The problem with purchasing pools.
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A unique law has been proposed that aims to level the playing field for individuals who work for small employers, are self-employed, and are unemployed, in the District of Columbia. The proposal would create one large group made up of all persons who live, work, or go to school in the District of Columbia, thus providing these individuals with the opportunity to be insured on the same terms and conditions as those who work for the government or for large employers.
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In 1983, New York State established an uncompensated care pool using the New York Prospective Hospital Reimbursement Methodology (NYPHRM). Two policy objectives of the NYPHRM were (1) to encourage more equitable distribution of uncompensated care across hospitals and (2) to increase access to hospital care for the uninsured. This article demonstrates that the New York uncompensated care pool was only moderately successful in achieving these goals. The principal findings are that the NYPHRM did result in routine care being redistributed away from hospitals that traditionally provided care to the uninsured, while provision of highly technological care was not significantly redistributed. This article suggests that if the primary policy goal is to increase access to care for the uninsured by changing the distribution of hospitals willing to provide care, the uncompensated care pool approach is moderately effective.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the effect of the tax subsidy on participation in employment-based health insurance for high- and low-risk individuals. The total exclusion of employer-paid health insurance premiums from taxable income has frequently been seen as contributing to excess insurance and hence welfare loss. However, less attention has been paid to quantifying the extent to which the tax subsidy mitigates the deleterious effects of adverse selection on the health insurance market. Adverse selection reduces pooling in an insurance market, so that high-risk individuals are either unable to obtain coverage or are forced to pay premiums that are unaffordable to all but the wealthiest. If there is an external benefit to society of an individual's purchase of medical care, then the presence of adverse selection may reduce the purchase of health care below the socially optimal level. Therefore, a mechanism for enhancing access to insurance and ultimately to medical care for high-risk individuals may be socially desirable. STUDY DESIGN: Data from the March 1996-March 1998 Current Population Survey (CPS). For each observation in the sample, state and federal income tax liability is calculated using code based on the ACIR Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism. The probability of having employment-based coverage in either one's own name or as a dependent is evaluated as a function of demographic variables such as age, education, marital status and family size, family income, type of employment, employer size, occupation, location, marginal tax rate, risk group (determined by self-assessed health status), and an interaction between risk group and tax rate. CPS data do not identify individuals who have declined offered coverage. Under alternative models of employer group decision making, the tax subsidy will have an important influence on the employer's decision to offer coverage. If offered, high-risk individuals accept coverage, while some low-risk individuals may decline coverage. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: For all individuals, the probability of having coverage is an increasing function of the marginal tax rate. Those classified as high-risk because their own or a family member's self-assessed health status is fair or poor are less likely to have coverage than those considered low-risk. The effect of the tax subsidy on insurance coverage is greater for high-risk individuals than for individuals classified as low-risk. CONCLUSIONS: These preliminary results indicate that high-risk individuals benefit from the tax subsidy by increased access to employment-based coverage. Therefore, welfare loss from excess levels of health insurance may be mitigated by welfare gain through expanded access to health insurance and hence to health care for high-risk individuals. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY, DELIVERY, OR PRACTICE: Elimination or reduction of the tax exclusion of health insurance premiums may have the unintended consequences of disproportionately reducing the probability of obtaining coverage in the employment-based market for high-risk individuals.
Inequality in health between rich and poor in Thailand was well documented; millions of informal workers and their families lacked health insurance; and the poor paid more proportionately in income for health care. The universal coverage is conceived as one of the means to redress the situation. But the term 'universal coverage' may mean differently among different groups of stakeholders. This paper, based on empirical research of health policy reform, collected perceptions and ideas from stakeholders and discusses the ways and strategies that universal coverage might take shape in Thailand. Two sources of information were taken: one from the questionnaire survey (according to the Delphi technique, two rounds of survey were taken), another an in-depth interview. Obtained information for policy formulation included how best, as conceived by stakeholders, to implement the universal coverage, sources of finance, fiscal implication for Thai government, ways to prevent higher demand for unnecessary services, and involvement of local government. Recent policy move in Thailand (the so-called 30 baht for all diseases) emerged in 2001 generated hot debate nationwide. The programme is currently in its early phase and is likely to evolve overtime--i.e. whether or not this programme will be financed by certain types of taxes or from annual government expense still unclear; and budget allocation among different health providers still unsettled. Anyhow this programme may be interpreted as a policy shift away from the pro-market based toward a government-supported egalitarianism.
Risk pools for small employers have become an integral part of proposals for national health care reform and have been implemented by a number of states. These explicit attempts to pool small employers are occurring at the same time that many small-firm employees obtain health insurance through implicit pooling arrangements as the dependent of a policyholder insured by a large firm. We use data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey to document the extent of implicit pooling arrangements, to examine whether small-firm employees and their dependents are adverse health risks, and to assess the cost implications of pooling small- and large-firm employees and dependents.
Providers considering managed care risk pool arrangements should understand thoroughly what services the pool covers, the time period covered, and how the pool is administered. Important issues related to pool administration include how credits and debits are applied; when the accounting occurs (interim, year-end, or contract termination); and provisions for reports, audit rights, and dispute resolution. Although a pool arrangement gives the health plan control over claims payment, the risk allocation made possible through a pool arrangement helps ensure that the economic incentives of the health plan and the provider are aligned.
States and small businesses have been rapidly establishing voluntary health care purchasing pools during the past few years. Purchasing pools can decrease health care costs, improve access for some small businesses and individual persons, allow greater choice among health care plans, and provide continuity of care. Purchasing pools also help to even the balance of power in the health care marketplace, which has come increasingly under the control of huge proprietary managed care corporations. This position paper of the American College of Physicians discusses how a system of well-designed voluntary purchasing pools can help protect the integrity of health care in the emerging managed care marketplace.
International agencies such as the World Bank have widely advocated the use of health insurance as a way of improving health sector efficiency and equity in developing countries. However, in developing countries with well-established, multiple-player health insurance markets, such as South Africa, extension of insurance coverage is now inhibited by problems of moral hazard, and associated cost escalation and fragmentation of insurer risk-pools. Virtually no research has been done on the problem of risk selection in health insurance outside developed countries. This paper provides a brief overview of the problem of risk fragmentation as it has been studied in developed countries, and attempts to apply this to middle-income country settings, particularly that of South Africa. A number of possible remedial measures are discussed, with risk-equalization funds being given the most attention. An overview is given of the risk-equalization approach, common misconceptions regarding its working and the processes that might be required to assess its suitability in different national settings. Where there is widespread public support for social risk pooling in health care, and government is willing and able to assume a regulatory role to achieve this, risk-equalization approaches may achieve significant efficiency and equity gains without destroying the positive features of private health care financing, such as revenue generation, competition and free choice of insurer.
OBJECTIVE: To describe the components of a function-based prospective payment model for inpatient medical rehabilitation that parallels diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), to evaluate this model in relation to stakeholder objectives, and to detail the components of a quality of care incentive program that, when combined with this payment model, creates an incentive for provides to maximize functional outcomes. DATA SOURCES: This article describes a conceptual model, involving no data collection or data synthesis. DATA SYNTHESIS: The basic payment model described parallels DRGs. Information on the potential impact of this model on medical rehabilitation is gleaned from the literature evaluating the impact of DRGs. The conceptual model described is evaluated against the results of a Delphi Survey of rehabilitation providers, consumers, policymakers, and researchers previously conducted by members of the research team. CONCLUSIONS: The major shortcoming of a function-based prospective payment model for inpatient medical rehabilitation is that it contains no inherent incentive to maximize functional outcomes. Linkage of reimbursement to outcomes, however, by withholding a fixed proportion of the standard FRG payment amount, placing that amount in a "quality of care" pool, and distributing that pool annually among providers whose predesignated, facility-level, case-mix-adjusted outcomes are attained, may be one strategy for maximizing outcome goals.
This final rule implements a provision of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002 by providing $40 million in Federal fiscal year 2003 and $40 million in Federal fiscal year 2004 to States that have incurred losses in connection with the operation of qualified high risk pools that meet certain criteria. This final rule also addresses comments received in response to the interim final rule that was published on May 2, 2003. This grant program implements section 2745 of the Public Health Service Act, as added by the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002.