Functional representations common to visual perception and imagination.

Abstract

Subjects determined whether probe dots appearing in component squares of a 5 X 5 grid fell on a figure that, depending on the condition, was (a) visually presented as a pattern of darkened squares, (b) only remembered from a preceding presentation of such a pattern, or (c) imaginally generated from a verbal code. The speed and accuracy of the responses to the probes as well as the functional dependencies of the reaction times on structural variables were essentially the same whether the figural pattern was imagined, remembered, or actually seen. Reaction times averaged between 400 and 500 msec and were consistently faster (a) for on-figure than for off-figure responses, (b) for simpler figures that had fewer squares, (c) for off-figure probes that were more distant from the figure, and (d) for on-figure probes that consisted either of more dots on the figure or of a dot at the intersection of a horizontal and a vertical bar. The reults were consistent with a model in which a subject's perceptual or imaginal representations of these forms contain barlike units that respond independently to the probes.