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S A Gelman

Publications and source records attributed to S A Gelman.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources
PubMed1995

The role of covariation versus mechanism information in causal attribution.

Traditional approaches to causal attribution propose that information about covariation of factors is used to identify causes of events. In contrast, we present a series of studies showing that people seek out and prefer information about causal mechanisms rather than information about covariation. Experiments 1, 2 and 3 asked subjects to indicate the kind of information they would need for causal attribution. The subjects tended to seek out information that would provide evidence for or against hypotheses about underlying mechanisms. When asked to provide causes, the subjects' descriptions were also based on causal mechanisms. In Experiment 4, subjects received pieces of conflicting evidence matching in covariation values but differing in whether the evidence included some statement of a mechanism. The influence of evidence was significantly stronger when it included mechanism information. We conclude that people do not treat the task of causal attribution as one of identifying a novel causal relationship between arbitrary factors by relying solely on covariation information. Rather, people attempt to seek out causal mechanisms in developing a causal explanation for a specific event.

Adult↗
PubMed1995

Overextensions in comprehension and production revisited: preferential-looking in a study of dog, cat, and cow.

This study investigated overextensions in comprehension and production using a new method (the preferential-looking paradigm) in which children (N = 99, mean age (younger) = 1;9, mean age (older) = 2;3) were asked to find the referent that matched the label they were given. Both Real Referent (in which there was a match) and Anomalous (in which there was no match) trials were included, as well as nonverbal control trials. During the Real Referent trials, all children significantly preferred the matching puppet. During the Anomalous trials, children showed no preference with two of the labels (dog and cat); however, they did show a preference when 'cow' was requested but not available. There were no differences based on prior overextension performance in production. It is concluded that overextensions in production are not diagnostic of children's underlying semantic representations, and that anomalous trials in comprehension provide useful information concerning young children's lexical entries.

Attention↗
PubMed1995

Children's understanding of homonyms.

Previous tasks have shown that preschool and early elementary schoolchildren typically have trouble learning and identifying homonyms (Peters & Zaidel, 1980; Mazzocco, 1989). It is possible that a one-to-one mapping assumption or a lack of metalinguistic skills makes homonym learning and identification particularly difficult. In three experiments we examined a total of 60 three-year-olds' ability to pick out homonym pairs, and the extent to which they realize that although homonyms share a common label, they represent two different categories. In Experiment 1 subjects were asked to identify homonym pairs. In Experiment 2, homonym pairs and non-homonym pairs were labelled, then children were asked whether the pairs had the same name, and whether they were the same kind of thing. In Experiment 3 children were shown one-half of each of several homonym and non-homonym pairs, then asked to identify a name match and a category match from a set of pictures. From these experiments we conclude that children have the metalinguistic skills necessary to identify homonym pairs; moreover, they realized that homonyms represent two different categories. Finally, if children have a one-to-one mapping assumption, it is not strong enough to prevent them from acquiring homonyms.

Child↗
PubMed1995

Traditional and evaluative aspects of flexibility in gender roles, social conventions, moral rules, and physical laws.

Traditional and evaluative aspects of flexibility regarding transgressions across several domains (masculine and feminine gender roles, moral rules, social etiquette, and physical law) were assessed in 24 4-year-olds, 40 8-year-olds, and 46 college undergraduates. Traditional and evaluative aspects of flexibility yielded distinctly different patterns of response. Data indicated an age-related increase in flexibility on traditional measures (i.e., traditional rule flexibility, cultural relativity) for transgressions in all domains, except physical laws. In contrast, subjects in all age groups were consistently negative in their evaluations of transgressions in moral rules, etiquette, and masculine gender roles. Female subjects viewed masculine gender role transgressions with greater flexibility and less negativity than did male subjects. Results demonstrate the multidimensional character of flexibility development in different social and physical domains. Results suggest that masculine and feminine gender roles and social etiquette may not fall within a common domain of social convention.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1994

Children's use of context in interpreting "big" and "little".

In order to use the words "big" and little" appropriately, adults use 3 kinds of contexts: normative (the size of the object is compared to a stored mental representation), perceptual (the object is compared to another physically present object of the same kind), and functional (the object is judged with regard to its intended use). In 3 experiments, we examined how flexibly children switch from one context to another. 2-4-year-olds judged a series of everyday objects as "big" or "little". To answer correctly, children had to judge each object twice, once in a normative context and once in a perceptual or functional context. Results showed that switching from one context to another was not inherently difficult, even for 2-year-olds. However, the direction of switch was important: children throughout the age range tested switched easily from a normative context but made errors when asked to switch to a normative context. We suggest that the normative context differs from the perceptual and functional contexts in that it is unmarked, and that unmarked contexts are accessible only when no other context has been recently experienced. When context is marked more explicitly, children shift flexibly among different meanings.

Age Factors↗
PubMed1992

The development of category-based induction.

In a category-based induction, knowing that a property is true of some category members leads one to conclude that the property is true of other category members. An example is: Cardinals have ulnar arteries. Therefore hawks have ulnar arteries. Recently, Osherson et al. (1990) demonstrated a number of phenomena involving category-based inductions, and proposed that these phenomena can be explained by variations in 2 processes: (a) the similarity between the premise category (cardinals in the above example) and the conclusion category (hawks in the above example), and (b) the degree to which the premise category "covers" (roughly, is similar to) instances of the lowest-level category that includes both the premise and conclusion categories (birds in the above example). The present paper traces the developmental course of the relevant phenomena and of the similarity and coverage processes that presumably underlie them. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that the inductions made by kindergartners are sensitive only to the similarity between the premise and conclusion categories. Studies 3 and 4 showed that second graders' inductions are sensitive to both premise-conclusion similarity and coverage, as long as there is no need actually to use a generated category that includes both the premise and conclusion categories. These developmental findings reveal an orderly process in the growth of category-based inductions, and also decompose the Osherson et al. model into 3 basic components that have not previously been explicitly distinguished.

Animal Population Groups↗
PubMed1992

On wooden pillows: multiple classification and children's category-based inductions.

Previous research has indicated that preschoolers do not distinguish between properties that are generalizable within a given category and those that are not. 2 possible general constraints on children's cognition are proposed to account for these findings. 3 studies are reported that argue against the presence of such general constraints. We examine preschoolers' understanding of the properties associated with material (e.g., wood, cotton) and object (e.g., chair, pillow) categories. In Study 1, subjects consistently made inductions based on the material compositions of items when asked to predict texture and fragility. In Study 2, the same subjects judged that items that shared material would share an unfamiliar dispositional property (e.g., gets sodden in water), but items that shared object kind would share a novel functional property (e.g., used for accelerating). Study 3 tested a younger sample of 3-year-olds and found the same sensitivity to category type, albeit with larger individual differences. By age 3, children use different modes of categorization to generalize different kinds of phenomena. These results argue against general limitations on children's abilities to use categories to make inductions. Even when children lack specific theoretical knowledge, the ability to organize phenomena into domains allows children to recognize which categories are relevant in different situations. This understanding can provide a basis for the development of more specific theories.

Association Learning↗
PubMed1991

Insides and essences: early understandings of the non-obvious.

Insides and essences are both critical concepts for appreciating the importance of non-obvious entities: neither are observable, both contrast with external appearances, and both can be more important than external appearances. The present research examined understandings of insides and essences in 3- to 5-year-old children. In Study 1, children were asked questions requiring them to think about both the insides and the outer appearances of a series of objects. In Study 2, children were tested on their understanding that insides are typically more important than outer surfaces for an object's identity and functioning. In Studies 3, 4, and 5, children were tested on their understanding of innate potential, a concept that reflects understanding of an inborn essence. Contrary to the traditional view of children as externalists (cf. Piaget, 1951), these studies demonstrate that by age 4 children have a firm grasp of the importance of both insides and essences. Even by age 3 children reason clearly about the inside-outside distinction. These results suggest that preschool children attend to non-obvious features and realize their privileged status. They may also indicate a more basic predisposition toward psychological essentialism in young children.

Attention↗
PubMed1991

As time goes by: children's early understanding of growth in animals.

Beliefs about naturally occurring transformations were examined in children aged 3 to 6 years in 4 experiments. Experiment 1 tested children's understanding that animals (but not artifacts) predictably get larger over time. Experiment 1a examined whether the results obtained in the first experiment could be attributed to an added memory component on the artifact task. Experiment 2 further examined beliefs about the aging of artifacts. In Experiment 3, color and shape (metamorphosis) changes of animals were investigated. At all ages, children appeared to understand that animals get larger and not smaller with age. While older children and adults allowed for rather dramatic changes in the size and shape of animals over the life span if the alternative involved decreasing in size with age, preschool children were less willing to accept these changes. Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that even young preschool children have 2 conceptual insights about natural transformations: that they are lawful and nonrandom, and that they are domain and mechanism specific. Further, children as young as age 3 are able to go beyond the perceptual appearance of animals in making judgments about transformations caused by growth. Implications for children's understanding of personal and species identity are discussed.

Animal Population Groups↗
PubMed1991

Understanding natural cause: children's explanations of how objects and their properties originate.

An understanding of natural cause includes the realization that events can occur independently of human activity or intentions. It also often entails realizing that causal mechanisms can be nonobservable or nonobvious. The present research investigated to what extent children ages 4-7 have developed a concept of natural cause. Study 1 examined children's understandings of object origins (e.g., how the sun began); Study 2 probed children's causal understandings of object behaviors and properties (e.g., why rabbits hop and have long ears). In both studies, children by age 4 were sensitive to the natural kind-artifact distinction in their explanations. They mentioned human intervention for human-made artifacts but rarely for naturally occurring things. Moreover, subjects at all ages were able to identify specific kinds of natural cause, including intrinsic causes (such as growth) and inborn nature. Finally, subjects understood the link between nonobvious, internal parts and self-generated activity (e.g., that bones are important for the flight of a bird). Altogether, these results suggest that even preschool children realize that natural causes exist. They contradict Piaget's characterization of young children as artificialistic (believing that naturally occurring things are created by people) and as focused on observable properties.

Adult↗
PubMed1989

The effects of object orientation and object type on children's interpretation of the word big.

Previous research indicates that preschool children have persistent difficulty interpreting big: 4-5-year-olds typically interpret big to mean tall, and 3-year-olds fail to use any consistent interpretation. We propose that children's interpretation may vary depending on 2 contextual factors: type of object and orientation of object. 40 children (ages 3 and 5) each saw 35 pairs of items and, for each pair, were asked to point to "the big one." Type of object was varied by showing each child 3 kinds of objects: "people," "brownies," and rectangles. Orientation of object was varied by presenting objects either standing perpendicular to the tabletop (vertical condition) or lying flat on the tabletop (horizontal condition). Older children relied on height more consistently than younger children, all subjects relied on area more often in the horizontal condition than in the vertical condition, and 3-year-olds relied on height more when judging the bigness of people than of rectangles matched for size. Taken together, these results demonstrate that contextual factors clearly influence children's responses. These results demonstrate the interplay of cognitive and semantic factors in the process of semantic development.

Child Development↗
PubMed1989

Incorporating new words into the lexicon: preliminary evidence for language hierarchies in two-year-old children.

In 4 experiments, we examined how young children incorporate new word meanings into their lexicons. 2-year-olds were each taught a new noun for an object that already had a known label (e.g., a "fep" for a dog). Children's interpretations of the new nouns were assessed by asking subjects to select the named toy from an array of 4 toys (e.g., "Point to a fep"). The experiments were designed to determine which of several possible semantic relations between novel and familiar words was most consistent with children's performance. It was found that children often seemed to interpret the new word as referring to a subordinate of the known category. This tendency was reduced when the named object could sensibly receive a proper name (e.g., when the named object was a stuffed animal), particularly when children had to consider both the familiar and the novel label for the object in the same session. Although not all alternative explanations have been ruled out, these results suggest that, from a very young age, children may spontaneously form language hierarchies when they hear a novel work for an object that already has a familiar name.

Association Learning↗
PubMed1989

Children's use of nonegocentric standards in judgments of functional size.

Dimensional adjectives are inherently relative in meaning, and so provide a test of children's ability to apply nonegocentric standards. The present research investigates children's ability to apply one kind of relative standard assessing the size of an object with regard to its intended use (a functional interpretation). In 3 experiments, children 3-5 years of age were asked to judge objects as "big" or "little" according to their function (e.g., a hat for a doll; a key for a door). Contrary to previous claims, the ability to use nonegocentric functional standards was present by age 3. However, 3-year-olds performed above chance only when their attention was directed to the relevant function, either by means of action (when actually shown how the objects fit together) or by means of language. In contrast, 4-year-olds performed well without additional action-based or linguistic cues. It is suggested that children have an implicit ordering in their interpretations of big and little, such that functional judgments are lower in priority than 2 other standards: normative (the size of an object is compared to a stored mental standard, e.g., a chihuahua is small for a dog) and perceptual (the size of an object is compared to another physically present object of the same type, e.g., a chihuahua 6 inches tall is big compared to a chihuahua 4 inches tall). Even 3-year-olds can make nonegocentric functional judgments of relative size, but the basis of the judgment must be unambiguous.

Attention↗
PubMed1988

Children's inductive inferences within superordinate categories: the role of language and category structure.

One important function of categories is to allow inferences that extend beyond surface appearances. In 2 studies, preschool and second-grade children were tested on their understanding that members of a category have similar internal parts. In 1 study, children were taught new information about the internal structure of various objects (e.g., an apple), then were probed to determine how far they generalized the new information (e.g., to another apple, to other fruit, to an unrelated object). In a second study, children participated in an open-ended interview that probed whether various types of objects had "the same kinds of stuff inside." Children at both ages and in both studies drew many inferences concerning the internal children to report that members of a basic-level category had the same internal parts. Older children drew more inferences at the superordinate level than did younger children. Older children were also more sensitive to differences in category domain (natural kind vs. artifact) at both basic and superordinate levels. Altogether, these results suggest that preschool children assume that basic-level categories share internal parts. They need to refine this belief at the basic level and to extend it to superordinate-level categories.

Child↗
PubMed1988

Coordination of size standards by young children.

"Big" and "little" are inherently relational terms: whether an object is considered big or little changes as the standard of comparison changes. The present studies examined how 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children use and coordinate 2 different kinds of standards: perceptual (object is compared to another physically present object) and normative (object is compared to a class standard stored in memory). Even the youngest children were capable of using both normative and perceptual standards. When children avoided a perceptual interpretation it was because they chose a conflicting normative interpretation instead. Thus, very young children can apply different standards of comparison when judging size.

Child Development↗
PubMed1987

Young children's inductions from natural kinds: the role of categories and appearances.

Recent analyses of natural kind terms (e.g., dog, gold) suggest that people expect members of a kind to share unforeseen properties. The present study investigated the development of this expectation by studying children's inductive inferences. On each of a series of problems, 3- and 4-year-old children were taught a new fact about an object and then were asked whether it would generalize to: an object that looked like the original, that had the same label as the original, that looked like the original and had the same label, or that differed from the original in both respects. The results indicate that 3- and 4-year-olds drew more inferences based on category membership than on perceptual appearances, when both were available. Furthermore, children often based their inferences on category membership even when no label was provided. Thus even 3-year-olds assumed that natural kind categories include more than superficial features.

Attention↗