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Biomedical subjects

Robert Boyd

Publications and source records attributed to Robert Boyd.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem.

Models of large-scale human cooperation take two forms. 'Indirect reciprocity' occurs when individuals help others in order to uphold a reputation and so be included in future cooperation. In 'collective action', individuals engage in costly behaviour that benefits the group as a whole. Although the evolution of indirect reciprocity is theoretically plausible, there is no consensus about how collective action evolves. Evidence suggests that punishing free riders can maintain cooperation, but why individuals should engage in costly punishment is unclear. Solutions to this 'second-order free rider problem' include meta-punishment, mutation, conformism, signalling and group-selection. The threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory. Here, we show that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem because punishers can withhold help from free riders without damaging their reputations. However, we also show that such a strategy cannot invade a population in which indirect reciprocity is not linked to collective action, thus leaving unexplained how collective action arises.

Biological Evolution↗

A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity.

Indirect reciprocity occurs when the cooperative behavior between two individuals is contingent on their previous behavior toward others. Previous theoretical analysis indicates that indirect reciprocity can evolve if individuals use an image-scoring strategy. In this paper, we show that, when errors are added, indirect reciprocity cannot be based on an image-scoring strategy. However, if individuals use a standing strategy, then cooperation through indirect reciprocity is evolutionarily stable. These two strategies differ with respect to the information to which they attend. While image-scoring strategies only need attend to the actions of others, standing strategies also require information about intent. We speculate that this difference may shed light on the evolvability of indirect reciprocity. Additionally, we show that systems of indirect reciprocity are highly sensitive to the availability of information. Finally, we present a model which shows that if indirect reciprocity were to evolve, selection should also favor trusting behavior in relations between strangers.

Altruism↗

The evolution of altruistic punishment.

Both laboratory and field data suggest that people punish noncooperators even in one-shot interactions. Although such "altruistic punishment" may explain the high levels of cooperation in human societies, it creates an evolutionary puzzle: existing models suggest that altruistic cooperation among nonrelatives is evolutionarily stable only in small groups. Thus, applying such models to the evolution of altruistic punishment leads to the prediction that people will not incur costs to punish others to provide benefits to large groups of nonrelatives. However, here we show that an important asymmetry between altruistic cooperation and altruistic punishment allows altruistic punishment to evolve in populations engaged in one-time, anonymous interactions. This process allows both altruistic punishment and altruistic cooperation to be maintained even when groups are large and other parameter values approximate conditions that characterize cultural evolution in the small-scale societies in which humans lived for most of our prehistory.

Journal Article↗

Comprehensive proteomic analysis of breast cancer cell membranes reveals unique proteins with potential roles in clinical cancer.

Proteins associated with cancer cell plasma membranes are rich in known drug and antibody targets as well as other proteins known to play key roles in the abnormal signal transduction processes required for carcinogenesis. We describe here a proteomics process that comprehensively annotates the protein content of breast tumor cell membranes and defines the clinical relevance of such proteins. Tumor-derived cell lines were used to ensure an enrichment for cancer cell-specific plasma membrane proteins because it is difficult to purify cancer cells and then obtain good membrane preparations from clinical material. Multiple cell lines with different molecular pathologies were used to represent the clinical heterogeneity of breast cancer. Peptide tandem mass spectra were searched against a comprehensive data base containing known and conceptual proteins derived from many public data bases including the draft human genome sequences. This plasma membrane-enriched proteome analysis created a data base of more than 500 breast cancer cell line proteins, 27% of which were of unknown function. The value of our approach is demonstrated by further detailed analyses of three previously uncharacterized proteins whose clinical relevance has been defined by their unique cancer expression profiles and the identification of protein-binding partners that elucidate potential functionality in cancer.

Amino Acid Sequence↗

Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.

Group beneficial norms are common in human societies. The persistence of such norms is consistent with evolutionary game theory, but existing models do not provide a plausible explanation for why they are common. We show that when a model of imitation used to derive replicator dynamics in isolated populations is generalized to allow for population structure, group beneficial norms can spread rapidly under plausible conditions. We also show that this mechanism allows recombination of different group beneficial norms arising in different populations.

Altruism↗