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Incomplete vertical integration in the health care industry: pseudomarkets and pseudopolicies.

Most economic relationships are either arm's-length exchange transactions, each party seeking his or her own interest, or command structures, such as a firm or public agency, integrating joint efforts toward a common goal. The health care industry, however, displays a pattern of incomplete vertical integration--relationships which are neither truly arm's-length nor completely hierarchical. The doctor-patient relationship is archetypical. Physicians appear to sell services in private markets; yet they reach through the exchange process to direct the consumer-patient's utilization decisions, implicity undertaking to act in the patient's interest, and thus integrate forward. But they also integrate backward to control the public regulatory process--self-government--and some forms of insurance. The health care systems of different countries--Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States--can be interpreted as different patterns of incomplete integration among five basic classes of transactors: consumer-patients, first-line providers, second-line providers, insurers, and governments. Each system of linkage has characteristic strengths and weaknesses. Nowhere, however, do we find a predominance of arm's-length market relationships. Where they exist, markets in health care are usually pseudomarkets dominated by one side of the transaction. The rhetoric of market relationships serves principally to obscure political struggles over shifting patterns of integration.

Canada↗

Predicting the deforestation-trend under different carbon-prices.

BACKGROUND: Global carbon stocks in forest biomass are decreasing by 1.1 Gt of carbon annually, owing to continued deforestation and forest degradation. Deforestation emissions are partly offset by forest expansion and increases in growing stock primarily in the extra-tropical north. Innovative financial mechanisms would be required to help reducing deforestation. Using a spatially explicit integrated biophysical and socio-economic land use model we estimated the impact of carbon price incentive schemes and payment modalities on deforestation. One payment modality is adding costs for carbon emission, the other is to pay incentives for keeping the forest carbon stock intact. RESULTS: Baseline scenario calculations show that close to 200 mil ha or around 5% of today's forest area will be lost between 2006 and 2025, resulting in a release of additional 17.5 GtC. Today's forest cover will shrink by around 500 million hectares, which is 1/8 of the current forest cover, within the next 100 years. The accumulated carbon release during the next 100 years amounts to 45 GtC, which is 15% of the total carbon stored in forests today. Incentives of 6 US$/tC for vulnerable standing biomass payed every 5 year will bring deforestation down by 50%. This will cause costs of 34 billion US$/year. On the other hand a carbon tax of 12 $/tC harvested forest biomass will also cut deforestation by half. The tax income will, if enforced, decrease from 6 billion US$ in 2005 to 4.3 billion US$ in 2025 and 0.7 billion US$ in 2100 due to decreasing deforestation speed. CONCLUSION: Avoiding deforestation requires financial mechanisms that make retention of forests economically competitive with the currently often preferred option to seek profits from other land uses. Incentive payments need to be at a very high level to be effective against deforestation. Taxes on the other hand will extract budgetary revenues from the regions which are already poor. A combination of incentives and taxes could turn out to be a viable solution for this problem. Increasing the value of forest land and thereby make it less easily prone to deforestation would act as a strong incentive to increase productivity of agricultural and fuelwood production, which could be supported by revenues generated by the deforestation tax.

Journal Article↗

The effects of health care advertising.

This paper begins by assessing the current status of health care advertising and its potential for growth, arguing that this form of marketing is not just a passing fad among a few clinics and hospitals. It then describes the opposing schools of thought concerning the economics of advertising, and considers both theory and evidence on the effects of advertising on prices, profits, quality, utilization, and innovation.

Advertising↗

Is medical care different? Old questions, new answers.

This paper examines whether changes in medical markets may be making them more like other markets. The emergence of HMOs and other managed care systems appears to have increased the consumer's potential ability to make better comparative judgments about the price and quality of medical care, and also seems to have made medical care more like other goods. However, the evidence that medical care is a "reputation good" suggests that it is, in this respect, different from other goods. Finally, the social concerns about medical care use necessarily make medical care different.

Consumer Advocacy↗

Arrow on trust.

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Economic Competition↗