METHODS: We reviewed the literature related to bioterrorism events and mental health with an emphasis on rural communities. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: Public health agencies should work with rural primary care providers and mental health professionals to develop educational interventions focused on posttraumatic stress disorder and other mental disorders, as well as algorithms for assessment, referral, and treatment of post-event psychological disorders and somatic complaints to ensure the availability, continuity, and delivery of quality mental health care for rural residents following bioterrorism and other public health emergencies.

Bioterrorism↗