Search PubMed⌕ Search

PubMed · 14999635

Looking back at smallpox.

Abstract

Smallpox apparently arose through transfer of variola virus to humans from another animal species. By causing a brief infection that required close contact for transmission and engendered solid immunity, the agent was always vulnerable to simple isolation measures. The high replicative fidelity of the viral DNA polymerase limited variola's ability to adapt to humans and preserved orthopoxviral antigenic cross-reactivity, so that vaccinia vaccination protected against smallpox. Host-derived genes encoding immunomodulatory proteins helped shelter viral replication from innate immune responses. Examination of clinical variants suggests that severity of illness was usually determined by host responses during the incubation period. Control of viral replication was aided by early postexposure vaccination and might be strengthened by additional immunological interventions. Massive inflammatory responses were responsible for major features of illness. Some patients with high levels of circulating virus developed hemorrhagic disease resembling septic shock. Continued study of virus-host interactions is needed to defend against genetically modified agents.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Mike Bray, Mark Buller. 2004-03-01. Looking back at smallpox.. https://doi.org/10.1086/381976

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related citations

A strategic vaccine facility for the UK.

This paper describes a proposed Strategic Vaccine Facility (SVF) to provide a capability to the UK to deal with new and emerging disease threats. It would underpin the vaccine manufacturing industry by developing expertise and technology to enable rapid manufacture of small batches of vaccines for emergency use against agents, such as bioterrorist agents and emerging diseases. It would have a rare ability to work with dangerous pathogens under containment, allowing the production of inactivated and live vaccines, which would be difficult in a conventional plant. The facility's output will include vaccine candidates and manufacturing protocols for transfer to industry, small vaccine batches for emergency use or clinical trials, and vaccine reference standards. It would also be available for manufacturing small batches of experimental and public health vaccines for the UK and the developing world, allowing clinical trials to be undertaken against key diseases.

Bioterrorism↗