Search PubMed⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search PubMed

Results for “Judgment”

Search indexed PubMed citations on genomics, clinical trials, systematic reviews and public health. Explore titles, authors and supplied subject terms, then open the PubMed record.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 217 records · Page 12Linked to original sources
PubMed2003

Hypothesis generation, probability judgment, and individual differences in working memory capacity.

This research examined the role of working memory (WM) in probability judgment and hypothesis generation using a simulated task that involved estimating the likelihood that particular menu items would be ordered by customers at a dinner. Five main findings were observed. First, judgments of the likelihood of individual items were made relative to alternatives retrieved from long-term memory. Second, the number of alternatives retrieved was positively correlated with a measure of WM-capacity (the operation-span task). Third, participants' probability judgments were subadditive (summing to well over 100%). Fourth, the degree to which participants' judgments were subadditive was affected by the number and strength of the alternatives retrieved from long-term memory. Fifth, the degree to which participants were subadditive was negatively correlated with WM-capacity. The results suggest that individual differences in WM-capacity are fundamental to hypothesis generation and probability judgment.

Humans↗
PubMed1990

Mothers' clinical judgment: a randomized trial of the Acute Illness Observation Scales.

The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the reliability, sensitivity, and specificity of mothers' judgments about acute illnesses in their children could be improved by using the Acute Illness Observation Scales (AIOS). At the 2-week well child care visit in a primary care center and a private practice, 369 mothers were divided at random into an intervention group (n = 183) and a control group (n = 186). A teaching film and booklet were used to educate mothers in the intervention group about the AIOS; control group mothers were taught a 3-point global scoring system for evaluating the chance of serious illness. In the 32 months of follow-up, 704 acute illnesses were evaluated in tandem and independently by mothers and pediatricians before the history and physical examination; 20 of these illnesses were serious. The judgments of the intervention group were more reliable than those of the control group (weighted kappa = 0.50 vs 0.26, respectively), as was the specificity of their judgments (85% vs 52%, respectively; p less than 0.0001). No difference was noted in the sensitivity of intervention group and control group mothers' judgments (80% vs 90%, respectively). Teaching parents to assess specific clinical information, as represented in the AIOS, has its greatest effect on the reliability and specificity, not the sensitivity, of their judgments. Such teaching could lead to fewer unnecessary office visits during acute illnesses.

Acute Disease↗
PubMed1999

Heuristic-systematic information processing and risk judgment.

The heuristic-systematic information processing model (HSM) holds that individuals will use one or both of these modes of information processing when attempting to evaluate information in order to arrive at a judgment. Systematic processing is defined by effortful scrutiny and comparison of information, whereas heuristic processing is defined by the use of cues to arrive more easily at a judgment. Antecedents to the two processing modes include information sufficiency, motivation, and self-efficacy. Structural equation modeling is used to examine competing configuration of this model and to evaluate the model as appropriate for predicting risk judgment. The model also is evaluated across three groups that vary with respect to their level of concern. These analyses are executed within a case study involving an epidemiological investigation of a suspected cancer cluster. The analysis confirms the HSM's theoretically proposed structure and shows it to be a useful vehicle for evaluating risk judgment. In the overall analysis, antecedent variables generally function as specified by theory. Systematic processing is predicted by greater motivation. Heuristic processing is predicted by information sufficiency. Self-efficacy is a significant predictor of both processing modes. And heuristic processing is shown to be associated with judgment of less risk. However, when the analysis is contrasted across three groups (those concerned about cancer, not concerned and uncertain) it is shown that the model is significantly more robust for the uncertain group. This finding may have implications for the use of the HSM in risk research specifically, and in field research generally.

Analysis of Variance↗
PubMed2004

Hierarchical switching with two types of judgment and two stimulus dimensions.

A number of recent studies have shown that shifting among four tasks that result from a factorial combination of two types of judgment with two judgment-to-response mappings results in a characteristics pattern of shift costs that indicates a hierarchical representation of the two task features judgment and mapping (e.g., Kleinsorge & Heuer, 1999). In the present study, two types of judgment were combined with two stimulus dimensions. With this task combination, the same basic shift-cost pattern was observed. This suggests that a combination of two types of judgment with two stimulus dimensions also results in a hierarchically structured task representation, indicating that such a task representation is readily adopted by participants when the combination of task features is suitable for a hierarchical organization.

Adult↗
PubMed1999

Individual moral judgment and cultural ideologies.

Moral judgment cannot be reduced to cultural ideology, or vice versa. But when each construct is measured separately, then combined, the product predicts powerfully to moral thinking. In Study 1, 2 churches (N = 96) were selected for their differences on religious ideology, political identity, and moral judgment. By combining these 3 variables, a multiple correlation of .79 predicted to members' moral thinking (opinions on human rights issues). Study 2 replicated this finding in a secular sample, with the formula established in Study 1 (R = .77). Individual conceptual development in moral judgment and socialization into cultural ideology co-occur, simultaneously and reciprocally, in parallel, and not serially. Individual development in moral judgment provides the epistemological categories for cultural ideology, which in turn influences the course of moral judgment, to produce moral thinking (e.g., opinions about abortion, free speech).

Adult↗
PubMed1987

Mood effects on person-perception judgments.

How does mood affect the way we learn about, judge, and remember characteristics of other people? This study looked at the effects of mood on impression formation and person memory. Realistic person descriptions containing positive and negative details were presented to subjects experiencing a manipulated happy or sad mood. Next, impression-formation judgments were obtained, and subjects' recall and recognition of details of the characters were assessed. Results showed that subjects spent longer learning about mood-consistent details but were faster in making mood-consistent judgments. Overall, happy subjects formed more favorable impressions and made more positive judgments than did sad subjects. Both cued recall and recognition memory were superior for mood-consistent characteristics. Positive mood had a more pronounced effect on judgments and memory than did negative mood. These findings are discussed in terms of recent theories of mood effects on cognition, and the likely implications of the results for everyday person-perception judgments are considered.

Adult↗
PubMed1988

A "change-of-standard" perspective on the relations among context, judgment, and memory.

We conducted three studies that tested a "change-of-standard" perspective on the relations among context, judgment, and recall. Each study consisted of two or three sessions held a few days apart. All subjects read about the sentencing decisions of one or two target trial judges and of six nontarget trial judges who consistently gave either higher or lower sentences than the target judge(s). Each study varied both the standard that was available when subjects initially judged the sentencing decisions of a target judge and the standard available when subjects subsequently recalled those decisions. To accomplish this, we varied the context of judgment, the timing of judgment, and the overall category norm for trial judges' sentencing decisions that was available at recall. We found that although subjects had been exposed to the same target information and had initially judged it in the same way, their recall of the information was different depending on whether and how a change-of-standard had occurred between judgment and recall. Unique predictions of the change-of-standard perspective were confirmed that could not be accounted for in terms of other types of context effects on judgment and memory.

Criminal Law↗
PubMed1988

The category effect in social judgment: experimental ratings of happiness.

Three experiments demonstrated the applicability of a range-frequency analysis to social judgments. Subjects rated the happiness of either (a) schematic drawings of faces or (b) life events as expressed in short verbal descriptions. The relative frequency of these stimuli was manipulated experimentally, as was the number of rating categories. Consistent with psychophysical research, ratings became less sensitive to differences in the frequencies of contextual stimuli as the number of categories increased (the category effect). With more categories, ratings also showed less adjustment to the range of stimuli actually presented. The reduction in adjustment was greater when stimuli were presented successively and when the experimental set covered a limited range. These effects of varying the number of categories were interpreted as reflecting changes in the effective context for judgment: With more categories, the differences between the effective frequencies of contextual stimuli are reduced and new, more extreme comparison values are evoked. The implications of using coarse versus fine scales of judgment are discussed in terms of the dynamics of social judgment as well as choice of the appropriate number of categories in social research. We argue that selection of the number of rating categories should be guided by research objectives rather than by a search for "true" judgments.

Facial Expression↗
PubMed1991

Describing and testing a moderator of the moral judgment and action relationship.

The relationship between moral judgment development and action for Ss who differ in the degree to which justice-based moral judgments influence moral decision making was investigated. First, a method for quantifying Ss' use of justice-based moral judgments in moral decision making (the utilizer variable) is described. Second, 5 moral judgment and action studies are reanalyzed to assess the moderating effect of the utilizer variable information. Results indicate that the relationship between moral judgment scores and action intensifies as utilization increases. Moreover, the utilizer effect appears uniform across different age and educational levels and behavioral domains. These findings support the validity of the utilizer variable and are consistent with recent multiprocess models of moral action that suggest that moral judgements are a necessary, but insufficient, factor in the production of moral action.

Decision Making↗
PubMed1996

Effects of mood during exposure to target information on subsequently reported judgments: an on-line model of misattribution and correction.

Three experiments investigated the effects of participants' mood during exposure to target information on delayed judgments of the target. Participants were exposed to a mood induction immediately before they acquired information about a political candidate and then reported their evaluation of the candidate at a later time. Effects of mood on judgment were moderated by 2 individual-differences measures that can be interpreted in terms of processing efficiency. These were political expertise and total recall for the candidate information, with higher scores on these indices interpreted as reflecting more efficient processing. Among low-expertise (or low-recall) perceivers, mood produced an assimilation effect on evaluative judgments. Among high-expertise (or high-recall) perceivers, mood produced a contrast effect on judgments. When pooling across these individual differences, mood exerted no influence on judgments. These findings are consistent with an on-line model of mood misattribution and overcorrection.

Adult↗
PubMed1997

Construal processes and trait ambiguity: implications for self-peer agreement in personality judgment.

The relationship between trait ambiguity and self-peer agreement in personality judgment was examined. In Study 1, self-peer agreement was lower on ambiguous traits (those with many behavioral referents) than on unambiguous ones (those with few behavioral referents). This finding was partially moderated by the level of friendship between peers. These results suggest that people disagree in their judgments because they use idiosyncratic trait definitions when making judgments on ambiguous traits. Study 2 tested this explanation by exploring self-peer agreement when participant pairs were forced to use the same trait definition versus different ones when judging themselves and each other. Forcing participants to use the same trait definition increased the degree to which their judgments covaried with one another. Discussion centers on the cognitive and motivational forces that can influence the degree to which personality judgments differ.

Ego↗
PubMed1998

Turning up the contrast: self-enhancement motives prompt egocentric contrast effects in social judgments.

Contrast effects occur when people judge the behavior and attitudes of others relative to their own. We tested a motivational account suggesting that these effects arise because people tailor their judgments of others to affirm their own self-worth. Consistent with that interpretation, participants displayed more egocentric contrast in their judgments of another person's intelligence (i.e., their evaluation of his score on the Scholastic Aptitude Test was more negatively related to their own score) after their self-esteem was threatened than after it was bolstered (Studies 1 and 2). High-self-esteem individuals displayed more judgmental contrast overall than did their low-esteem counterparts (Study 2). Strongly pro-choice participants whose esteem was threatened also displayed more contrast in their judgments of another person's attitude on abortion, relative to esteem-bolstered participants (Study 3). Discussion centers on the implications of these findings for theory on social comparison, self-affirmation, and social judgment.

Achievement↗
PubMed1999

Interactive effects of personality and mood on emotion-congruent memory and judgment.

Prior research on emotion congruency has tended to focus on either the effects of mood states or of personality traits on cognition. The aim of the present research was to explore when and how personality traits and mood states interact to influence emotion-congruent memory and judgment. In Study 1, participants filled out measures of personality and natural mood and then completed a series of memory and judgment tasks. The same procedure was used in Study 2, except a positive or negative mood state was induced prior to completion of the cognitive tasks. Extraversion and positive affectivity were related to retrieval of positive memories and the tendency to make positive judgments. Neuroticism and negative affectivity were related to retrieval of negative memories and the tendency to make negative judgments. In addition, several significant personality by mood interaction effects on memory and judgment were obtained in Study 2, which suggests that personality and mood effects on cognition are not independent of one another. Discussion focuses on integrating mood-congruency theories with personality theories and specifying the conditions under which mood by trait interaction effects effects emerge.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Encoding fluency is a cue used for judgments about learning.

The authors used paired-associate learning to investigate the hypothesis that the speed of generating an interactive image (encoding fluency) influenced 2 metacognitive judgments: judgments of learning (JOLs) and quality of encoding ratings (QUEs). Results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that latency of a keypress indicating successful image formation was negatively related to both JOLs and QUEs even though latency was unrelated to recall. Experiment 3 demonstrated that when concrete and abstract items were mixed in a single list, latency was related to concreteness, judgments, and recall. However, item concreteness and fluency influenced judgments independently of one another. These outcomes suggest an important role of encoding fluency in the formation of metacognitive judgments about learning and future recall.

Cognition↗
PubMed1990

Relation of socioeconomic status to logical and sociomoral judgment of middle-aged men.

Empirical links between socioeconomic status and logical and sociomoral judgment were studied. Logical judgment was measured with adaptations of the pendulum and correlations tasks devised by Inhelder and Piaget (1958); sociomoral judgment was scored with the standard Kohlberg interview. Measures of socioeconomic status (SES) were status of family of origin and subject's educational attainment and occupational prestige. In a sample of 83 middle-aged men, the 3 measures of SES accounted for 25% and 12% of the variance in logical and sociomoral judgment, respectively. Adult occupational prestige accounted for 6% of the variance in logical judgment beyond that explained by family status and education, suggesting that adult cognitive functioning may be related to occupational placement, occupational experience, or both.

Adult↗
PubMed1994

Aging and illusory correlation in judgments of co-occurrence.

This study examined the influence of aging on illusory correlation in judgments of co-occurrence. Older and younger Ss judged the probability of co-occurrence for events associated with preexisting expectancies after receiving nonsalient or salient information about the true probabilities of co-occurrence of the events. Results showed that when current information on event co-occurrence was not salient, preexisting expectancies strongly influenced the judgments of both younger and older Ss. However, when this information was salient, younger Ss' judgments reflected more accurate adjustment to the probabilistic relationships in the information than did older Ss' judgments. This age difference may be related to changes in memory processes that accompany increasing age and to differences in judgment processes necessitated by these changes.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2001

Seeing where you are heading: integrating environmental and egocentric reference frames in cardinal direction judgments.

This research focused on how people coordinate the environmental reference frame of a map with the egocentric reference frame of the forward field of view to make cardinal direction judgments. In 3 studies, reference frame misalignment was found to slow response time for cardinal direction judgments and also markedly decrease accuracy. The studies also showed that people often use a nonrotational, analytic strategy for cardinal direction judgments that has not been identified for other navigational tasks, and that interface aids that improve other navigational tasks seem ineffective for cardinal direction judgments. These findings lead to the recommendation that interface aids for improving cardinal direction judgments should integrate heading information from the environmental reference frame into the egocentric frame (forward view).

Adolescent↗
PubMed2006

The effect of target group size on risk judgments and comparative optimism: the more, the riskier.

In 5 experiments, college students exhibited a group size effect on risk judgments. As the number of individuals in a target group increased, so did participants' judgments of the risk of the average member of the group for a variety of negative life events. This happened regardless of whether the stimuli consisted of photographs of real peers or stick-figure representations of peers. As a result, the degree to which participants exhibited comparative optimism (i.e., judged themselves to be at lower risk than their peers) also increased as the size of the comparison group increased. These results suggest that the typical comparative optimism effect reported so often in the literature might be, at least in part, a group size effect. Additional results include a group size effect on judgments of the likelihood that the average group member will experience positive and neutral events and a group size effect on perceptual judgments of the heights of stick figures. These latter results, in particular, support the existence of a simple, general cognitive mechanism that integrates stimulus numerosity into quantitative judgments about that stimulus.

Adult↗