Cryptographic framework for document-objects resulting from multiparty collaborative transactions.

Abstract

Multiparty transactional frameworks--i.e. Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) or Health Level (HL) 7--often result in composite documents which can be accurately modelled using hyperlinked document-objects. The structural complexity arising from multiauthor involvement and transaction-specific sequencing would be poorly handled by conventional digital signature schemes based on a single evaluation of a one-way hash function and asymmetric cryptography. In this paper we outline the generation of structure-specific authentication hash-trees for the the authentication of transactional document-objects, followed by asymmetric signature generation on the hash-tree value. Server-side multi-client signature verification would probably constitute the single most compute-intensive task, hence the motivation for our usage of the Rabin signature protocol which results in significantly reduced verification workloads compared to the more commonly applied Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) protocol. Data privacy is handled via symmetric encryption of message traffic using session-specific keys obtained through key-negotiation mechanisms based on discrete-logarithm cryptography. Individual client-to-server channels can be secured using a double key-pair variation of Diffie-Hellman (DH) key negotiation, usage of which also enables bidirectional node authentication. The reciprocal server-to-client multicast channel is secured through Burmester-Desmedt (BD) key-negotiation which enjoys significant advantages over the usual multiparty extensions to the DH protocol. The implementation of hash-tree signatures and bi/multidirectional key negotiation results in a comprehensive cryptographic framework for multiparty document-objects satisfying both authentication and data privacy requirements.