PubMed · 14049684
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VAN BERGEN. 1963. [REPLICATIONS].. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/14049684/
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In 2001, the Federal Office of Pipeline Safety promulgated its pipeline integrity management rule for hazardous liquid pipelines. A notice of proposed rule making for a similar rule for gas pipelines was issued in January 2003. A final rule must be in place by the end of 2003. These rules derive from formal risk management initiatives of both the pipeline industry and the regulators beginning in the early to mid-1990s. The initiatives and resulting rules built on many of the process safety and risk management concepts and frameworks of the process industries, as modified for pipelines. Looking closely at the parallels and the differences is an interesting study of how the technical, public and industry-specific requirements affect the types of regulations, supporting management system frameworks and the technical activities for improving hazardous materials process safety. This paper is based on the experience of the author in project work with federal and state regulators and with industry groups and companies, in both the process and pipeline industries over the last 17 years. It provides insights into various alternative pathways for communicating process safety concepts and improving process safety as the concepts are translated into specific company and even individual employee actions. It specifically highlights how the commonalities and differences in the types and configurations of physical assets and operating practices of the pipeline companies and process facilities affect respective cultures, language and actions for process safety management.
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The sciences analyzing and describing risks are relatively new and developing, and the associated terminologies are developing as well. This has led to ambiguity in the use of terms, both between different risk sciences and between the different parties involved in risk debates. Only recently, major vocabularies have been compiled by authoritative agencies. Some of these vocabularies are examined and explained based on a division into fundamental and action oriented risk terms. Fundamental terms are associated with description and characterization of the chemical, biological and physical processes leading from risk source(s) to possible consequences/effects. The approach to these terms is based on a cause-effect skeleton. The action oriented terms cover administrative, scientific, sociological, etc. processes associated with the work of identifying, characterizing, regulating and communicating risks in the society, and their internal connection and iterative character have been illustrated. Focus is laid on engineering and toxicological risks, but to some extent, the thoughts presented may be extrapolated to other areas. Differences in applied terminology probably cannot be eliminated, but they can be identified and clarified for better understanding. With the present paper, the authors hope to contribute to reducing the probability of derailing risk discussions from the risk issue itself.