Search PubMed⌕ Search

PubMed · 9987353

Infusion devices require educated users.

Abstract

With increased use of intravenous therapy, nurse managers can use this guide to select and integrate appropriate equipment and educate staff.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

E A McConnell. 1998. Infusion devices require educated users.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9987353/

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related citations

The effects of expanding patient choice of provider on waiting times: evidence from a policy experiment.

Long waiting times for inpatient treatment in the UK National Health Service have been a source of popular and political concern, and therefore a target for policy initiatives. In the London Patient Choice Project, patients at risk of breaching inpatient waiting time targets were offered the choice of an alternative hospital with a guaranteed shorter wait. This paper develops a simple theoretical model of the effect of greater patient choice on waiting times. It then uses a difference in difference econometric methodology to estimate the impact of the London choice project on ophthalmology waiting times. In line with the model predictions, the project led to shorter average waiting times in the London region and a convergence in waiting times amongst London hospitals.

Choice Behavior↗

Health insurance benefit packages prioritized by low-income clients in India: three criteria to estimate effectiveness of choice.

We applied a decision tool for rationing choices, with a predetermined budget of about 11 US dollars per household per year, to identify priorities of poor people regarding health insurance benefits in India in late 2005. A total of 302 individuals, organized in 24 groups, participated from a number of villages and neighborhoods of towns in Karnataka and Maharashtra. Many individuals were illiterate, innumerate and without insurance experience. Involving clients in insurance package design is based on an implied assumption that people can make judicious rationing decisions. Judiciousness was assessed by examining the association between the frequency of choosing a package and its perceived effectiveness. Perceived effectiveness was evaluated by comparing respondents' choices to the costs registered in 2049 illness episodes among a comparable cohort, using three criteria: 'reimbursement' (reimbursement regardless of the absolute level of expenditure), 'fairness' (higher reimbursement rate for higher expenses) and 'catastrophic coverage' (insurance for catastrophic exposure). The most frequently chosen packages scored highly on all three criteria; thus, rationing choices were confirmed as judicious. Fully 88.4% of the respondents selected at least three of the following benefits: outpatient, inpatient, drugs and tests, with a clear preference to cover high aggregate costs regardless of their probability. The results show that involving prospective clients in benefit package design can be done without compromising the judiciousness of rationing choices, even with people who have low education, low-income and no previous experience in similar exercises.

Choice Behavior↗

Insurance choice and tax-preferred health savings accounts.

We develop an infinite horizon utility maximization model of the interaction between insurance choice and tax-preferred health savings accounts. The model can be used to examine a wide range of policy options, including flexible spending accounts, health savings accounts, and health reimbursement accounts. We also develop a 2-period model to simulate various implications of the model. Key results from the simulation analysis include the following: (1) with no adverse selection, use of unrestricted health savings accounts leads to modest welfare gains, after accounting for the tax revenue loss; (2) with adverse selection and an initial pooling equilibrium comprised of "sick" and "healthy" consumers, introducing HSAs can, but does not necessarily, lead to a new pooling equilibrium. The new equilibrium results in a higher coinsurance rate, an increase in expected utility for healthy consumers, and a decrease in expected utility for sick consumers; (3) with adverse selection and a separating equilibrium, both sick and healthy consumers are better off with a health savings account; (4) efficiency gains are possible when insurance contracts are explicitly linked to tax-preferred health savings accounts.

Choice Behavior↗