PubMed · 3434642
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J A Lerner. 1987. Psychoanalytic identity.. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01255230
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We believe it should be possible to make operational the philosophical ideas of the good life in order to make it the object of scientific research. The Quality of Life Research Center in Copenhagen, Denmark has therefore spent the last several years with these questions and tried to find practical and evidence-based scientific solutions. This paper describes the theoretical road taken in moving from the abstract philosophy of life to the actual questionnaire. It presents an important aspect of our work with the quality-of-life (QOL) concept though the last decade. We have developed the quality-of-life philosophy; the SEQOL, QOL5, and QOL1 questionnaires; the quality-of-life theory; and the quality-of-life research methodology. We carried out quality-of-life population surveys and developed techniques for improving quality of life with the chronically sick patient. This paper presents the struggle to create a rating scale for the generic measurement of the global quality of life, based on quality-of-life theory, derived from quality-of-life philosophy. The developed rating scale is a ratio scale combining a Likert scale, a visual analogue scale, and a numerical scale, to a reduced combination scale. This allows for the extraction of as much information from the respondents as possible without exhausting them unduly or demanding more than can be reasonably expected.
The QALY (quality-adjusted life years) attempts to incorporate the dimension of quality of life into the evaluation by adjusting life years by a quality factor. In practice, this is based on discussing with people the progression of a number of hypothetical illnesses and their ensuing side effects. From this information, the person assesses how each state of health described compares with a theoretical maximum state of health. For example, 1 day with a certain condition might the equivalent of living only 0.5 days in good health. We believe that QALY value only represents a superficial impression of a person's quality of life. In short, the QALY does not express what it means for a person to live a life at reduced quality. We believe that if the patients were optimally informed and allowed to decide for themselves, they would more often reject high-tech expensive biomedical treatments that only serve to prolong life and do not increase its quality. The problem of priorities may then turn out to be far more simple and also more ethical: the focus will be on the quality of life, not on QALY, and the question of the meaning of life and death will achieve greater openness and respect.