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PubMed1998

Similarity and rules: distinct? Exhaustive? Empirically distinguishable?

The distinction between rule-based and similarity-based processes in cognition is of fundamental importance for cognitive science, and has been the focus of a large body of empirical research. However, intuitive uses of the distinction are subject to theoretical difficulties and their relation to empirical evidence is not clear. We propose a 'core' distinction between rule- and similarity-based processes, in terms of the way representations of stored information are 'matched' with the representation of a novel item. This explication captures the intuitively clear-cut cases of processes of each type, and resolves apparent problems with the rule/similarity distinction. Moreover, it provides a clear target for assessing the psychological and AI literatures. We show that many lines of psychological evidence are less conclusive than sometimes assumed, but suggest that converging lines of evidence may be persuasive. We then argue that the AI literature suggests that approaches which combine rules and similarity are an important new focus for empirical work.

Cognition↗
PubMed2003

Embodied experience and linguistic meaning.

What role does people's embodied experiences have in their use and understanding of meaning? Most theories in cognitive science view meaning in terms of propositional structures that may be combined to form higher-order complexes in representing the meanings of conversations and texts. A newer approach seeks to capture meaning in terms of high-dimensional semantic space. Both views reflect the idea that meaning is best understood as abstract and disembodied symbols. My aim in this article is to make the case for an embodied view of linguistic meaning. This view provides a challenge to traditional approaches to linguistic meaning (although may not necessarily be entirely incompatible with them). I discuss several new lines of research from both linguistics and psychology that explore the importance of embodied perception and action in people's understanding of words, phrases, and texts. These data provide strong evidence in favor of the idea that significant aspects of thought and language arises from, and is grounded in, embodiment.

Cognition↗
PubMed1999

Perceptual symbol systems.

Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components--not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspection (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.

Cognition↗
PubMed2002

The development of ordinal numerical knowledge in infancy.

A critical question in cognitive science concerns how numerical knowledge develops. One essential component of an adult concept of number is ordinality: the greater than and less than relationships between numbers. Here it is shown in two experiments that 11-month-old infants successfully discriminated, whereas 9-month-old infants failed to discriminate, sequences of numerosities that descended in numerical value from sequences that increased in numerical value. These results suggest that by 11 months of age infants possess the ability to appreciate the greater than and less than relations between numerical values but that this ability develops between 9 and 11 months of age. In an additional experiment 9-month-old infants succeeded at discriminating the ordinal direction of sequences that varied in the size of a single square rather than in number, suggesting that a capacity for non-numerical ordinal judgments may develop before a capacity for ordinal numerical judgments. These data raise many questions about how infants represent number and what happens between 9 and 11 months to support ordinal numerical judgments.

Age Factors↗
PubMed2006

Using dual-process theory and analogical transfer to explain facilitation on a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task.

Using the analogical transfer paradigm, the present study investigated the competing explanations of Girotto and Legrenzi (Psychological Research 51: 129-135, 1993) and Griggs, Platt, Newstead, and Jackson (Thinking and Reasoning 4: 1-14, 1998) for facilitation on the SARS version of the THOG problem, a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task. Girotto and Legrenzi argue that facilitation is based on logical analysis of the task [System 2 reasoning in Evans's (Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7: 454-459, 2003) dual-process account of reasoning] while Griggs et al. maintain that facilitation is due to an attentional heuristic produced by the wording of the problem (System 1 reasoning). If Girotto and Legrenzi are correct, then System 2 reasoning, which is volitional and responsible for deductive reasoning, should be elicited, and participants should comprehend the solution principle of the THOG task and exhibit analogical transfer. However, if Griggs et al. are correct, then System 1 reasoning, which is responsible for heuristic problem solving strategies such as an attentional heuristic, should occur, and participants should not abstract the solution principle and transfer should not occur. Significant facilitation (68 and 82% correct) was only observed for the two SARS source problems, but significant analogical transfer did not occur. This lack of transfer suggests that System 1 reasoning was responsible for the facilitation observed in the SARS problem, supporting Griggs et al.'s attentional heuristic explanation. The present results also underscore the explanatory value of using analogical transfer rather than facilitation as the criterion for problem understanding.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Hemispheric specialization for spatial frequency processing in the analysis of natural scenes.

Experimental data coming from visual cognitive sciences suggest that visual analysis starts with a parallel extraction of different visual attributes at different scales/frequencies. Neuropsychological and functional imagery data have suggested that each hemisphere (at the level of temporo-parietal junctions-TPJ) could play a key role in spatial frequency processing: The right TPJ should predominantly be involved in low spatial frequency (LFs) analysis and the left TPJ in high spatial frequency (HFs) analysis. Nevertheless, this functional hypothesis had been inferred from data obtained when using the hierarchical form paradigm, without any explicit spatial frequency manipulation per se. The aims of this research are (i) to investigate, in healthy subjects, the hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis with an explicit manipulation of spatial frequencies of natural scenes and (ii) to examine whether the 'precedence effect' (the relative rapidity of LFs and HFs processing) depends on the visual field of scene presentation or not. For this purpose, participants were to identify either non-filtered or LFs and HFs filtered target scene displayed either in the left, central, or right visual field. Results showed a hemispheric specialization for spatial frequency processing and different 'precedence effects' depending on the visual field of presentation.

Cognition↗
PubMed1992

Implicit knowledge: new perspectives on unconscious processes.

Recent evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience indicates that brain-damaged patients and normal subjects can exhibit nonconscious or implicit knowledge of stimuli that they fail to recollect consciously or perceive explicitly. Dissociations between implicit and explicit knowledge, which have been observed across a variety of domains, tasks, and materials, raise fundamental questions about the nature of perception, memory, and consciousness. This article provides a selective review of relevant evidence and considers such phenomena as priming and implicit memory in amnesic patients and normal subjects, perception without awareness and "blindsight" in patients with damage to visual cortex, and nonconscious recognition of familiar faces in patients with facial-recognition deficits (prosopagnosia). A variety of theoretical approaches to implicit/explicit dissociations are considered. One view is that all of the various dissociations can be attributed to disruption or disconnection of a common mechanism underlying conscious experience; an alternative possibility is that each dissociation requires a separate explanation in terms of domain-specific processes and systems. More generally, it is concluded that rather than reflecting the operation of affectively charged unconscious processes of the kind invoked by psychodynamic or Freudian theorists, dissociations between implicit and explicit knowledge are a natural consequence of the ordinary computations of the brain.

Amnesia↗
PubMed2006

The interaction of implicit learning, explicit hypothesis testing learning and implicit-to-explicit knowledge extraction.

To further explore the interaction between the implicit and explicit learning processes in skill acquisition (which have been tackled before, e.g. in [Sun, R., Merrill, E., & Peterson, T. (2001). From implicit skill to explicit knowledge: A bottom-up model of skill learning. Cognitive Science, 25(2), 203-244; Sun, R., Slusarz, P., & Terry, C. (2005). The interaction of the explicit and the implicit in skill learning: A dual-process approach. Psychological Review, 112(1), 159-192]), this paper explores details of the interaction of different learning modes: implicit learning, explicit hypothesis testing learning, and implicit-to-explicit knowledge extraction. Contrary to the common tendency in the literature to study each type of learning in isolation, this paper highlights the interaction among them and various effects of the interaction on learning, including the synergy effect. This work advocates an integrated model of skill learning that takes into account both implicit and explicit learning processes; moreover, it also uniquely embodies a bottom-up (implicit-to-explicit) learning approach in addition to other types of learning. The paper shows that this model accounts for various effects in the human behavioural data from the psychological experiments with the process control task, in addition to accounting for other data in other psychological experiments (which has been reported elsewhere). The paper shows that to account for these effects, implicit learning, bottom-up implicit-to-explicit extraction and explicit hypothesis testing learning are all needed.

Algorithms↗
PubMedDate not supplied

[The fragmentation of representational space in schizophrenia].

Existent neurocognitive models of schizophrenia converge towards a core of impairments involving working memory, context processing, action planning, controlled and intentional processing. However, the emergence of this core remains itself difficult to explain and more specific hypotheses do not explain the heterogeneity of schizophrenia. To overcome these limits, we propose a new paradigm based on representational theory from cognitive science. Some recent developments of this theory enable us to describe a subjective universe as a representational space which is displayed from memory. We outline a conceptual framework to construct such a representational space from analogical -representations that can be activated in working memory and are connected to a network of symbolic structures. These connections are notably made through an analytic process of the analogical fragments, which involves the attentional focus. This framework allows us to define rigorously some defense processes in response to traumatic tensions that are expressed on the representational space. The fragmentation of representational space is a consequence of a defensive denial based on an impairment of the analytic process. The fragmentation forms some parasitic areas in memory which are excluded from the main part of the representational space and disturb information processing. The key clinical concepts of paranoid syndromes can be defined in this conceptual framework: mental automatism, delusional intuition, acute destructuration, psychotic dissociation, and autistic withdrawal. We show that these syndromes imply each other, which in return increases the fragmentation of the representational space. Some new concepts emerge naturally in this framework, such as the concept of "suture" which is defined as a link between a parasitic area and the main representational space. Schizophrenia appears as a borderline case of fragmentation of the representational space. This conceptual framework is compatible with numerous etiological factors. Multiple clinical forms can be differentiated in accordance with the persistence of parasitic areas, the degree of fragmentation, and the formation of sutures. We use this approach to account for an empirical study concerning the analysis of analogical representations in schizophrenia. We used the Parallel Visual Information Processing Test (PVIPT) which assesses the analysis of interfering visual information. Subjects were asked to connect several small geometric figures printed on a transparency. The transparency was displayed above four photographs which were the interfering material. Then, subjects completed three tasks concerning the photographs: a recognition task, a recall task, and an affective qualification task. Using a case-by-case study, this test allows us to access the defense processes of the subjects, which is not possible with the usual methods in cognitive psychopathology. Twelve clinically-stable schizophrenic subjects participated in the study which also included a self-assessment of alexithymia by the Toronto Alexithymia Scale. We obtained 2 main results: (a) creation of items in recall or false recognition by 8 subjects, and (b) lack of the usual -negative correlations between the alexithymia score and the recall, recognition and affective qualification scores in the PVIPT. These 2 results contrast with what has been previously observed for alexithymia using the same methodology. The result (a) confirms an interfering activation in schizophrenic memory, which can be interpreted in our framework as indicative of parasitic areas. The creation of items suggests the formation of sutures between the semantic content of photographs and some delusional fragments. The result (b) suggests that the apparent alexithymia in schizophrenia is a defense against interfering activation in parasitic areas. We underline the interest of individual protocols to exhibit the dynamic interplay between an interfering activity in memory and a defensive flattening of affects.

Affective Symptoms↗
PubMed1993

Neural networks, nativism, and the plausibility of constructivism.

Recent interest in PDP (parallel distributed processing) models is due in part to the widely held belief that they challenge many of the assumptions of classical cognitive science. In the domain of language acquisition, for example, there has been much interest in the claim that PDP models might undermine nativism. Related arguments based on PDP learning have also been given against Fodor's anti-constructivist position--a position that has contributed to the widespread dismissal of constructivism. A limitation of many of the claims regarding PDP learning, however, is that the principles underlying this learning have not been rigorously characterized. In this paper, I examine PDP models from within the framework of Valiant's PAC (probably approximately correct) model of learning, now the dominant model in machine learning, and which applies naturally to neural network learning. From this perspective, I evaluate the implications of PDP models for nativism and Fodor's influential anti-constructivist position. In particular, I demonstrate that, contrary to a number of claims, PDP models are nativist in a robust sense. I also demonstrate that PDP models actually serve as a good illustration of Fodor's anti-constructivist position. While these results may at first suggest that neural network models in general are incapable of the sort of concept acquisition that is required to refute Fodor's anti-constructivist position, I suggest that there is an alternative form of neural network learning that demonstrates the plausibility of constructivism. This alternative form of learning is a natural interpretation of the constructivist position in terms of neural network learning, as it employs learning algorithms that incorporate the addition of structure in addition to weight modification schemes. By demonstrating that there is a natural and plausible interpretation of constructivism in terms of neural network learning, the position that nativism is the only plausible model of acquisition can no longer be defended. Indeed, I briefly discuss a number of learning-theoretic reasons indicating that constructivist models so characterized uniquely possess a number of important learning characteristics.

Cognition↗
PubMed1999

"Near" and "far" in language and perception.

A major interest in cognitive science is the relationship between linguistic and perceptual representations of space. One approach to exploring this relationship has been to investigate aspects of the linguistic encoding of space that correspond closely to aspects of the visual system. Another approach, which does not contradict the first but rather complements it, is to investigate ways in which linguistic and visual representations of space are different. This paper pursues the second approach by arguing that the distinction between proximal and distal demonstratives (e.g. this vs. that, here vs. there) does not correspond to an independently established distinction between near and far space in the visual system but is instead based on language-internal factors. Recent neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies suggest that the brain contains separate mechanisms for representing, on the one hand, near or peripersonal space which extends roughly to the perimeter of arm's reach and, on the other hand, far or extrapersonal space which expands outward from that boundary. In addition, crosslinguistic research suggests that it is very common for languages to have two basic types of demonstrative terms - proximal and distal. This parallelism raises the possibility that the linguistic distinction may derive from the perceptual distinction. However, several arguments support the contrary view that the two distinctions are independent of one another. A substantial proportion of languages in the world have demonstrative systems that divide space into three or more egocentrically-grounded regions, thereby violating the two-way perceptual contrast. Even more importantly, empirical studies of how demonstratives are used in ongoing discourse in different languages suggest that they do not encode quantitative spatial information such as within vs. beyond arm's reach; instead, they specify abstract semantic notions that, when combined with the unique pragmatic features of communicative contexts, allow speakers to make a virtually unlimited range of spatial distance contrasts. Thus, demonstratives constitute an interesting case of divergence between linguistic and perceptual representations of space.

Animals↗
PubMed2002

(Physio)logical circuits: the intellectual origins of the McCulloch-Pitts neural networks.

This article examines the intellectual and institutional factors that contributed to the collaboration of neuropsychiatrist Warren McCulloch and mathematician Walter Pitts on the logic of neural networks, which culminated in their 1943 publication, "A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity." Historians and scientists alike often refer to the McCulloch-Pitts paper as a landmark event in the history of cybernetics, and fundamental to the development of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. This article seeks to bring some historical context to the McCulloch-Pitts collaboration itself, namely, their intellectual and scientific orientations and backgrounds, the key concepts that contributed to their paper, and the institutional context in which their collaboration was made. Although they were almost a generation apart and had dissimilar scientific backgrounds, McCulloch and Pitts had similar intellectual concerns, simultaneously motivated by issues in philosophy, neurology, and mathematics. This article demonstrates how these issues converged and found resonance in their model of neural networks. By examining the intellectual backgrounds of McCulloch and Pitts as individuals, it will be shown that besides being an important event in the history of cybernetics proper, the McCulloch-Pitts collaboration was an important result of early twentieth-century efforts to apply mathematics to neurological phenomena.

Biology↗
PubMed1995

What infant memory tells us about infantile amnesia: long-term recall and deferred imitation.

Long-term recall memory was assessed using a nonverbal method requiring subjects to reenact a past event from memory (deferred imitation). A large sample of infants (N = 192), evenly divided between 14- and 16-months old, was tested across two experiments. A delay of 2 months was used in Experiment 1 and a delay of 4 months in Experiment 2. In both experiments two treatment groups were used. In one treatment group, motor practice (immediate imitation) was allowed before the delay was imposed; in the other group, subjects were prevented from motor practice before the delay. Age-matched control groups were used to assess the spontaneous production of the target acts in the absence of exposure to the model in both experiments. The results demonstrated significant deferred imitation for both treatment groups at both delay intervals, and moreover showed that infants retained and imitated multiple acts. These findings suggest that infants have a nonverbal declarative memory system that supports the recall of past events across long-term delays. The implications of these findings for the multiple memory system debate in cognitive science and neuroscience and for theories of infantile amnesia are considered.

Attention↗
PubMed2003

Autopoiesis: a review and a reappraisal.

The aim of the paper is to review critically the notion of autopoiesis as presented by Maturana and Varela. In particular, recognizing that there are difficulties in obtaining a complete and clear picture from the primary literature, an effort is made to present a coherent view-also based on many years of personal contact with Francisco Varela. The paper begins with a few historical notes to highlight the cultural background from which the notion of autopoiesis arose. The basic principles of autopoiesis as a theory of cellular life are then described, emphasizing also what autopoiesis is not: not an abstract theory, not a concept of artificial life, not a theory about the origin of life-but rather a pragmatic blueprint of life based on cellular life. It shown how this view leads to a conceptually clear definition of minimal life and to a logical link with related notions, such as self-organization, emergence, biological autonomy, auto-referentiality, and interactions with the environment. The perturbations brought about by the environment are seen as changes selected and triggered by the inner organization of the living. These selective coupling interactions impart meaning to the minimal life and are thus defined by Maturana and Varela with the arguable term of "cognition". This particular view on the mutual interactions between living organism and environment leads these authors to the notion of "enaction", and to the surprising view that autopoiesis and cognition are two complementary, and in a way equivalent, aspects of life. It is then shown how cognition, so defined, permits us to build a bridge between biology and cognitive science. Autopoiesis also allows one to conceive chemical models of minimal cellular life that can be implemented experimentally. The corresponding work on "chemical autopoiesis" is then reviewed. The surprising impact of autopoiesis in the social sciences ("social autopoiesis") is also briefly discussed. This review also comments on why the theory of autopoiesis had, and still has, a difficult time being accepted into the mainstream of life-science research. Finally, it is pointed out that the new interest in system biology and complexity theories may lead to a reappraisal of autopoiesis and related notions, as outlined also by other authors, such as Tibor Ganti and Stuart Kauffmann.

Cell Cycle↗
PubMed1999

Surviving adversity: event decay, vulnerability and the onset of anxiety and depressive disorder.

Knowledge concerning the temporal relationship between adverse experiences and the onset of anxiety and depressive disorders remains sparse despite life stress forming a pivotal component to social, neurological and cognitive science models of their aetiology. In this study two groups of married women were selected through their shared adverse experiences; for one group, the marital partner had recently died, and in the second group, the marital partner had recently experienced a myocardial infarction. These groups were assessed in close proximity to their event experiences and again approximately 3 months later. Adaptations of both the Longitudinal Interval Follow-up Evaluation and the Life Event and Difficulty Schedule were used to provide a detailed clinical and event history both preceding and following their experiences. Analysis showed clear evidence for the progressive decay in the adverse effects of life events over time; an attribute thus far largely neglected in work seeking to clarify event-illness relationships. Comparisons between fixed and time-varying effects, representative of precisely formulated models of vulnerability/resilience, confirmed the role both of previous psychiatric consultation history and of limited individual coping skills as risk factors for the onset of diagnosable disorder. Improvements in the specification of stress modelling procedures should facilitate the integration of ideas from competing aetiological models of the onset and subsequent course of anxiety and depressive disorder.

Adjustment Disorders↗
PubMed1994

Psychiatry and the new dynamics.

Self-organizing and self-tuning neural networks are conceptualized as nonlinear dynamical systems. It is shown that biological psychiatry can be encompassed within this nonlinear dynamical framework, where it becomes coherent with trends in cognitive science. A state space representation that is a hyperspace with an energy topology and a fractal dimension is utilized. The state space representation provides a unifying framework for the classification of mental disorders. Clinical phenomena in schizophrenia can be explained in terms of nonlinear dynamics. The framework is also productive of psychiatric research. These results motivate the development of a nonlinear dynamical psychiatry.

Autistic Disorder↗
PubMed1996

The red herring and the pet fish: why concepts still can't be prototypes.

There is a Standard Objection to the idea that concepts might be prototypes (or exemplars, or stereotypes): Because they are productive, concepts must be compositional. Prototypes aren't compositional, so concepts can't be prototypes. However, two recent papers (Osherson and Smith, 1988; Kamp and Partee, 1995) reconsider this consensus. They suggest that, although the Standard Objection is probably right in the long run, the cases where prototypes fail to exhibit compositionality are relatively exotic and involve phenomena which any account of compositionality is likely to find hard to deal with; for example, the effects of quantifiers, indexicals, contextual constraints, etc. In this paper, we argue that the Standard Objection to prototype theory was right after all: The problems about compositionality are insuperable in even the most trivial sorts of examples; it is therefore as near to certain as anything in cognitive science ever gets that the structure of concepts is not statistical. Theories of categorization, concept acquisition, lexical meaning and the like, which assume the contrary simply don't work.

Concept Formation↗
PubMed1995

Consciousness and the natural method.

'Consciousness' is a superordinate term for a heterogeneous array of mental state types. The types share the property of 'being experienced' or 'being experiences'--'of there being something that it is like for the subject to be in one of these states.' I propose that we can only build a theory of consciousness by deploying 'the natural method' of coordinating all relevant informational resources at once, especially phenomenology, cognitive science, neuroscience and evolutionary biology. I'll provide two examples of the natural method in action in mental domains where an adaptationist evolutionary account seems plausible: (i) visual awareness and (ii) conscious event memory. Then I will discuss a case, (iii), dreaming, where I think no adaptationist evolutionary account exists. Beyond whatever interest the particular cases have, the examination will show why I think that a theory of mind, and the role conscious mentation plays in it, will need to be built domain-by-domain with no a priori expectation that there will be a unified account of the causal role or evolutionary history of different domains and competences.

Animals↗