Pharmacist administration of controlled substances after an earthquake.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to R M Veatch.
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In an effort to clarify the concept of "medically futile care," two types of futile care are identified: 1) care that produces no demonstrable effect; and 2) care that produces an effect that is believed by the speaker to be of no net benefit. It is the second type of futile care, when a patient or surrogate and the clinician disagree over the benefit that the patient will receive from an intervention, that is most interesting morally and that cannot properly be labelled medically futile. As such, decisions to limit access to care deemed futile should not rest with medical professionals. This Article argues for a limited duty of clinicians to provide life-prolonging and some other fundamental care that is equitably funded and desired by the patient while competent, even if the clinician believes that such interventions will produce no net benefit.
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For years analysts have recognized the error of assuming that experts in medical science are also experts in deciding the clinically correct course for patients. This paper extends the analysis of the use of the consensus of experts to their use in public policy groups such as NIH Consensus Development panels. After arguing that technical experts cannot be expected to be expert on public policy decisions, the author extends the criticism to the use of the consensus of experts in estimating facts to provide a basis for policy decisions. It is argued that to the extent that (a) experts' views regarding a body of facts can be expected to correlate with their values relevant to those facts; and (b) the values of experts differ from the values of lay people, even the estimates of the facts given by the consensus of expert panels can be expected to differ from the estimates lay people would have given had they had the relevant scientific expertise.
Recognition of the need to ration care has focused attention on the concept of "basic care." It is often thought that care that is "basic" is also morally prior. This article questions that premise in light of the usual definitions of "basic." Specifically, it argues that Oregon's rationing scheme, which defines "basic" in terms of cost-effective care, fails to pay sufficient attention to important ethical principles such as justice.
Observing that the Hippocratic Oath is on a collision course with the cost-containment movement, a prominent medical ethicist asks whether a physician ethically can refuse to treat patients with inadequate insurance coverage and if different levels of care are permissible.
Rationing of health care is an inevitable correlate of living in a world of finite resources. It is morally necessary. The Hippocratic ethic commits clinicians to do whatever will benefit the patient and therefore must be abandoned in a world of moral rationing. After looking at some unacceptable preliminary strategies, two patient-centered adjustments in the Hippocratic ethic, adopting a more objective standard of patient benefit and adding a principle of patient autonomy, are defended. Still, however, cutting the fat out of the system will not be sufficient. A true social ethic of resource allocation will be necessary. A social contract approach supports a principle of equity as a necessary supplement to utility and cost-benefit analysis. It does not follow, however, that clinicians must take on these social ethical decisions. Clinicians should be exempt from normal social ethics so they are free to pursue the objective welfare of patients (provided they consent to such benefit). Administrators are in no better position to allocate scarce resources. What is needed is input from patients to (a) set categorical limits on their own care, (b) articulate principles for fine-tuning the allocation decisions, and (c) supervise professional agents who will make specific gatekeeping decisions for allocating a pool of resources legitimately thought to belong to the patient population. Neither administrators nor clinicians will be responsible for rationing decisions. In 1989 we spent $604.1 billion on health (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1990). That is almost $2 billion a day. Sometimes the benefits are dramatic: the pneumonia cured, the heart transplanted, the children spared from infectious diseases with immunizations that cost only pennies. Even so, the American health care system leaves much to be desired. Many other countries have higher life expectancy at birth. Infant mortality in the United States is far higher than countries like Japan and Sweden (United Nations Children's Fund 1990). If we look at the distribution of health status in the United States, the problems look even worse. Today, depending on the study, about 13 to 15 percent of the population has no health insurance at all (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989; Short, Monheit, and Beauregard 1989). Another 13 percent is woefully underinsured (Farley 1985). Social variables such as income, education, and race reveal dramatically different health status (Short, Monheit, and Beauregard 1989; Farley 1985). To respond to these needs, rationing will be essential.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)
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Edmund Pellegrino has pioneered work in medical ethics calling for a reconstruction of Hippocratic ethics. In particular, he has spoken of incorporating principles that concern justice and the common good. This article traces his commitment to the common good, concern for the poor, opposition to libertarianism, acknowledgement of the necessity of rationing, and reluctance to give clinicians social allocational tasks. It asks how Pellegrino relates distributive justice to the common good. Drawing on his theory relating autonomy to patient-centered beneficence (in which autonomy is one element of the good rather than a side constraint on the good), the author argues that Pellegrino appears to make justice one element of the common good rather than a distributional moral constraint on promoting the good. He suggests that Pellegrino stands in three consequentialist or teleological moral traditions: professional physician ethics, Aristotelianism, and Catholic moral theology, but that there are the makings of a more independent, more egalitarian theory of justice in his writings.
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