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PubMed1986

Category breadth and hierarchical structure in personality: studies of asymmetries in judgments of trait implications.

Trait breadth and hierarchical organization are central structural principles in personality theory and research. We assume that personality traits serve as categories of behavioral events, and we define the breadth of traits as the diversity of their behavioral manifestations. We show that trait breadth can be measured reliably both by ratings and by direct comparisons within trait pairs. We assess the hierarchical relations between traits differing in breadth, using a task in which subjects select the most meaningful of two statements, such as "To be talkative is a way of being extroverted" versus "To be extroverted is a way of being talkative." The extent of asymmetry in the choices of the subject sample provides an index of the degree of class inclusion. In four studies, we demonstrate that the size of the asymmetry effect is highly predictable from differences in trait breadth, even when the effects of social desirability, familiarity, and meaningfulness are controlled. Moreover, we replicate these findings in two cultural contexts, and even at the level of individual subjects. The availability of traits at different hierarchical levels requires personality psychologists to make an explicit choice about level of abstraction, especially when studying behavioral consistency. We discuss the prospect for identifying a generally preferred or "basic" level of personality description.

Humans↗
PubMed2001

Can one ever be too wealthy or too chaste? Searching for nonlinearities in mate judgment.

In 3 studies, the authors searched for nonlinearities as possible clues to context-sensitive mechanisms involved in mating decisions. Participants judged targets' sexual desirability, marital desirability, or social status on the basis of information about income or number of past sexual partners. Because one cannot know in advance where nonlinearities occur or measure all values of independent variables, a "zoom and focus" method was used. The authors began by sampling a wide range of values, followed by successively more focused examination of potentially interesting regions. Across studies, income and desirability were linked exponentially, particularly for male targets and marriage partners. Sexual partners and desirability were sometimes linked nonmonotonically, with more partners first increasing, then decreasing, desirability. The authors discuss how nonmonotonic functions may suggest competing underlying processes.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2004

The redux of cognitive consistency theories: evidence judgments by constraint satisfaction.

The authors suggest that decisions made from multiple pieces of evidence are performed hy mechanisms of parallel constraint satisfaction, which are related to cognitive consistency theories. Such reasoning processes are bidirectional--decisions follow from evidence, and evaluations of the evidence shift toward coherence with the emerging decision. Using a factually complex legal case, the authors observed patterns of coherence shifts that persisted even when the distribution of decisions was manipulated (Study 1) and influenced by the participants' attitudes (Study 2). The evaluations of the evidence cohered with the preferred decision even when participants changed their preference (Study 3). Supporting the bidirectionality of reasoning. Study 4 showed that assigning participants to a verdict affected their evaluation of the evidence. Coherence shifts were observed also in related background knowledge. This research suggests that cognitive consistency theories should play a greater role in the understanding of human reasoning and decision making.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2004

The automaticity of race and Afrocentric facial features in social judgments.

Four experiments were conducted to examine the automaticity of stereotyping based on racial category and (within-race) Afrocentric facial features. Results showed that both forms of stereotyping are efficient processes, able to operate when cognitive resources are highly restricted. The 2 differed, however, in their controllability. Participants demonstrated that they were sensitized to race-based stereotypes and able to control that influence to a significant degree. In contrast, participants appeared to be largely unaware of using Afrocentric features to make stereotypic inferences, and they proved unable to avoid doing so, even when they were given explicit information about the process and they demonstrated that they could easily and reliably identify the relevant features.

Adult↗
PubMed2006

Framing discrimination: effects of inclusion versus exclusion mind-sets on stereotypic judgments.

Three studies investigated how inclusion versus exclusion strategies differentially lead to stereotypic decisions. In inclusion strategies, suitable targets are selected from a list of candidates, whereas in exclusion strategies, unsuitable candidates are eliminated. Across 2 separate target domains (Study 1: male and female politicians; Studies 2 and 3: African American and European American basketball players), exclusion strategies, as compared with inclusion strategies, elicited higher levels of both sensitivity stereotyping (i.e., greater difficulty distinguishing among members of stereotyped groups) and criterion stereotyping (i.e., setting different decision thresholds for judging members of different groups; see M. R. Banaji & A. G. Greenwald, 1995). Thus, the strategy used during decision making can influence the final decision via 2 theoretically distinct stereotyping mechanisms.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1991

Explanation, imagination, and confidence in judgment.

This article concerns a class of experimental manipulations that require people to generate explanations or imagine scenarios. A review of studies using such manipulations indicates that people who explain or imagine a possibility then express greater confidence in the truth of that possibility. It is argued that this effect results from the approach people take in the explanation or imagination task: They temporarily assume that the hypothesis is true and assess how plausibly it can account for the relevant evidence. From this view, any task that requires that a hypothesis be treated as if it were true is sufficient to increase confidence in the truth of that hypothesis. Such tasks cause increased confidence in the hypothesis at the expense of viable alternatives because of changes in problem representation, evidence evaluation, and information search that take place when the hypothesis is temporarily treated as if it were true.

Decision Making↗
PubMed2003

When do stereotypes come to mind and when do they color judgment? A goal-based theoretical framework for stereotype activation and application.

The authors describe a theoretical framework for understanding when people interacting with a member of a stereotyped group activate that group's stereotype and apply it to that person. It is proposed that both stereotype activation and stereotype application during interaction depend on the strength of comprehension and self-enhancement goals that can be satisfied by stereotyping one's interaction partner and on the strength of one's motivation to avoid prejudice. The authors explain how these goals can promote and inhibit stereotype activation and application, and describe diverse chronic and situational factors that can influence the intensity of these goals during interaction and, thereby, influence stereotype activation and application. This approach permits integration of a broad range of findings on stereotype activation and application.

Ethnicity↗
PubMed1997

Thurstonian and Brunswikian origins of uncertainty in judgment: a sampling model of confidence in sensory discrimination.

As a preliminary step towards the presentation of a model of confidence in sensory discrimination, the authors propose a distinction between 2 different origins of uncertainty named after 2 of the great probabilists in the history of psychology, L.L. Thurstone and Egon Brunswik. The authors review data that suggest that there are empirical as well as conceptual differences between the 2 modes of uncertainty and thus that separate models of confidence are needed in tasks dominated by Thurstonian and Brunswikian uncertainty. The article presents a computational model for 1 class of tasks dominated by Thurstonian uncertainty: sensory discrimination with pair comparisons. The sensory sampling model predicts decisions, confidence assessments, and the complex pattern of response times in simple psychophysical discrimination tasks (J.V. Baranski and W.M. Petrusic, 1994). The model also accounts for the disposition towards underconfidence often observed in sensory discrimination with pair comparisons.

Adult↗
PubMed2006

Deciding about decision models of remember and know judgments: a reply to Murdock (2006).

B. B. Murdock (2006) has interpreted remember-know data within a decision space defined by item and associative information, the fundamental variables in his general recognition memory model TODAM (B. B. Murdock, 1982). He has related parameters of this extended model to stimulus characteristics for several classic remember-know data sets. The authors show that this accomplishment is shared by both one- and two-dimensional signal-detection-based remember-know models (J. C. Dunn, 2004; C. M. Rotello, N. A. Macmillan, & J. A. Reeder, 2004; J. T. Wixted & V. Stretch, 2004), which can be represented in this same decision space and can be related to stimulus characteristics with similar success. Murdock claims that his model, unlike its competitors, is a process model; however, the process aspects of TODAM are not used in his application, and the decision aspects are identical to a previously proposed model. Murdock's claim that one competing model (STREAK; C. M. Rotello et al., 2004) is not fully specified is shown to be false. The new model is not superior to existing ones, but comparisons among the models to date are not definitive. The authors describe several strategies that might be applied to distinguish among them.

Cognition↗
PubMed2006

Judgments of path, not heading, guide locomotion.

To steer a course through the world, people are almost entirely dependent on visual information, of which a key component is optic flow. In many models of locomotion, heading is described as the fundamental control variable; however, it has also been shown that fixating points along or near one's future path could be the basis of an efficient control solution. Here, the authors aim to establish how well observers can pinpoint instantaneous heading and path, by measuring their accuracy when looking at these features while traveling along straight and curved paths. The results showed that observers could identify both heading and path accurately (approximately 3 degrees ) when traveling along straight paths, but on curved paths they were more accurate at identifying a point on their future path (approximately 5 degrees ) than indicating their instantaneous heading (approximately 13 degrees ). Furthermore, whereas participants could track changes in the tightness of their path, they were unable to accurately track the rate of change of heading. In light of these results, the authors suggest it is unlikely that heading is primarily used by the visual system to support active steering.

Association Learning↗
PubMed2004

Partition-edit-count: naive extensional reasoning in judgment of conditional probability.

The authors provide evidence that people typically evaluate conditional probabilities by subjectively partitioning the sample space into n interchangeable events, editing out events that can be eliminated on the basis of conditioning information, counting remaining events, then reporting probabilities as a ratio of the number of focal to total events. Participants' responses to conditional probability problems were influenced by irrelevant information (Study 1), small variations in problem wording (Study 2), and grouping of events (Study 3), as predicted by the partition-edit-count model. Informal protocol analysis also supports the authors' interpretation. A 4th study extends this account from situations where events are treated as interchangeable (chance and ignorance) to situations where participants have information they can use to distinguish among events (uncertainty).

Humans↗
PubMed2005

Ordinal judgments and summation of nonvisible sets of food items by two chimpanzees and a rhesus macaque.

Two chimpanzees and a rhesus macaque rapidly learned the ordinal relations between 5 colors of containers (plastic eggs) when all containers of a given color contained a specific number of identical food items. All 3 animals also performed at high levels when comparing sets of containers with sets of visible food items. This indicates that the animals learned the approximate quantity of food items in containers of a given color. However, all animals failed in a summation task, in which a single container was compared with a set of 2 containers of a lesser individual quantity but a greater combined quantity. This difficulty was not overcome by sequential presentation of containers into opaque receptacles, but performance improved if the quantitative difference between sizes was very large.

Animals↗
PubMed2004

Local and global judgments of confidence.

Studies of calibration have shown that people's mean confidence in their answers (local confidence) tends to be greater than their overall estimate of the percentage of correct answers (global confidence). Moreover, whereas the former exhibits overconfidence, the latter often exhibits underconfidence. Three studies present evidence that global underconfidence reflects a failure to make an allowance for correct answers that are likely to result from mere guessing and can be eliminated by informing participants of the dubious normative status of estimates below 50% (i.e., chance). Previously reported discrepancies between global and local confidence, it is concluded, arise less from possible methodological artifacts in assessment of local confidence than from normatively inappropriate assessments of global confidence.

Humans↗
PubMed2005

The effects of word frequency and similarity on recognition judgments: the role of recollection.

K. J. Malmberg, J. Holden, and R. M. Shiffrin (2004) reported more false alarms for low- than high-frequency words when the foils were similar to the targets. According to the source of activation confusion (SAC) model of memory, that pattern is based on recollection of an underspecified episodic trace rather than the error-prone familiarity process. The authors tested the SAC account by varying whether participants were warned about the nature of similar foils and whether the recognition test required the discrimination. More false alarms for low-frequency similar items occurred only when participants were not warned at study about the subtle features to be discriminated later. The differential false-alarm rate by word frequency corresponded to the pattern of remember responses obtained when the test instructions did not ask for a subtle discrimination, supporting the SAC account that reversed false-alarm rates to similar foils are based on the recollection process.

Attention↗
PubMed2006

Hidden covariation detection produces faster, not slower, social judgments.

In P. Lewicki's (1986b) demonstration of hidden covariation detection (HCD), responses of participants were slower to faces that corresponded with a covariation encountered previously than to faces with novel covariations. This slowing contrasts with the typical finding that priming leads to faster responding and suggests that HCD is a unique type of implicit process. The authors extended Lewicki's methodology and showed that participants exposed to nonsalient covariations between hair length and personality were subsequently faster to respond to faces with those covariations than to faces without, despite lack of awareness of the critical covariations. This result confirms that people can detect subtle relationships between features of stimuli and that, as with other types of implicit cognition, this detection facilitates responding.

Adult↗
PubMed2006

Collaboration in associative recognition memory: using recalled information to defend "new" judgments.

S. E. Clark, A. Hori, A. Putnam, and T. J. Martin (2000) showed that collaboration on a recognition memory task produced facilitation in recognition of targets but had inconsistent and sometimes negative effects regarding distractors. They accounted for these results within the framework of a dual-process, recall-plus-familiarity model but showed only weak evidence to support it. The present results of 3 experiments present stronger evidence for Clark et al.'s dual-process view and also show why such evidence is difficult to obtain.

Attention↗
PubMed2006

Between ignorance and truth: Partition dependence and learning in judgment under uncertainty.

In 3 studies, participants viewed sequences of multiattribute objects (e.g., colored shapes) appearing with varying frequencies and judged the likelihood of the attributes of those objects. Judged probabilities reflected a compromise between (a) the frequency with which each attribute appeared and (b) the ignorance prior probability cued by the number of distinct values that the focal attribute could take on. Thus, judged probabilities were partition dependent, varying with the number of events into which the state space was subjectively divided. This bias was diminished among participants more confident in what they learned, was strong and insensitive to level of confidence when ignorance priors were especially salient, and required ignorance priors to be salient only when probabilities were elicited (not during encoding).

Attention↗
PubMed2005

Impaired visuospatial recognition memory but normal object novelty detection and relative familiarity judgments in adult mice expressing the APPswe Alzheimer's disease mutation.

The present study examined the effects of a human APPswe mutation on object recognition memory in adult Tg2576 mice. The results showed that 14-month old Tg2576 mice were able to detect object novelty as well as control mice, even with delays of up to 24 hr. In addition, transgenic mice showed a normal recency effect and explored the most recently encountered object significantly less than an object encountered earlier in a trial. However, adult Tg2576 mice showed impairments in detecting a change in the relative positions of an array of familiar objects. The results suggest that the formation of representations involving a combination of object identity and spatial information are particularly sensitive to amyloid pathology in adult APPswe mutant mice.

Alzheimer Disease↗

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