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R G Webster

Publications and source records attributed to R G Webster.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Evolution and molecular epidemiology of H9N2 influenza A viruses from quail in southern China, 2000 to 2005.

H9N2 influenza viruses have become established and maintain long-term endemicity in terrestrial poultry in Asian countries. Occasionally these viruses transmit to other mammals, including humans. Increasing epidemiological and laboratory findings suggest that quail may be an important host, as they are susceptible to different subtypes of influenza viruses. To better understand the role of quail in influenza virus ecology and evolution, H9N2 viruses isolated from quail during 2000 to 2005 were antigenically and genetically characterized. Our results showed that H9N2 viruses are prevalent year-round in southern China and replicate mainly asymptomatically in the respiratory tract of quail. Genetic analysis revealed that both the G1-like and Ck/Bei-like H9N2 lineages were cocirculating in quail since 2000. Phylogenetic analyses demonstrated that most of the isolates tested were double- or multiple-reassortant variants, with four G1-like and 16 Ck/Bei-like genotypes recognized. A novel genotype of G1-like virus became predominant in quail since 2003, while multiple Ck/Bei-like genotypes were introduced into quail, wherein they incorporated G1-like gene segments, but none of them became established in this host. Those Ck/Bei-like reassortants generated in quail have then been introduced into other poultry. These complex interactions form a two-way transmission system between quail and other types of poultry. The present study provides evidence that H9N2 and H5N1 subtype viruses have also exchanged gene segments to generate currently circulating reassortants of both subtypes that have pandemic potential. Continuing influenza virus surveillance in poultry is critical to understanding the genesis and emergence of potentially pandemic strains in this region.

Amino Acid Motifs↗

Characterization of avian H9N2 influenza viruses from United Arab Emirates 2000 to 2003.

Our aim was to establish the phylogenetic relation of H9N2 avian viruses in the Middle East to other Asian H9N2 lineages by characterization of 7 viruses isolated from United Arab Emirates (2000-2003). All these viruses had an additional basic amino acid at the hemagglutinin-connecting peptide; 6 contained a mutation associated with increased affinity toward human-like sialic acid substrates. The viruses' surface glycoproteins and most internal genes were >90% similar to those of A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 (H9N2) lineage. The hemadsorbing site of neuraminidase had up to 4 amino acid substitutions, as do human pandemic viruses. M2 sequence analysis revealed amino acid changes at 2 positions, with increasing resistance to amantadine in cell culture. They replicated efficiently in inoculated chickens and were successfully transmitted to contacts. They continue to maintain H5N1-like genes and may augment the spread of H5N1 viruses through regional co-circulation and inapparent infection. These viruses may present as potential pandemic candidates themselves.

Amantadine↗

Emergence and predominance of an H5N1 influenza variant in China.

The development of highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza viruses in poultry in Eurasia accompanied with the increase in human infection in 2006 suggests that the virus has not been effectively contained and that the pandemic threat persists. Updated virological and epidemiological findings from our market surveillance in southern China demonstrate that H5N1 influenza viruses continued to be panzootic in different types of poultry. Genetic and antigenic analyses revealed the emergence and predominance of a previously uncharacterized H5N1 virus sublineage (Fujian-like) in poultry since late 2005. Viruses from this sublineage gradually replaced those multiple regional distinct sublineages and caused recent human infection in China. These viruses have already transmitted to Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand, resulting in a new transmission and outbreak wave in Southeast Asia. Serological studies suggest that H5N1 seroconversion in market poultry is low and that vaccination may have facilitated the selection of the Fujian-like sublineage. The predominance of this virus over a large geographical region within a short period directly challenges current disease control measures.

Animals↗

Evolution and adaptation of H5N1 influenza virus in avian and human hosts in Indonesia and Vietnam.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 is endemic in poultry in East and Southeast Asia with disease outbreaks recently spreading to parts of central Asia, Europe and Africa. Continued interspecies transmission to humans has been reported in Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia and China, causing pandemic concern. Here, we genetically characterize 82 H5N1 viruses isolated from poultry throughout Indonesia and Vietnam and 11 human isolates from southern Vietnam together with sequence data available in public databases to address questions relevant to virus introduction, endemicity and evolution. Phylogenetic analysis shows that all viruses from Indonesia form a distinct sublineage of H5N1 genotype Z viruses suggesting this outbreak likely originated from a single introduction that spread throughout the country during the past two years. Continued virus activities in Indonesia were attributed to transmission via poultry movement within the country rather than through repeated introductions by bird migration. Within Indonesia and Vietnam, H5N1 viruses have evolved over time into geographically distinct groups within each country. Molecular analysis of the H5N1 genotype Z genome shows that only the M2 and PB1-F2 genes were under positive selection, suggesting that these genes might be involved in adaptation of this virus to new hosts following interspecies transmission. At the amino acid level 12 residues were under positive selection in those genotype Z viruses, in the HA and PB1-F2 proteins. Some of these residues were more frequently observed in human isolates than in avian isolates and are related to viral antigenicity and receptor binding. Our study provides insight into the ongoing evolution of H5N1 influenza viruses that are transmitting in diverse avian species and at the interface between avian and human hosts.

Animals↗

Establishment of multiple sublineages of H5N1 influenza virus in Asia: implications for pandemic control.

Preparedness for a possible influenza pandemic caused by highly pathogenic avian influenza A subtype H5N1 has become a global priority. The spread of the virus to Europe and continued human infection in Southeast Asia have heightened pandemic concern. It remains unknown from where the pandemic strain may emerge; current attention is directed at Vietnam, Thailand, and, more recently, Indonesia and China. Here, we report that genetically and antigenically distinct sublineages of H5N1 virus have become established in poultry in different geographical regions of Southeast Asia, indicating the long-term endemicity of the virus, and the isolation of H5N1 virus from apparently healthy migratory birds in southern China. Our data show that H5N1 influenza virus, has continued to spread from its established source in southern China to other regions through transport of poultry and bird migration. The identification of regionally distinct sublineages contributes to the understanding of the mechanism for the perpetuation and spread of H5N1, providing information that is directly relevant to control of the source of infection in poultry. It points to the necessity of surveillance that is geographically broader than previously supposed and that includes H5N1 viruses of greater genetic and antigenic diversity.

Animals↗

Role of domestic ducks in the propagation and biological evolution of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses in Asia.

Wild waterfowl, including ducks, are natural hosts of influenza A viruses. These viruses rarely caused disease in ducks until 2002, when some H5N1 strains became highly pathogenic. Here we show that these H5N1 viruses are reverting to nonpathogenicity in ducks. Ducks experimentally infected with viruses isolated between 2003 and 2004 shed virus for an extended time (up to 17 days), during which variant viruses with low pathogenicity were selected. These results suggest that the duck has become the "Trojan horse" of Asian H5N1 influenza viruses. The ducks that are unaffected by infection with these viruses continue to circulate these viruses, presenting a pandemic threat.

Animals↗

The spread of the H5N1 bird flu epidemic in Asia in 2004.

H5N1 avian influenza has spread to eight countries in eastern Asia including China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Indonesia in early 2004. This H5N1 influenza A virus is extremely virulent in poultry including chickens and ducks, killing millions of birds throughout the region. Additionally this virus has transmitted to humans (mainly children) in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand, killing 54 of 100 diagnosed persons. To control this epidemic hundreds of millions of chickens and ducks have been culled. One genotype of H5N1 designated "Z" has become dominant in Asia. This virus was first detected in wild birds in Hong Kong in November 2002 and was antigenically distinct from H5N1 viruses isolated from 1997 to early 2002 and lethal for aquatic birds. The H5N1 virus infecting humans and poultry in Asia in 2004 is an antigenic variant of the Z genotype. Here we consider the possible role of migrating birds in the evolution and spread of the H5N1 influenza A virus throughout Asia. We conclude that the available information is consistent with a role for migrating birds but limited information is available and that serological studies are urgently needed on migrating birds worldwide. The prospect is that this H5N1/04 influenza A virus will become endemic in poultry in eastern Asia and will be a continuing threat to animal and human health. It is also projected that a human H5N1 vaccine will eventually be needed.

Animals↗

Are ducks contributing to the endemicity of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus in Asia?

Wild waterfowl are the natural reservoir of all influenza A viruses, and these viruses are usually nonpathogenic in these birds. However, since late 2002, H5N1 outbreaks in Asia have resulted in mortality among waterfowl in recreational parks, domestic flocks, and wild migratory birds. The evolutionary stasis between influenza virus and its natural host may have been disrupted, prompting us to ask whether waterfowl are resistant to H5N1 influenza virus disease and whether they can still act as a reservoir for these viruses. To better understand the biology of H5N1 viruses in ducks and attempt to answer this question, we inoculated juvenile mallards with 23 different H5N1 influenza viruses isolated in Asia between 2003 and 2004. All virus isolates replicated efficiently in inoculated ducks, and 22 were transmitted to susceptible contacts. Viruses replicated to higher levels in the trachea than in the cloaca of both inoculated and contact birds, suggesting that the digestive tract is not the main site of H5N1 influenza virus replication in ducks and that the fecal-oral route may no longer be the main transmission path. The virus isolates' pathogenicities varied from completely nonpathogenic to highly lethal and were positively correlated with tracheal virus titers. Nevertheless, the eight virus isolates that were nonpathogenic in ducks replicated and transmitted efficiently to naïve contacts, suggesting that highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses causing minimal signs of disease in ducks can propagate silently and efficiently among domestic and wild ducks in Asia and that they represent a serious threat to human and veterinary public health.

Animals↗

H5N1 chicken influenza viruses display a high binding affinity for Neu5Acalpha2-3Galbeta1-4(6-HSO3)GlcNAc-containing receptors.

To characterize differences in the receptor-binding specificity of H5N1 chicken viruses and viruses of aquatic birds, we used a panel of synthetic polyacrylamide (PAA)-based sialylglycopolymers that carried identical terminal Neu5Acalpha2-3Gal fragments but varied by the structure of the next saccharide residues. A majority of duck viruses irrespective of their HA subtype, bound with the highest affinity to trisaccharide Neu5Acalpha2-3Galbeta1-3GlcNAc, suggesting that these viruses preferentially recognize sialyloligosaccharide receptors with type 1 core (Galbeta1-3GlcNAc). Substitution of 6-hydroxyl group of GlcNAc residue of tested sialylglycopolymers by 6-sulfo group had little effect on receptor binding by duck viruses. By contrast, H5N1 chicken and human viruses isolated in 1997 in Hong Kong preferred receptors with type 2 core (Galbeta1-4GlcNAcbeta) and bound sulfated trisaccharide Neu5Acalpha2-3Galbeta1-4(6-HSO3)GlcNAcbeta (6-Su-3'SLN) with the extraordinary high affinity. Another chicken virus, A/FPV/Rostok/34 (H7N1), and several mammalian viruses also displayed an increased affinity for sulfated sialyloligosaccharide receptor. The binding of chicken and mammalian viruses to tracheal epithelial cells of green monkey decreased after treatment of cells with glucosamine-6-sulfatase suggesting the presence of 6-O-Su-3'SLN determinants in the airway epithelium. It remains to be seen whether existence of the 6-O-Su-3'SLN groups in the human airway epithelial cells might facilitate infection of humans with H5N1 chicken viruses.

Animals↗

Genesis of a highly pathogenic and potentially pandemic H5N1 influenza virus in eastern Asia.

A highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, H5N1, caused disease outbreaks in poultry in China and seven other east Asian countries between late 2003 and early 2004; the same virus was fatal to humans in Thailand and Vietnam. Here we demonstrate a series of genetic reassortment events traceable to the precursor of the H5N1 viruses that caused the initial human outbreak in Hong Kong in 1997 (refs 2-4) and subsequent avian outbreaks in 2001 and 2002 (refs 5, 6). These events gave rise to a dominant H5N1 genotype (Z) in chickens and ducks that was responsible for the regional outbreak in 2003-04. Our findings indicate that domestic ducks in southern China had a central role in the generation and maintenance of this virus, and that wild birds may have contributed to the increasingly wide spread of the virus in Asia. Our results suggest that H5N1 viruses with pandemic potential have become endemic in the region and are not easily eradicable. These developments pose a threat to public and veterinary health in the region and potentially the world, and suggest that long-term control measures are required.

Animals↗

The evolution of H5N1 influenza viruses in ducks in southern China.

The pathogenicity of avian H5N1 influenza viruses to mammals has been evolving since the mid-1980s. Here, we demonstrate that H5N1 influenza viruses, isolated from apparently healthy domestic ducks in mainland China from 1999 through 2002, were becoming progressively more pathogenic for mammals, and we present a hypothesis explaining the mechanism of this evolutionary direction. Twenty-one viruses isolated from apparently healthy ducks in southern China from 1999 through 2002 were confirmed to be H5N1 subtype influenza A viruses. These isolates are antigenically similar to A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96 (H5N1) virus, which was the source of the 1997 Hong Kong "bird flu" hemagglutinin gene, and all are highly pathogenic in chickens. The viruses form four pathotypes on the basis of their replication and lethality in mice. There is a clear temporal pattern in the progressively increasing pathogenicity of these isolates in the mammalian model. Five of six H5N1 isolates tested replicated in inoculated ducks and were shed from trachea or cloaca, but none caused disease signs or death. Phylogenetic analysis of the full genome indicated that most of the viruses are reassortants containing the A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96-like hemagglutinin gene and the other genes from unknown Eurasian avian influenza viruses. This study is a characterization of the H5N1 avian influenza viruses recently circulating in ducks in mainland China. Our findings suggest that immediate action is needed to prevent the transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses from the apparently healthy ducks into chickens or mammalian hosts.

Animals↗

H5N1 influenza: a protean pandemic threat.

Infection with avian influenza A virus of the H5N1 subtype (isolates A/HK/212/03 and A/HK/213/03) was fatal to one of two members of a family in southern China in 2003. This incident was preceded by lethal outbreaks of H5N1 influenza in waterfowl, which are the natural hosts of these viruses and, therefore, normally have asymptomatic infection. The hemagglutinin genes of the A/HK/212/03-like viruses isolated from humans and waterfowl share the lineage of the H5N1 viruses that caused the first known cases of human disease in Hong Kong in 1997, but their internal protein genes originated elsewhere. The hemagglutinin of the recent human isolates has undergone significant antigenic drift. Like the 1997 human H5N1 isolates, the 2003 human H5N1 isolates induced the overproduction of proinflammatory cytokines by primary human macrophages in vitro, whereas the precursor H5N1 viruses and other H5N1 reassortants isolated in 2001 did not. The acquisition by the viruses of characteristics that enhance virulence in humans and waterfowl and their potential for wider distribution by infected migrating birds are causes for renewed pandemic concern.

Animals↗

Responsiveness to a pandemic alert: use of reverse genetics for rapid development of influenza vaccines.

BACKGROUND: In response to the emergence of severe infection capable of rapid global spread, WHO will issue a pandemic alert. Such alerts are rare; however, on Feb 19, 2003, a pandemic alert was issued in response to human infections caused by an avian H5N1 influenza virus, A/Hong Kong/213/03. H5N1 had been noted once before in human beings in 1997 and killed a third (6/18) of infected people. The 2003 variant seemed to have been transmitted directly from birds to human beings and caused fatal pneumonia in one of two infected individuals. Candidate vaccines were sought, but no avirulent viruses antigenically similar to the pathogen were available, and the isolate killed embryonated chicken eggs. Since traditional strategies of vaccine production were not viable, we sought to produce a candidate reference virus using reverse genetics. METHODS: We removed the polybasic aminoacids that are associated with high virulence from the haemagglutinin cleavage site of A/Hong Kong/213/03 using influenza reverse genetics techniques. A reference vaccine virus was then produced on an A/Puerto Rico/8/34 (PR8) backbone on WHO-approved Vero cells. We assessed this reference virus for pathogenicity in in-vivo and in-vitro assays. FINDINGS: A reference vaccine virus was produced in Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP)-grade facilities in less than 4 weeks from the time of virus isolation. This virus proved to be non-pathogenic in chickens and ferrets and was shown to be stable after multiple passages in embryonated chicken eggs. INTERPRETATION: The ability to produce a candidate reference virus in such a short period of time sets a new standard for rapid response to emerging infectious disease threats and clearly shows the usefulness of reverse genetics for influenza vaccine development. The same technologies and procedures are currently being used to create reference vaccine viruses against the 2004 H5N1 viruses circulating in Asia.

Animals↗

Continuing evolution of H9N2 influenza viruses in Southeastern China.

H9N2 influenza viruses are panzootic in domestic poultry in Eurasia and since 1999 have caused transient infections in humans and pigs. To investigate the zoonotic potential of H9N2 viruses, we studied the evolution of the viruses in live-poultry markets in Hong Kong in 2003. H9N2 was the most prevalent influenza virus subtype in the live-poultry markets between 2001 and 2003. Antigenic and phylogenetic analysis of hemagglutinin (HA) showed that all of the 19 isolates found except one belonged to the lineage represented by A/Duck/Hong Kong/Y280/97 (H9N2). The exception was A/Guinea fowl/NT184/03 (H9N2), whose HA is most closely related to that of the human isolate A/Guangzhou/333/99 (H9N2), a virus belonging to the A/Chicken/Beijing/1/94-like (H9N2) lineage. At least six different genotypes were recognized. The majority of the viruses had nonstructural (and HA) genes derived from the A/Duck/Hong Kong/Y280/97-like virus lineage but had other genes of mixed avian virus origin, including genes similar to those of H5N1 viruses isolated in 2001. Viruses of all six genotypes of H9N2 found were able to replicate in chickens and mice without adaptation. The infected chickens showed no signs of disease, but representatives of two viral genotypes were lethal to mice. Three genotypes of virus replicated in the respiratory tracts of swine, which shed virus for at least 5 days. These results show an increasing genetic and biologic diversity of H9N2 viruses in Hong Kong and support their potential role as pandemic influenza agents.

Animals↗

Microbial adaptation and change: avian influenza.

The evolution of influenza is a continuing process involving viral and host factors. The increasing frequency of emergence of the highly pathogenic H5N1, H7N3 and H7N7 influenza viruses and the panzootic spread of H9N2 influenza virus, all of which can be potentially transmitted to humans, are of great concern to both veterinary and human public health officials. The question is how soon the next pandemic will emerge. A convergence of factors, including the population densities of poultry, pigs and humans, are likely factors affecting the evolution of the virus. Highly concentrated poultry and pig farming, in conjunction with traditional live animal or 'wet' markets, provide optimal conditions for increased mutation, reassortment and recombination of influenza viruses. Strategies to reduce the evolution of influenza and the emergence of pandemics include the separation of species, increased biosecurity, the development of new vaccine strategies and better basic knowledge of the virus. More effective co-operation between scientists and veterinary and public health officials is required to achieve these goals.

Animals↗

Characterization of H9 subtype influenza viruses from the ducks of southern China: a candidate for the next influenza pandemic in humans?

A current view of the emergence of pandemic influenza viruses envisages a gene flow from the aquatic avian reservoir to humans via reassortment in pigs, the hypothetical "mixing vessel." Understanding arising from recent H5N1 influenza outbreaks in Hong Kong since 1997 and the isolation of avian H9N2 virus from humans raises alternative options for the emergence of a new pandemic virus. Here we report that H9N2 influenza viruses established in terrestrial poultry in southern China are transmitted back to domestic ducks, in which the viruses generate multiple reassortants. These novel H9N2 viruses are double or even triple reassortants that have amino acid signatures in their hemagglutinin, indicating their potential to directly infect humans. Some of them contain gene segments that are closely related to those of A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5N1/97, H5N1) or A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 (G1-like, H9N2). More importantly, some of their internal genes are closely related to those of novel H5N1 viruses isolated during the outbreak in Hong Kong in 2001. This study reveals a two-way transmission of influenza virus between terrestrial and aquatic birds that facilitates the generation of novel reassortant H9N2 influenza viruses. Such reassortants may directly or indirectly play a role in the emergence of the next pandemic virus.

Animals↗

Land-based birds as potential disseminators of avian mammalian reassortant influenza A viruses.

Chickens, quail, and other land-based birds are extensively farmed around the world. They have been recently implicated in zoonotic outbreaks of avian influenza in Hong Kong. The possibility that land-based birds could act as mixing vessels or disseminators of avian/mammalian reassortant influenza A viruses with pandemic potential has not been evaluated. In this report, we investigated whether chickens and Japanese quail are susceptible to a mammalian influenza virus (A/swine/Texas/4199-2/98 [H3N2]). This virus did not grow in chickens and replicated to low levels in Japanese quail but did not transmit. Replacing the H3 gene of this virus for one of the avian H9 viruses resulted in transmission of the avian/swine reassortant virus among quail but not among chickens. Our findings demonstrated that Japanese quail could provide an environment in which viruses like the A/swine/Texas/4199-2/98 [H3N2] virus could further reassort and generate influenza viruses with pandemic potential.

Animals↗