Biomedical subjects

S-J Blakemore

Publications and source records attributed to S-J Blakemore.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2005

Thinking about intentions.

In this fMRI study, we investigated the convergence of underlying neural networks in thinking about a scenario involving one's own intentional action and its consequences and setting up and holding in mind an intention to act. A factorial design was employed comprising two factors: i. Causality (intentional or physical events) and ii. Prospective Memory (present or absent). In each condition, subjects answered questions about various hypothetical scenarios, which related either to the link between the subject's own intentions and consequential actions (Intentional Causality) or to the link between a natural, physical event and its consequences (Physical Causality). A prospective memory task was embedded in half the blocks. In this task, subjects were required to keep in mind an intention (to press a key on seeing a red stimulus background) whilst carrying out the ongoing Causality task. Answering questions about intentional causality versus physical causality activated a network of regions that have traditionally been associated with Theory of Mind, including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the superior temporal sulcus and the temporal poles bilaterally. In addition, the precuneus bordering with posterior cingulate cortex, an area involved in self-awareness and self-related processing, was activated more when thinking about intentional causality. In the prospective memory task, activations were found in the right parietal cortex, frontopolar cortex (BA 10) and precuneus. Different subregions within the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex were activated in both main effects of intentional causality and prospective memory. Therefore, the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex subserves separately thinking about one's own intentions and consequent actions and bearing in mind an intention to make an action. Previous studies have shown that prospective memory, requiring the formation of an intention and the execution of a corresponding action, is associated with decreased activation in the dorsal mPFC, close to the region activated in Theory of Mind tasks. Here, we found that holding in mind an intention to act and at the same time thinking about an intentional action led to reduced activity in a dorsal section of the mPFC. This was a different region from a more anterior, inferior dorsal mPFC region that responded to intentional causality. This suggests that different regions of mPFC play different roles in thinking about intentions.

Adult↗

PubMed2005

Somatosensory activations during the observation of touch and a case of vision-touch synaesthesia.

In this study, we describe a new form of synaesthesia in which visual perception of touch elicits conscious tactile experiences in the perceiver. We describe a female subject (C) for whom the observation of another person being touched is experienced as tactile stimulation on the equivalent part of C's own body. Apart from this clearly abnormal synesthetic experience, C is healthy and normal in every other way. In this study, we investigate whether C's 'mirrored touch' synesthetic experience is caused by overactivity in the neural system that responds to the observation of touch. A functional MRI experiment was designed to investigate the neural system involved in the perception of touch in a group of 12 non-synesthetic control subjects and in C. We investigated neural activity to the observation of touch to a human face or neck compared with the observation of touch to equivalent regions on an object. Furthermore, to investigate the somatosensory topography of the activations during observation of touch, we compared activations when observing a human face or neck being touched with activations when the subjects themselves were touched on their own face or neck. The results demonstrated that the somatosensory cortex was activated in the non-synesthetic subjects by the mere observation of touch and that this activation was somatotopically organized such that observation of touch to the face activated the head area of primary somatosensory cortex, whereas observation of touch to the neck did not. Moreover, in non-synesthetic subjects, the brain's mirror system-comprising premotor cortex, superior temporal sulcus and parietal cortex-was activated by the observation of touch to another human more than to an object. C's activation patterns differed in three ways from those of the non-synesthetic controls. First, activations in the somatosensory cortex were significantly higher in C when she observed touch. Secondly, an area in left premotor cortex was activated in C to a greater extent than in the non-synesthetic group. Thirdly, the anterior insula cortex bilaterally was activated in C, but there was no evidence of such activation in the non-synesthetic group. The results suggest that, in C, the mirror system for touch is overactive, above the threshold for conscious tactile perception.

Adult↗

PubMed2003

Delusions of alien control in the normal brain.

Delusions of alien control, or passivity experiences, are symptoms associated with schizophrenia in which patients misattribute self-generated actions to an external source. In this study hypnosis was used to induce a similar misattribution of self-generated movement in normal, healthy individuals. Positron Emission Tomography (PET) was employed to investigate the neural correlates of active movements correctly attributed to the self, compared with identical active movements misattributed to an external source. Active movements attributed to an external source resulted in significantly higher activations in the parietal cortex and cerebellum than identical active movements correctly attributed to the self. We suggest that, as a result of hypnotic suggestion, the functioning of this cerebellar-parietal network is altered so that self-produced actions are experienced as being external. These results have implications for the brain mechanisms underlying delusions of control, which may be associated with overactivation of the cerebellar-parietal network.

Adult↗

PubMed2003

The detection of contingency and animacy from simple animations in the human brain.

Contingencies between objects and people can be mechanical or intentional-social in nature. In this fMRI study we used simplified stimuli to investigate brain regions involved in the detection of mechanical and intentional contingencies. Using a factorial design we manipulated the 'animacy' and 'contingency' of stimulus movement, and the subject's attention to the contingencies. The detection of mechanical contingency between shapes whose movement was inanimate engaged the middle temporal gyrus and right intraparietal sulcus. The detection of intentional contingency between shapes whose movement was animate activated superior parietal networks bilaterally. These activations were unaffected by attention to contingency. Additional regions, the right middle frontal gyrus and left superior temporal sulcus, became activated by the animate-contingent stimuli when subjects specifically attended to the contingent nature of the stimuli. Our results help to clarify neural networks previously associated with 'theory of mind' and agency detection. In particular, the results suggest that low-level perception of agency in terms of objects reacting to other objects at a distance is processed by parietal networks. In contrast, the activation of brain regions traditionally associated with theory of mind tasks appears to require attention to be directed towards agency and contingency.

Adolescent↗