Actuarial considerations on genetic testing.

Abstract

In the UK the majority of life insurers employ relatively liberal underwriting standards so that people can easily gain access to life assurance cover. Up to 95% of applicants are accepted at standard terms. If genetic testing becomes widespread then the buying habits of the public may change. Proportionately more people with a predisposition to major types of disease may take life assurance cover while people with no predisposition may take proportionately less. A model is used to show the possible effect. However, the time-scales are long and the mortality of assured people is steadily improving. The change in buying habits may result in the rate of improvement slowing down. In the whole population, the improvement in mortality is likely to continue and could improve faster if widespread genetic testing results in earlier diagnosis and treatment. Life insurers would not call for genetic tests and need not see the results of previous tests except for very large sums assured. In the UK, life insurers are unlikely to change their underwriting standards, and are extremely unlikely to bring in basic premium rating systems that give discounts on the premium or penalty points according to peoples genetic profile. The implications of widespread genetic testing on medical insurance and some health insurance covers may be more extreme.