PubMed · 11652534
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R J Corry, R Mendez, G E Friedlaender, P S Russell, B Schulman, G Opelz. 1988. Organ allocation.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11652534/
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Levine argues that neither self-interest nor altruism explains experimental results in bargaining and public goods games. Subjects' preferences appear also to be sensitive to their opponents' perceived altruism. Sethi and Somanathan provide a general account of reciprocal preferences that survive under evolutionary pressure. Although a wide variety of reciprocal strategies pass this evolutionary test, Sethi and Somanthan conjecture that fewer are likely to survive when reciprocal strategies compete with each other. This paper develops evolutionary agent-based models to test their conjecture in cases where reciprocal preferences can differ in a variety of games. We confirm that reciprocity is necessary but not sufficient for optimal cooperation. We explore the theme of competition among reciprocal cooperators and display three interesting emergent organizations: racing to the "moral high ground," unstable cycles of preference change, and, when we implement reciprocal mechanisms, hierarchies resulting from exploiting fellow cooperators. If reciprocity is a basic mechanism facilitating cooperation, we can expect interaction that evolves around it to be complex, non-optimal, and resistant to change.
Kin-selection theory has thrived in the explanation of a wide variety of biological phenomena, chiefly the evolution of biological altruism as that found in sterile castes of eusocial insects. Much of the way in which it has been tested is based on the existence of conflicts over sex-ratio production within eusocial colonies. However, despite neatly showing eusocial colonies as arenas where selection at the gene level triggers the appearance of sophisticated disputes, these studies have only demonstrated the existence of genes that act by biasing sex ratios to promote their own spread. Here we argue that such genes depend on the social organization of the colonies where they are expressed, but that they are not, in any way, the precursors of these societies-the major implication being that unequivocal evidence that eusociality evolved through the action of kin-selected altruistic genes is still lacking. Additionally, we highlight the neglect of alternative theories on the explanation of both biological altruism and sex-ratio conflicts, and defend that the enthusiasm with the latter has, in some cases, led to its inappropriate use as a basis for the explanation of other biological characteristics of eusocial organisms, when accounts based on phylogenetic or physiological constraints are also available.