Biomedical subjects

Walter Schaeken

Publications and source records attributed to Walter Schaeken.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2005

The wording of conclusions in relational reasoning.

Literature on relational reasoning mainly focuses on the performance question. It is typically argued that problem difficulty relies on the number of "mental models" compatible with the problem. However, no study has ever investigated the wording of conclusions that participants formulate. In the present work, we analyze the relational terms that people use in drawing conclusions from spatial relation problems (A is to the left of B, B is to the left C, D is in front of A, E is in front C, What is the relation between D and E?). We observed a general preference for expressing conclusions with 'left' rather than conclusions with 'right'. We also found that three factors had an influence on the wording of the conclusions: the linguistic form of premises, the question type and the presentation format. On the other hand, the number of models and premise order did not affect the wording of conclusions. Our study shows that the type of conclusion produced provides a new key to identifying the mental processes involved in spatial reasoning. Implications for the two main approaches to reasoning processes (i.e. the analogical and the propositional approaches) are discussed.

Child↗

PubMed2005

Everyday conditional reasoning: a working memory-dependent tradeoff between counterexample and likelihood use.

Considerable evidence has revealed that working memory capacity is an important determinant of conditional reasoning performance. There are two accounts describing the conditional inference process, the probabilistic and the mental models accounts. According to the mental models account, reasoners retrieve and integrate counterexample information to attain a conclusion. According to the probabilistic account, reasoners base their judgments on probabilistic information. It can be assumed that reasoning according to the mental models process would require more working memory resources than would solving the inference on the basis of probabilistic information. By means of a verbal report study, we showed that participants with low working memory capacity more often use probabilistic information, whereas participants with higher working memory capacity are more likely to use counterexample information. Working memory capacity thus not only relates to reasoning performance, it also determines which process reasoners will engage in.

Cognition↗

PubMed2004

Promise is debt, threat another matter: the effect of credibility on the interpretation of conditional promises and threats.

Evidence from reasoning tasks shows that promises and threats both tend to receive biconditional interpretations. They also both display high speaker control. On the face of it, the only difference seems to be the positive or negative signing of the consequent. In a promise, the speaker tries to persuade the hearer to do something by holding out the prospect of a particular reward; in a threat, the speaker tries to refrain the hearer from doing something by holding out the prospect of a particular punishment. This paper investigates the respects in which conditional promises and threats differ further by means of an inference task. The credibility of the consequent was manipulated in order to examine whether the acceptability ratings of inferences based on promises and on threats would be equally affected. The results of the inference task and an analysis of the reasons people give for their answers suggest that the credibility of promises is less affected by the use of excessive consequents than the credibility of threats. In other words, promise remains debt, whereas threat is another matter.

Analysis of Variance↗

PubMed2004

The difference between generating counter examples and using them during reasoning.

The aim of this article is to provide insight into the types of long-term knowledge that are used for solving causal conditional inferences. Two taxonomies were constructed to map the types of counter example. The available counter examples are traditionally probed via a counter example generation task. We observed that there are some significant differences in the types of counter example retrieved in the reasoning task versus the generation task. The generation task can be used for predicting answers that sprout from a reasoning process that takes counter example into account, but some participants use a different reasoning process in which the available semantic information is not used as contrasting evidence. Nonetheless, we found that the results of the generation task validly predicted the proportion of inferences accepted as well as the number of counter examples used during reasoning.

Classification↗

PubMed2003

A critique of Oaksford, Chater, and Larkin's (2000) conditional probability model of conditional reasoning.

M. Oaksford, N. Chater, and J. Larkin (2000) proffered a Bayesian model in which conditional inferences are a direct function of conditional probabilities. In the current article, the authors first considered this model regarding the processing of negatives in conditional reasoning. Its predictions were evaluated against a large-scale meta-analysis (W. J. Schroyens, W. Schaeken, & G. d'Ydewalle, 2001b). This evaluation shows that the model is flawed: The relative size of the negative effects does not match predictions. Next, the authors evaluated the model in relation to inferences about affirmative conditionals, again considering the results of a meta-analysis (W. J. Schroyens, W. Schaeken, & G. d'Ydewalle, 2001a). The conditional probability model is countered by the data reported in literature; a mental models based model produces a better fit. The authors conclude that a purely probabilistic model is deficient and incomplete and cannot do without algorithmic processing assumptions if it is to advance toward a descriptively adequate psychological theory.

Conditioning, Psychological↗

PubMed2003

In search of counter-examples: deductive rationality in human reasoning.

Dual-process theories come in many forms. They draw on the distinction between associative, heuristic, tacit, intuitive, or implicit processes (System 1) and rule-based, analytic, explicit processes (System 2). We present the results of contextual manipulations that have a bearing on the supposed primacy of System 1 (Stanovich & West, 2000). Experiment 1 showed that people who evaluated logically valid or invalid conditional inferences under a timing constraint (N=56), showed a smaller effect of logical validity than did people who were not placed under a timing constraint (N= 44). Experiment 2 similarly showed that stressing the logical constraint that only inferences that follow necessarily are to be endorsed (N = 36) increased the size of the validity effect, as compared to that of participants (N=33) given the standard instruction to make "logical" inferences. These findings concur with the thesis in dual-processing frameworks that "Rationality-2 processes" (Evans & Over, 1996), "test procedures" (Chater & Oaksford, 1999), or "conclusion validation processes" (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Schroyens, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2001) serve to override the results of System 1 processes.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2003

Inference suppression and semantic memory retrieval: every counterexample counts.

Reasoning with conditionals involving causal content is known to be affected by retrieval of counterexamples from semantic memory. In this study we examined the characteristics of this search process in everyday conditional reasoning. In Experiment 1 we manipulated the number (zero to four) of explicitly presented counterexamples (alternative causes or disabling conditions) for causal conditionals. In Experiment 2, using a generation pretest, we measured the number of counterexamples participants could retrieve for a set of causal conditionals. One month after the pretest, participants were presented a reasoning task with the same conditionals. The experiments indicated that acceptance of modus ponens linearly decreased with every additionally retrieved disabler, whereas affirmation of the consequent acceptance linearly decreased as a function of the number of retrieved alternatives. Results for denial of the antecedent and modus tollens were less clear. The findings show that the search process does not necessarily stop after retrieval of a single counterexample and that every additional counterexample has an impact on the inference acceptance.

Cognition↗

PubMed2002

The relative contribution of content and context factors on the interpretation of conditionals.

Previous research showed that conditional reasoning is affected by the content and the context of the studied problems. In this study, we investigate in detail the relative effect of three factors, namely the number of alternative or disabling reasons, speaker control, and pragmatic type, on the interpretation of conditionals. These factors were subject to prior research, but mostly in a fragmented way. This study indicates that some important nuances must be added to earlier findings. The number of alternatives and disablers, the speaker control, and the pragmatic type of conditional statements all have a considerable effect on how we interpret these sentences and reason with them, but they do not have equal weight. Alternatives/disablers play a significant but very limited role on the interpretation of conditionals, while the influence of speaker control and of pragmatic type is far more imperative.

Adult↗

PubMed2002

Causal conditional reasoning and semantic memory retrieval: a test of the semantic memory framework.

This study tested and refined a framework that proposes a mechanism for retrieving alternative causes and disabling conditions (Cummins, 1995) during reasoning. Experiment 1 examined the relation between different factors affecting retrieval. The test revealed high correlations between the number of possible alternative causes or disabling conditions and their strength of association and plausibility. Experiment 2 explored the hypothesis that due to a more extended search process, conditional inferences would last longer when many alternative causes or disabling conditions were available. Affirmation of the consequent (AC) and modus ponens (MP) latencies showed the hypothesized pattern. Denial of the antecedent (DA) and modus tollens (MT) inferences did not show latency effects. The experiment also identified an effect of the number of disabling conditions on AC and DA acceptance. Experiment 3 measured efficiency of disabler retrieval by a limited time, disabler generation task. As predicted, better disabler retrieval was related to lower acceptance of the MP and MT inferences.

Humans↗

PubMed2000

Heuristic and analytic processes in propositional reasoning with negatives.

The authors report 4 studies on heuristic and analytic processes in conditional reasoning with negations and show that a heuristic negative conclusion bias cannot account for the effects observed on problem-solving latencies derived from eye-movement measures (Experiment 1) and a novel mouse-tracking methodology (Experiment 2). A double negation elimination process can account for both the latency and response-frequency effects of a negation in the clause about which an inference is made. It is further shown that other negation effects cannot be explained by an affirmative premise bias proposed in the literature. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that a novel availability hypothesis provides a viable alternative. It is argued that extant analytic theories need to be extended to incorporate a validating search for counter examples and need to specify how pragmatic and comprehension processes influence such a search.

Adult↗