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PubMed · 3760442

Psychoanalysis and time.

J A Arlow
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Abstract

Psychoanalysis is fundamentally related to time because it is an effort to understand how disturbances in the present are determined by events in the past. Technically, we know that the patient who is reporting immediate perceptions is not aware of the passage of time, but he becomes self-conscious as undesirable elements threaten to appear in his associations. Time is not sensed by direct awareness, nor is it an agent of action or events. Various functions of the ego influence how time is experienced consciously, leading to phenomena such as déjà vu, a sensation of timelessness, misjudgment of time duration, the experience of premonition. Psychoanalysis more than any other discipline sheds light on the coexistence of past, present, and future, as influenced by unconscious fantasy thinking. The analyst's understanding of the patient's associations is guided by temporal factors such as context and contiguity, succession of similar or opposite elements. Basically, the self is a time-bound concept; identity implies that a self is the same entity at different points in time. There is a deep-seated rebellion against the tyranny of time, beginning with need frustration in the infant and culminating in the knowledge that man is destined to lose the struggle against death.

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AwarenessDeja VuDepersonalizationDissociative DisordersDriveHumansProfessional-Patient RelationsPsychoanalytic TheoryPsychoanalytic TherapyTime PerceptionJournal Article

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BibTeXRIS

J A Arlow. 1986. Psychoanalysis and time.. https://doi.org/10.1177/000306518603400301

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