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Biomedical subjects

Ronald M Atlas

Publications and source records attributed to Ronald M Atlas.

11 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2006

The dual-use dilemma for the life sciences: perspectives, conundrums, and global solutions.

The term "dual-use" traditionally has been used to describe technologies that could have both civilian and military usage, but this term has at least three different dimensions that pose a dilemma for modern biology and its possible misuse for hostile purposes: (1) ostensibly civilian facilities that are in fact intended for military or terrorist bioweapons development and production; (2) equipment and agents that could be misappropriated and misused for biological weapons development and production; and (3) the generation and dissemination of scientific knowledge that could be misapplied for biological weapons development and production. These three different aspects of the "dual-use dilemma" are frequently confused--each demands a distinct approach within a "web of prevention" in order to reduce the future risk of bioterrorism and biowarfare. This article discusses the nature of the different perspectives and divergent approaches as a contribution to finding a scientifically acceptable global solution to the problem posed by the dual-use dilemma. We propose that: (1) facilities that are intended for bioweapons development and production should be primarily prevented by a strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) effectively implemented in all nation states, one that includes provisions for adequate transparency to improve confidence and a mechanism for thorough inspections when there is sufficient cause, and enhanced law enforcement activities involving international cooperation and sharing of critical intelligence information; (2) potentially dual-use equipment and agents should be available to legitimate users for peaceful purposes, but strengthened national biosafety and physical and personnel biosecurity controls in all nations together with effective export controls should be implemented to limit the potential for the misappropriation of such equipment and materials; and (3) information should be openly accessible by the global scientific community, but a culture of responsible conduct involving the breadth of the international life sciences communities should be adopted to protect the ongoing revolution in the life sciences from being hijacked for hostile misuse of the knowledge generated and communicated by life scientists.

Access to Information↗
PubMed2005

Biodefense research: an emerging conundrum.

Biodefense research creates a conundrum for the scientific community--what are the permissible limits of biodefense research and how can knowledge in the life sciences be protected against misuse? As biodefense research expands to counter the threat of bioterrorism, so does suspicion and the need for guidance to respond to these concerns.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMed2005

Globalizing biosecurity.

A harmonized international regime that enhances biosecurity is needed to reduce the risk of bioterrorism. Like other security regimes, this will entail mutually reinforcing strands, which need to include: enactment of legally binding control of access to dangerous pathogens, transparency for sanctioned biodefense programs, technology transfer and assistance to developing countries to jointly advance biosafety and biosecurity, global awareness of the dual-use dilemma and the potential misuse of science by terrorists, and development of a global ethic of compliance. To work, this effort must be undertaken collectively, utilizing the international and regional institutions that already have a role to play in providing safety and security. Most notably, it must grow in a top-down manner from the Biological Weapons Convention accord, in which States Parties have agreed to ban the development of biological weapons, and in a bottom-up manner from the scientific and health communities, which are engaged in the research and public health efforts that must be protected against misuse-especially involving the World Health Organization.

Bioterrorism↗
PubMed2005

Recognizing biothreat diseases: realistic training using standardized patients and patient simulators.

The UofL Center for the Deterrence of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism's (CDBB's) training involving standardized patients, who can make convincingly accurate representations of clinical signs and symptoms, and patient simulators has proven to be an effective means of enhancing bioterrorism preparedness. In addition to providing ready access to formative measures of preparedness, both of these teaching and learning tools also offer the option of summative evaluation of skills and knowledge acquired during training sessions. The use of moulage allows for very realistic representations of cutaneous anthrax and smallpox as well as other conditions such as recluse spider bites and chickenpox with which these biothreat infections can be confused. Exercises and drills expose deficiencies and permit essential reinforcement of skills developed in training. Unannounced exercises are especially useful in assessing public health preparedness.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMed2003

Bioterrorism and biodefence research: changing the focus of microbiology.

Fear that terrorists can use biological agents as weapons of mass destruction is significantly impacting the conduct of microbiological research. Abundant new funds are available for biodefence research, and many researchers are racing to enter the field. There are some concerns, however, that a large emphasis on this issue could skew the microbiology research agenda. Furthermore, new responsibilities for safely conducting research with biothreat agents and concern that information might be misused could drive some researchers away from the field.

Animals↗
PubMed2002

Bioterriorism: from threat to reality.

The fears and predictions of attacks with biological weapons, which were increasing at the close of the twentieth century, were transformed into reality not long after September 11, 2001, when several anthrax-laden letters were sent through the U.S. postal system. The attack challenged our medical preparedness and scientific understanding of the epidemiology of biothreat agents. It is fortunate that this was not a massive aerosol release that could have exposed hundreds of thousands. Rapid diagnoses and medical treatments limited casualties and increased survival rates, but tragically some individuals died of inhalational anthrax. Even as physicians tested new treatment regimes and scientists employed new ways of detecting anthrax and decontaminating the mail, new predictions were made for potentially even more devastating attacks with anthrax, smallpox, plague, tularemia, botulism, or hemorrhagic fever viruses. Fear gripped the nation. Law enforcement sought to find the villain(s) who sent the anthrax letters and to deter future bioterrorist attacks. The biomedical community began to seek new ways of protecting against such future threats of bioterrorism.

Animals↗