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Cognitive components of naming in children: effects of referential uncertainty and stimulus realism.

The ease of picture naming in children was assessed as a function of two stimulus characteristics: (a) the number of available correct names for a picture (referential uncertainty) and (b) the degree to which a picture realistically represents the depicted object (stimulus realism). Two experiments employing different methods demonstrated that: (a) children named low uncertainty objects (those with a single dominant name, e.g., key, elephant) faster than high uncertainty objects (those with multiple possible correct names, e.g., lamp/light, stove/oven) and (b) this uncertainty effect arose at a stage of naming subsequent to object identification. Possible underlying mechanisms for the uncertainty effect include passive diffusion of activation over multiple object-name pathways or active inhibition among competing candidate names. Stimulus realism (colored photographs vs uncolored line drawings) did not consistently influence naming performance. Implications for understanding children's naming behavior are discussed.

Attention

Lycanthropy and demonomania: some psychopathological issues.

Modern reports on lycanthropy mainly concentrate on the content of patients' beliefs in being transformed into an animal. By contrast, an interest in the form of the symptomatology is usually minimal. This paper draws on Karl Jaspers' phenomenological views and focuses on some important albeit neglected psychopathological issues related to form which are relevant to any comprehensive consideration of lycanthropic phenomena.

Awareness

The many faces of human ageing: toward a psychological culture of old age.

In an effort to distil major findings about the nature of human ageing, seven propositions are presented as a guiding frame of reference. This propositional framework is then used to specify some conditions for a positive culture of old age and to advance one possible model of good psychological ageing. This model focuses on the dynamic interplay between three processes: selection, optimization, and compensation. The model is universal in its basic features, but at the same time emphasizes individual variations in phenotypic manifestation.

Adaptation, Psychological

Worry is reasonable: the role of explanations in pessimism about future personal events.

This experiment examines one component of worry, elevated subjective probabilities of negative events, and attempts to elucidate the cognitive processes on which this is based. The results suggest that the pessimistic subjective probabilities shown by chronic worriers can be understood using general theories of judgment, specifically, by the use of the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). However, it is the availability of a particular pattern of cognitions--an increased accessibility of explanations for why a negative event would occur, combined with a reduced accessibility of explanations for why it would not--that is important. The results are integrated within a description of the worry process, and possible clinical applications through the use of reason-generation techniques are discussed.

Adult

Illusion of control: invulnerability to negative affect and depressive symptoms after laboratory and natural stressors.

We examined whether individual differences in susceptibility to the illusion of control predicted differential vulnerability to depressive responses after a laboratory failure and naturally occurring life stressors. The illusion of control decreased the likelihood that subjects (N = 145) would (a) show immediate negative mood reactions to the laboratory failure, (b) become discouraged after naturally occurring negative life events, and (c) experience increases in depressive symptoms a month later given the occurrence of a high number of negative life events. In addition, the stress-moderating effect of the illusion of control on later depressive symptoms appeared to be mediated in part by its effect on reducing the discouragement subjects experienced from the occurrence of negative life events. These findings provide support for the hopelessness theory of depression and for the optimistic illusion-mental health link.

Adult

Pseudomemory in hypnotized and task-motivated subjects.

Highly hypnotizable hypnotized (H; n = 16) and task-motivated (TM; n = 13) subjects received pseudomemory suggestions (see Orne, 1979). TM subjects reported being more awake and motivated than did H subjects and were more likely to pass the target noise suggestion. However, 69% of subjects in both conditions who passed the noise suggestion reported pseudomemories. Pseudomemory rate (for H subjects, 69% and for TM subjects, 46%) was not reduced by informing subjects that they could distinguish reality and fantasy in a state of deep concentration. At final inquiry, after deep concentration, pseudomemories remained stable (for H subjects, 75% and for TM subjects, 54%). As predicted, H subjects reported more unsuggested noises and more pseudomemories of novel noises than did TM subjects. Subjects who reported pseudomemories were more confident in the accuracy of their memories than were subjects who reported that the suggested noises were imagined.

Adult

Processing of ambiguous and unambiguous feedback by depressed and nondepressed college students: schematic biases and their implications for depressive realism.

Explored schematic processing as a mechanism for predicting (a) when depressed Ss would be negative relative to nondepressed Ss and (b) when depressed and nondepressed Ss would show biased or unbiased (i.e., "realistic") processing. Depressed and nondepressed Ss performed multiple trials of a task under conditions in which the two groups held either equivalent or different schemas regarding this task. Ss received either an unambiguous or objectively normed ambiguous feedback cue on each trial. In full support of schematic processing, depressed Ss showed negative encoding relative to nondepressed Ss only when their schemas were more negative, and both depressed and nondepressed Ss showed positively biased, negatively biased, and unbiased encoding depending on the relative feedback cue-to-schema match. Depressed and nondepressed Ss' response latencies to unambiguous feedback also supported the occurrence of schematic processing. We discuss the methodological, treatment, and "realism" implications of these findings and suggest a more precise formulation of Beck's schema theory of depression.

Adult

Hypnosis and pseudomemories: the effects of prehypnotic expectancies.

Contrary to predictions, the pseudomemory rate of subjects who received prehypnotic information that hypnosis increased recall was indistinguishable from the pseudomemory rates of subjects who received information that hypnosis did not increase recall and of subjects who received no specific prehypnotic information. Indeed, by the last recall trial, none of the 47 subjects exhibited pseudomemory. Subjects exhibited faulty memory of events that actually occurred (i.e., pencils spilling), and were as uncertain of events that actually occurred, as they were of suggested events that did not occur during the session (telephone ringing). Subjects were generally consistent in their certainty, or lack of it, across events. Finally, subjects led to believe that hypnosis is an altered state of consciousness were less aware of external events, and had the lowest rate of recall of target suggestions compared with subjects in the comparison groups.

Adult

Depression, realism, and the overconfidence effect: are the sadder wiser when predicting future actions and events?

Do depressed individuals make more realistic judgments than their nondepressed peers in real world settings? Depressed and nondepressed Ss in 2 studies were asked to make predictions about future actions and outcomes that might occur in their personal academic and social worlds. Both groups of Ss displayed overconfidence, that is, they overestimated the likelihood that their predictions would prove to be accurate. Of key importance, depressed Ss were less accurate in their predictions, and thus more overconfident, than their nondepressed counterparts. These differences arose because depressed Ss (a) were more likely to predict the occurrence of low base-rate events and (b) were less likely to be correct when they made optimistic predictions (i.e., stated that positive events would occur or that aversive outcomes would not). Discussion focuses on implications of these findings for the depressive realism hypothesis.

Adult

Negotiating reality after physical loss: hope, depression, and disability.

The utility of different reality negotiation strategies among 57 persons who had traumatically acquired severe physical disabilities was examined. It was predicted that a sense of goal-directed determination ("agency"; Snyder, 1989) would predict lower depression and psychosocial impairment scores soon after injury. To meet the demands of rehabilitation and social integration, however, it was hypothesized that a sense of ability to find ways to meet goals ("pathways") would predict lower depression and psychosocial impairment among persons who had been disabled for a longer period. The expected interaction was significant in the prediction of psychosocial impairment but not of depression. The sense of pathways was predictive of impairment and depression regardless of the time since injury. Results suggest that in the reality negotiation process the different components of hope as defined by Snyder have salient effects on perceptions of ability to function in social capacities.

Activities of Daily Living

Self-concept change and self-presentation: the looking glass self is also a magnifying glass.

Studies 1 and 2 showed that identical behaviors had greater impact on the self-concept when performed publicly rather than privately. That is, the self-concept is more likely to change by internalizing public behavior than by internalizing behavior that is identical but lacks the interpersonal context. The self-concept change extends even to behavioral changes and occurs even when participants are unaware of being observed. In addition, those who are high in self-monitoring are more likely to internalize their behavior than those who are low in self-monitoring. Study 3 provided evidence about what components of a public situation affect the internalization of behavior. Choice about making the self-portrayal, drawing on episodes from one's own past rather than relying on a yoked script, and expecting future interaction with the audience all increased the internalization of a public behavior.

Adaptation, Psychological

Depression, nondepression, and cognitive illusions: reply to Schwartz.

In his comment, Schwartz argued that the Alloy and Abramson findings call into question the hypothesized causal link between learned helplessness and depression. Schwartz's contention is based on his interpretation of the Alloy and Abramson findings as showing that nondepressives cannot detect noncontingency. Although we argue that Schwartz has misinterpreted our data, we agree with his general contention that nondepressives may be relatively invulnerable to depression. We discuss the implications of our data for the learned helplessness theory as well as for other cognitive theories of depression. In addition, we evaluate Schwartz's intriguing motivational account of depressive accuracy in judging response-outcome contingencies. Finally, in response to Schwartz's question of whether nondepressives' errors in judging contingency are really errors at all, we suggest it is important to distinguish among error, irrationality, and maladaptiveness when discussing cognitive bias.

Adaptation, Psychological

Personal responsibility and control over our bodies: when expectation exceeds reality.

Good health has become more than a means to personal goals such as greater attractiveness and increased longevity. It symbolizes self-control, hard work, ambition, and success in life. Inherent in this symbolism is the concept that the individual controls behavior, which in turn controls health. Although control over one's life plays an important role in both physical and mental health, the concept of personal control also infers responsibility. Positive attributes are accorded to people who are healthy, but those who fall ill, or those with less than the perfect body, are blamed and are thought to be self-indulgent, lazy, or even irresponsible and immoral. There is a tendency to overstate the impact of personal behavior on health. However, biological realities shape the degree to which health is under the control of the individual. The positive effects of behavior change must be balanced with the limits imposed by biology.

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