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Results for “Insurance Selection Bias”

Search indexed PubMed citations on genomics, clinical trials, systematic reviews and public health. Explore titles, authors and supplied subject terms, then open the PubMed record.

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At least 217 records · Page 12Linked to original sources
PubMed1996

Medigap reform legislation of 1990: have the objectives been met?

The 1990 medigap reform legislation had multiple objectives: To simplify the insurance market in order to facilitate policy comparison, provide consumer choice, provide market stability, promote competition, and avoid adverse selection. Based on case study interviews with a cross-section of individuals and organizations, we report that most of these objectives have been achieved. Consumers of medigap plans are able to make more informed choices, largely because they can adequately compare policies based on standard benefits. Marketing abuses have apparently declined, as evidenced by a decrease in the number of consumer complaints. Finally, no major detrimental impact on the insurance industry was detected. Beneficiaries still face some confusion in this market, however, such as understanding the rating methodologies used to set premiums and how this may affect their choices. Confusion could increase with the growth of managed care options.

Aged↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Medical savings accounts: in the spotlight on Capitol Hill.

Medical savings accounts (MSAs) have emerged as one of the key health care proposals under consideration in the 104th Congress. These tax-free accounts, which are viewed as an alternative to traditional "comprehensive" health care coverage, would allow individuals and their employers to set aside money to pay for major health care expenses. Depending on how they are designed, MSAs could have significant implications for HMOs and other managed care arrangements.

Cost Sharing↗
PubMed1997

Winners and losers under medical savings accounts.

As legislators wait to see how the MSA approach to health care reform plays out in the laboratory of the states, authors Marilyn Moon, Len M. Nichols and Susan Wall have put the numbers to work. The researchers simulated the effects of introducing MSAs into the health insurance market. What they found is what critics of MSAs suspected: As the young and healthy shift to MSAs, the premiums for those left in the remaining insurance pool will escalate. However, the authors conclude that if you are male, young and healthy, you stand to gain a lot from the MSA experiment.

Cost Sharing↗
PubMed1997

Risk management.

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

Cost Allocation↗
PubMed1997

Solutions for adverse selection in behavioral health care.

Health plans have incentives to discourage high-cost enrollees (such as persons with mental illness) from joining. Public policy to counter incentives created by adverse selection is difficult when managed care controls cost through methods that are largely beyond the grasp of direct regulation. In this article, the authors evaluate three approaches to dealing with selection incentives: risk adjustment, the carving out of benefits, and cost- or risk-sharing between the payer and the plan. Adverse selection is a serious problem in the context of managed care. Risk adjustment is not likely to help much, but carving out the benefit and cost-sharing are promising directions for policy.

Economic Competition↗
PubMed1997

Proposal: a position for the insurance industry on genetic testing.

Proposed legislation to limit the use of genetic test results in insurance underwriting has appeared with increasing frequency at the state and federal level. The proponents seek to protect consumers from unfair discrimination by insurers. Can we not develop a proactive approach, acknowledging that we do not need to do prospective testing while we assert that we must retain the current status of equivalency of information between the underwriter and the applicant?

Genetic Testing↗