Process-based and code-based interference in dual-task performance.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Pierre Jolicoeur.
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Targets are identified more poorly when presented during a congruent cued response than during an incongruent cued response (blindness effect). The authors investigated sequential trial dependencies in the blindness effect. The results show that the size of the blindness effect depends both on the previous cued response-target congruency relationship and on repetition of events from the preceding trial. This finding suggests that cued responses and targets become linked together in a single episodic trace; repeating one of these events from the preceding trial activates the other. Depending on whether the activated representation matches or conflicts with events on the current trial, target identification performance is either facilitated or impaired. Implications for action planning and feature binding are discussed.
We used electrophysiological methods to track the deployment of visual spatial attention while observers were engaged in concurrent central attentional processing, using a variant of the attentional blink paradigm. Two visual targets (T1, T2) were presented at a stimulus onset asynchrony of either 200 ms or 800 ms. T1 was a white digit among white letters presented on a dark background using rapid serial visual presentation at fixation. T2 was another digit that was presented to the left or right of fixation simultaneously with a distractor digit in the opposite visual field, each followed by a pattern mask. In each T2 display, one digit was red and one was green. Half of the subjects reported the red digit and ignored the green one, whereas the other half reported the green digit and ignored the red one. T1 and T2 were reported in one block of trials, and only T2 in another block (order counterbalanced across subjects). Accuracy of report of T2 was lower at short SOA than at long SOA when both T1 and T2 were reported, but was similar across SOA when only T2 was reported. The electrophysiological results focused on the N2pc component, which was used as an index of the locus of spatial attention. N2pc was reduced in amplitude when subjects reported T1, and particularly so at the short SOA. The results suggest that attention to T1 interfered with the deployment of visual spatial attention to T2.
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The divergent predictions of 2 models of dual-task performance are investigated. The central bottleneck and central capacity sharing models argue that a central stage of information processing is capacity limited, whereas stages before and after are capacity free. The models disagree about the nature of this central capacity limitation. The central bottleneck model claims that central processing acts on only 1 task at a time and, therefore, constitutes a bottleneck that processes tasks serially. The central capacity sharing model postulates that the central stage is a limited-capacity parallel processor that divides resources among to-be-performed tasks. As a result of this difference, in the psychological refractory period paradigm, the central capacity sharing model predicts that lengthening Task 2 precentral processing will improve Task 1 performance at short stimulus onset asynchronies, whereas the central bottleneck model does not. Results of 2 experiments confirm the prediction of the central capacity sharing model.
Attentional capture is the unintentional deployment of attention to a task-irrelevant but attentionally salient object. The contingent involuntary orienting hypothesis states that it occurs only if a distractor's property matches current top-down attentional control settings (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992). Folk, Leber, and Egeth (2002) found that monitoring a central RSVP stream for a coloured target led to spatial attentional capture by a peripheral distractor that matched the target colour. Using a similar paradigm, we explored the time course of this spatial blink. Implications of this study for current accounts of the attentional capture phenomenon are discussed.
A dual-task procedure was used to investigate the attentional requirements of number processing. The results show that (1) numeric information in Task 2 can be retrieved in parallel with capacity-demanding processing in Task 1 but (2) comparing two quantities requires central capacity, which is depleted by switching from one task to another. This finding resolves an apparent discrepancy in the literature, in which digit magnitude information has not been retrieved in parallel with a second task (Logan & Schulkind, 2000), despite repeated demonstrations that this information is retrieved autonomously, even when it is deleterious to performance (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982). A model is proposed to reconcile existing findings with the new ones revealed in the present investigation.
RATIONALE: Research on the limits of information processing shows that when a dual task is performed in quick succession, performance on the second task is increasingly degraded as the temporal gap between task 1 and task 2 decreases. The carry-over effect on task 2 is assumed to occur because the central cognitive stage of processing must be completed before the processing of task 2 can begin. This creates a bottleneck when the tasks are performed in close succession, but with longer delays task 2 is no longer affected by task 1. OBJECTIVES: It was predicted that if alcohol disturbs (slows) the central stage of processing, shorter delays between task 1 and task 2 should reveal more intense disruption in the performance of task 2. METHODS: Two groups (n=16) of healthy male social drinkers performed a baseline test on a dual task. On each trial, task 1 was followed by task 2 at one of four delays (50, 200, 500, and 1100 ms). The groups then received either 0.65 g alcohol/kg or a placebo and performed the task again. RESULTS: The RT of the alcohol and placebo groups did not differ on the baseline test. In accord with the hypothesis, the alcohol group performed task 2 more slowly on the treatment test than did the placebo group at the three shortest delays (P<0.02). At the longest delay, the RT of the groups did not differ (P>0.15). CONCLUSIONS: This pattern of task 2 RTs indicates that a moderate dose of alcohol can significantly impair (slow) the central, cognitive stage of information processing.
We previously reported that BARF1 gene has either an immortalizing effect, when expressed in primary primate epithelial cells, or a malignant transforming activity, when expressed in established and nontumoral rodent fibroblast or human B-cell lines. As predicted from sequence analysis, we found that BARF1 coded protein can be secreted from different cell lines, among them BARF1-transfected Balb/c3T3 rodent fibroblasts. Thus, as an initial step to clarify BARF1 oncogenic functions, we investigated whether the secreted form of BARF1 protein can activate the cell cycle as a growth factor. Since efficient BARF1 expression could be obtained from 293-tTA cells infected with a tetracycline-regulatable recombinant adenovirus, secreted BARF1 product could be purified from the culture medium of such cells by ammonium sulfate precipitation, ion exchange chromotography and sucrose gradient sedimentation. We describe in this paper that addition of a purified product of secreted BARF1 protein to serum-free culture medium of Balb/c3T3 rodent fibroblasts, human Louckes B-cell line and primary monkey kidney epithelial cells resulted in a cell cycle activation that was inhibited by affinity-purified anti-BARF1 antibody. Our demonstration of a specific stimulation of cell cycle in vitro by BARF1 secreted product suggests that this EBV-encoded BARF1 protein could act as a growth factor in vivo.
An examination of previous claims for virtually perfect time-sharing in dual-task situations reveals confounding effects that may have obscured dual-task interference. Two experiments are conducted in which these confounding effects are minimized, revealing statistically significant dual-task interference. These results support the hypothesis that human information processing is dominated by a structural central capacity limitation and call into question the hypothesis that dual-task interference can be eliminated by meeting the 5 conditions outlined by D. Meyer and D. Kieras (1999).
BACKGROUND: Although moderate doses of alcohol can impair performance on tasks that require information processing, little is known about the locus of the alcohol effects within the processing stream. This study used a psychological refractory period paradigm to investigate the effect of alcohol on the central, cognitive stage of information processing when task complexity is manipulated by altering stimulus-response compatibility. METHODS: Thirty-four healthy male social drinkers were assigned to one of two groups (n = 17) that performed two tasks. Each trial consisted of a task 1 stimulus (tone) followed by a task 2 stimulus (letter) that was presented after one of four stimulus onset asynchronies (50, 200, 500, or 1100 msec). A baseline test of performance was obtained before the groups received a beverage containing either 0.0 g/kg (placebo) or 0.65 g/kg alcohol. Both groups were retested when blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was increasing and was decreasing. RESULTS: The alcohol group made significantly more errors in task 1 compared with their drug-free baseline measure during the ascending phase of the BAC curve, and error rates increased to a greater extent for the more complex arbitrary stimulus-response mapping condition. Moreover, this increase in errors continued unabated during the descending phase of the BAC curve. Increasing BACs also slowed performance (longer reaction time), but unlike errors, reaction time returned to drug-free baseline levels when BAC was decreasing. CONCLUSIONS: The results provide evidence that an acute dose of alcohol can impair one aspect of the central, cognitive stages of information processing. The possibility that errors in information processing remain during decreasing BACs even after processing speed has returned to drug-free levels has important practical implications relating to the detrimental consequences of acute alcohol intoxication.
Smilek, Eastwood, and Merikle (2000) demonstrated that the detection of change was facilitated when the target character changed in many rather than few of its features. Specifically, the function relating search response time to display set size was shallower when more features changed than when fewer features changed. The researchers interpreted these results as indicating that large feature changes provide preattentive guidance of focal attention to the location of the change. We tested this preattentive guidance hypothesis by examining change detection performance in the context of a spatial cuing paradigm. The hypothesis predicts that (1) the cost on invalidly cued trials should be less when more features change than when fewer features change, and (2) the features manipulation should have no effect on validly cued trials. In contrast to these predictions, our results show that cuing effects are equivalent across all levels of feature change and that a robust effect of the features manipulation is observable for both validly and invalidly cued trials. We argue that large feature changes do not provide preattentive guidance and in fact can be detected more readily after attention is already in place at the target location.
We investigated picture plane rotation effects on the minimum stimulus duration required to recognise pictures of familiar objects in a picture-word verification task. Participants made unspeeded responses, selecting from 126 written alternatives. Longer stimulus durations were needed to identify plane-misoriented views. These orientation effects were non-linear, arguing against a simple mental rotation account of compensation for plane misorientation in identification tasks. Orientation effects were found for almost all items, in particular including those labelled at the basic level (cf. Hamm, McMullen, 1998, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 24, 413-426). We suggest that plane misorientation increases the difficulty of basic level as well as subordinate level identification unless only a small, visually dissimilar set of stimuli are presented. Errors in the task were analysed to provide an alternative, objective measure of perceived visual similarity, by assessing the number and nature of mistaken identifications made to a given target object. We propose that misorientation effects are best understood in terms of the effects of the perceived visual similarity of a target to its set of response alternatives rather than in terms of the level (basic or subordinate) at which the target is to be identified.
Targets are identified more accurately when they are presented during an incongruent response (e.g., a left-pointing arrowhead presented during a right key press) than during a congruent response (e.g., a left-pointing arrowhead presented during a left key press). This effect, referred to here as congruency-induced blindness, has been hypothesised to result from the occupation of feature codes. According to the code occupation hypothesis (Behav. Brain Sci.; J. Experim. Psychol.: Human Percept. Perform.; Vis. Cogn., in press), only costs of congruency between features of a planned or executed action and a to-be-perceived target should be observed; neither costs nor benefits of incongruency are predicted by this account. In the present study, we investigated costs and benefits in identifying left and right targets directly by manipulating neutral response type and the symbols used to cue the neutral response, which produced four neutral conditions. Three important results emerged: (1). a significant main effect of RSI (suggesting that increasing temporal overlap between a planned action and target presentation interferes with perceptual reports of the target), (2). a significant main effect of congruency (showing that impairment is code-specific), and (3). clear-cut costs with little evidence for benefits. Other complex patterns of results provided additional information relevant for extant theories of perception-action interactions.
The authors present the central capacity sharing (CCS) model and derive equations describing its behaviors to explain results from dual-task situations. The predictions of the CCS model are contrasted with those of the central bottleneck model. The CCS model predicts all of the hallmark effects of the psychological refractory period (PRP) pardigm: -1 slope of the PRP effect at short stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs), underadditivity of precentral Task 2 manipulations, additivity of central or postcentral Task 2 manipulations with SOA, and carry forward to Task 2 of Task 1 precentral or central manipulations at short SOAs. The CCS model also predicts that Task 1 response times increase with decreasing SOA. The model is a viable alternative to the central bottleneck model.
Blindness to response-compatible stimuli is the finding that targets are identified less accurately when presented during the planning or execution of a congruent response (e.g., right arrow presented during a right keypress) versus an incongruent response (e.g., right arrow presented during a left keypress). Accounts of this effect suggest the planning and execution of a response are critical to its observation. Five experiments investigated whether a blindness effect would be observed in the absence of a planned response. Results suggest that a planned response is not necessary to observe a content-specific blindness effect and that the blindness effect may actually comprise both an action-related component and a symbolic component that is distinct from the action-planning system.
Action-compatible blindness refers to the finding that target stimuli are perceived less frequently if they are presented during the planning or execution of a compatible action (e.g., a left arrow presented during a left manual key press) than during an incompatible action (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997 a, b). We investigated the effect of lengthening the response execution phase in the action-compatible blindness paradigm by requiring subjects to tap a response key once or three times on the assumption that tapping three times would increase the duration of the execution phase of the response. Prior research (e.g., Stevanovski, Oriet, & Jolicoeur, 2002; Wühr & Müsseler, 2001) has shown that larger blindness effects are observed for targets presented during the execution phase of a response than after the response has been made. We investigated whether a larger blindness effect would be observed in the three-tap condition than in the one-tap condition, or whether lengthening the duration of the response would extend the time course of the blindness effect. Neither of these possibilities was supported by the data irrespective of whether the number of taps to be made was blocked or mixed within a block of trials. The results are discussed in terms of current accounts of action-compatible blindness and the possible cognitive differences between making a single response and repeating a response.
The goal of the present experiment was to test the predictions of Central Bottleneck and Central Capacity Sharing models. According to the Central Bottleneck model, dual task interference, as observed in the PRP paradigm, is caused by an all-or-none bottleneck in information processing. The Central Capacity Sharing model postulates that dual task interference is caused by a capacity limited process that can allocate capacity in a graded fashion. The Central Bottleneck model predicts no change in RT1 with decreasing SOA, whereas the Central Capacity Sharing model predicts that RT1 will increase with decreasing SOA and that the slope of the RT1 SOA effect will depend upon the difficulty of task 2. Subjects were required to perform a tone pitch judgement and shape-matching task in rapid succession. Task order was randomized and the SOA between the first and second stimulus varied from 50 to 1250 ms. Results from this experiment favour the Central Capacity Sharing model. The results were then run through simulations of both the Central Bottleneck and Central Capacity Sharing models. Results from the simulations also favoured the Central Capacity Sharing model. As the difficulty of the second task increased, more capacity was allocated to it, confirming the prediction that as task 2 difficulty increases, the RT1 SOA slope increases. The proportion of capacity allocated to the first task varied from.78 to.91 indicating that capacity can be allocated in a graded fashion.