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Teleological behaviorism.

Abstract

A psychological science of efficient causes, using internal mechanisms to explain overt behavior, is distinguished from another psychological science, based on Aristotelian final causes, using external objects and goals to explain overt behavior. Efficient-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of how a particular act is emitted; final-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of why a particular act is emitted. Physiological psychology, modern cognitive psychology, and some parts of behaviorism including Skinnerian behaviorism are efficient-cause psychologies; final-cause psychology, a development of Skinnerian behaviorism, is here called teleological behaviorism. Each of these two conceptions of causality in psychology implies a different view of the mind, hence a different meaning of mental terms.

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BibTeXRIS

H Rachlin. 1992. Teleological behaviorism.. https://doi.org/10.1037/%2F0003-066x.47.11.1371

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