The bioengineered competitor? Steroids, hormones, and individual rights.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to T H Murray.
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Medical ethics is commonly assumed to be a form of 'applied moral philosophy' in which practical moral judgments are deduced from moral theories. This account of the relationship between moral theory and moral judgment is inadequate in several reports. The deductivist approach often results in inadequate attention being given to social, historical and developmental contexts. It also fails to explain some common phenomena in practical moral reasoning. In contrast to the emphasis in deductivism, a case-centered or casuistic practical ethics insists on immersion in the particularities of cases and on interpretation of details in light of moral maxims and other mid-level forms of moral reasoning. Two features of casuistics that ought to be distinguished but frequently are not, are: (1) the emphasis on immersion and interpretation, and (2) a claim about the relation between moral judgment and moral theory as sources of moral knowledge. Once we consider case-centered moral judgments as sources of moral knowledge, we must also begin to look critically but open-mindedly to moral traditions which, upon examination, appear to be more dynamic and to have more reformist potential than is commonly assumed.
Relationships governed by markets keep moral and social dimensions to a bare minimum. Gifts, by their open-endedness, defy such minimalization. Impersonal gifts such as blood or body parts or charity may not regulate relationships between specific individuals, but they serve other functions by regulating larger relationships and honoring important human values, precisely those threatened by massive and impersonal bureaucracies.
The fetus destined to be born rather than aborted has become increasingly an object of medical and moral concern. With considerable justification, women view this concern--which they share to a great degree--with suspicion that it will serve as a pretext for denying them social and economic equality with men. This article attempts to show that practical moral judgments about our obligations to not-yet-born children can be made without falling into the abyss of controversy surrounding abortion. By stressing the similarities in fathers' duties to their born children, we can also counter a measure of our historical propensity to view women's moral duties to their not-yet-born children as the overwhelmingly important feature of their moral lives, and resist the temptation to impose coercive public policies.
An examination of the notion of divided loyalties dilemmas in medicine, situated within their social contexts, yields insight into the contemporary social and moral position of medicine in the United States. In a review of the literature, the author identifies four concepts important to gaining an understanding of the position that divided loyalties play in medicine and the physician-patient relationship. After describing some of the situations in which these dilemmas affect physicians' responses to patients' health care needs, interests, and choices, the author argues that divided loyalties dilemmas are not rare, and will probably increase with the changes in U.S. medicine. Candor and awareness of the importance of the public belief in physician loyalty are seen as necessary in preventing these changes from becoming destructive of the physician-patient relationship.
Three issues addressed in Robert Weir's book Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns raise important questions about the social and political context of moral judgment, and the relation of moral judgment to moral theory. Arguments to the effect that infants are not moral "persons" as we normally understand the concept of personhood, illuminate the dialectical relationship between sound, confident moral judgments and moral theories. The way we describe and label decisions to offer or not to offer particular treatments to specific individuals has political and moral consequences. In general, we should opt for descriptions that display, rather than conceal, the problematic and controversial aspects of our decisions. The active killing of patients can only be defended from the narrowest viewpoint of minimizing that individual's suffering. It ignores the requirements made of other moral actors, and it fails to acknowledge a number of important facts about social institutions. Workable solutions must be attentive to the political and social context of moral dilemmas.
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