PubMed · 11168169
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M H Nicolas-Chanoine. 2000. Future needs--diagnostic services.. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1469-0691.2000.00127.x
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This paper summarizes recent thinking on stimulating industrial research and development (R&D) for neglected infectious diseases and argues that it is critical to enlarge the value of the market for medicines and vaccines through, for example, global purchase funds. The most important economic barriers to R&D are that the commercial markets are small and that individual purchasing power is severely limited, even though the number of patients may be very large. Since R&D costs for all diseases are high, this means that returns will not cover investments. Various mechanisms have been proposed to address this economic imbalance (accepting that other barriers will also need to be considered). Economic devices which reduce the costs of R&D--push factors--are useful, but our review suggests that high costs do not explain the shortfall in R&D. Economic devices which address the lack of viable markets have been termed pull factors and are designed to create or secure a market, thereby improving the likelihood of a return on investments. One pull mechanism is the commitment in advance to purchase a product that meets specified criteria, if invented. The purchase-precommitment approach has a number of attractive features. For example, it only rewards successful outputs rather than supporting research that may not succeed. Pull programmes effectively mimic the market and lead companies to favour lines of attack that they believe will lead to marketable products. Overall, a combination of push and pull mechanisms is likely to represent an attractive approach. This could combine, for example, increased funding for public laboratories, public-private partnerships in R&D, purchases of underutilized existing products, and a precommitment to purchase new drugs and vaccines when developed.
This paper examines the proposal to build research and development (R&D) capabilities for dealing with neglected infectious and tropical diseases in countries where they are endemic, as a potentially cost- and time-effective way to fill the gap between the supply of and need for new medicines. With reference to the situation in India, we consider the competencies and incentives needed by companies so that their strategy can be shifted from reverse engineering of existing products to investment in R&D for new products. This requires complex reforms, of which the intellectual property rights agreement is only one. We also consider whether Indian companies capable of conducting research and development are likely to target neglected diseases. Patterns of patenting and of R&D, together with evidence from interviews we have conducted, suggest that Indian companies, like multinational corporations, are likely to target global diseases because of the prospect of much greater returns. Further studies are required on how Indian companies would respond to push and pull incentives originally designed to persuade multinational corporations to do more R&D on neglected diseases.