Biomedical subjects

Peter Juslin

Publications and source records attributed to Peter Juslin.

11 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2006

On the role of causal intervention in multiple-cue judgment: positive and negative effects on learning.

Previous studies have suggested better learning when people actively intervene rather than when they passively observe the stimuli in a judgment task. In 4 experiments, the authors investigated the hypothesis that this improvement is associated with a shift from exemplar memory to cue abstraction. In a multiple-cue judgment task with continuous cues, the data replicated the improvement with intervention and participants who experimented more actively produced more accurate judgments. In a multiple-cue judgment task with binary cues, intervention produced poorer accuracy and participants who experimented more actively produced poorer judgments. These results provide no support for a representational shift but suggest that the improvement with active intervention may be limited to certain tasks and environments.

Adult↗

PubMed2006

Go with the flow: How to master a nonlinear multiple-cue judgment task.

The authors examined the cognitive processes that participants use in linear and nonlinear multiple-cue judgment tasks, hypothesizing that people are unable to use explicit cue abstraction in a nonlinear task, instead turning to exemplar memory. Experiment 1 confirmed that people are unable to use cue abstraction in nonlinear tasks but failed to confirm the hypothesized, spontaneous shift to exemplar memory. Instead, the participants appeared to be trapped in persistent and futile attempts to abstract the cue-criterion relations. Only after being instructed to rely on exemplar memory in Experiment 2 did they master the nonlinear task. The results suggest that adaptive shifts of representation need not occur spontaneously and that analytical thought may sometimes harm performance in nonlinear tasks.

Adult↗

PubMed2006

Liquid-specific stimulus properties can be used for haptic perception of the amount of liquid in a vessel put in motion.

We investigated whether people can use haptic liquid-specific information made available by shaking the vessel containing the liquid. In experiment 1 we studied to what extent people can discriminate between liquid and solid substances and determine the amount of substance in the shaken vessel, as well as the effects of exploratory procedures on these abilities. Exploratory procedures including horizontal shaking of the vessel produced accurate identification of the content and more precise judgments for a liquid than for a solid, but vertical lifting produced an overestimation of the amount of liquid. In experiment 2 we demonstrated that people can discriminate between the amount of liquid and the amount of solid in the same vessel. Three theories of what liquid-specific stimulus properties are picked up by shaking the vessel are preliminarily examined.

Adult↗

PubMed2005

Capacity limitations and the detection of correlations: comment on Kareev (2000).

Y. Kareev (2000) argued that the limited capacity of working memory may be an adaptive advantage for the early detection of useful correlations. His analysis indeed suggests that the optimal sample size is close to G. A. Miller's (1956) "magical number 7 +/- 2." The authors point out logical and statistical limitations of Y. Kareev's (2000) analysis, including that it neglects that the adaptive value is not determined by the hit rate but by the posterior probability of hit and that only signal trials are considered. The authors' analysis demonstrates that when these limitations are corrected for, the alleged benefit for small samples does not occur, and larger samples imply considerable improvement in the detection of correlations.

Adaptation, Psychological↗

PubMed2005

The cognitive substrate of subjective probability.

The prominent cognitive theories of probability judgment were primarily developed to explain cognitive biases rather than to account for the cognitive processes in probability judgment. In this article the authors compare 3 major theories of the processes and representations in probability judgment: the representativeness heuristic, implemented as prototype similarity, relative likelihood, or evidential support accumulation (ESAM; D. J. Koehler, C. M. White, & R. Grondin, 2003); cue-based relative frequency; and exemplar memory, implemented by probabilities from exemplars (PROBEX; P. Juslin & M. Persson, 2002). Three experiments with different task structures consistently demonstrate that exemplar memory is the best account of the data whereas the results are inconsistent with extant formulations of the representativeness heuristic and cue-based relative frequency.

Adult↗

PubMed2005

Evidence for rule-based processes in the inverse base-rate effect.

Three studies provide convergent evidence that the inverse base-rate effect (Medin & Edelson, 1988) is mediated by rule-based cognitive processes. Experiment 1 shows that, in contrast to adults, prior to the formal operational stage most children do not exhibit the inverse base-rate effect. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that an adult sample is a mix of participants relying on associative processes who categorize according to the base-rate and participants relying on rule-based processes who exhibit a strong inverse base-rate effect. The distribution of the effect is bimodal, and removing participants independently classified as prone to rule-based processing effectively eliminates the inverse base-rate effect. The implications for current explanations of the inverse base-rate effect are discussed.

Adult↗

PubMed2004

Subjective probability intervals: how to reduce overconfidence by interval evaluation.

Format dependence implies that assessment of the same subjective probability distribution produces different conclusions about over- or underconfidence depending on the assessment format. In 2 experiments, the authors demonstrate that the overconfidence bias that occurs when participants produce intervals for an uncertain quantity is almost abolished when they evaluate the probability that the same intervals include the quantity. The authors successfully apply a method for adaptive adjustment of probability intervals as a debiasing tool and discuss a tentative explanation in terms of a naive sampling model. According to this view, people report their experiences accurately, but they are naive in that they treat both sample proportion and sample dispersion as unbiased estimators, yielding small bias in probability evaluation but strong bias in interval production.

Choice Behavior↗

PubMed2004

Note on the rationality of rule-based versus exemplar-based processing in human judgment.

This paper reports a study of the relationship between rule- versus exemplar-based processing and criteria for rationality of judgment. Participants made probability judgments in a classification task devised by S. W. Allen and L. R. Brooks (1991). In the exemplar condition, the miscalibration was accounted for by stochastic components of the judgment with a format-dependence effect, implying simultaneous over- and underconfidence depending on the response scale. In the rule condition, there was an overconfidence bias not accounted for by the stochastic components of judgment. In both conditions the participants were additive on average and reasonably transitive, but the larger stochastic component in the exemplar condition produced somewhat larger absolute deviations. The results suggest that exemplar processes are unbiased but more perturbed by stochastic components, while rule-based processes may be more prone to bias.

Adult↗

PubMed2003

Exemplar effects in categorization and multiple-cue judgment.

Categorization and multiple-cue judgment are similar tasks, but the influential models in the two areas are different in terms of the computations, processes, and neural substrates that they imply. In categorization, exemplar memory is often emphasized, whereas multiple-cue judgment generally is interpreted in terms of integration of cues that have been abstracted in training. In 3 experiments the authors investigated whether these conclusions derive from genuine differences in the processes or are accidental to the different research methods. The results revealed large individual differences and a shift from exemplar memory to cue abstraction when the criterion is changed from a binary to a continuous variable, especially for a probabilistic criterion. People appear to switch between qualitatively distinct processes in the 2 tasks.

Adult↗

PubMed2003

Cue abstraction and exemplar memory in categorization.

In this article, the authors compare 3 generic models of the cognitive processes in a categorization task. The cue abstraction model implies abstraction in training of explicit cue-criterion relations that are mentally integrated to form a judgment, the lexicographic heuristic uses only the most valid cue, and the exemplar-based model relies on retrieval of exemplars. The results from 2 experiments showed that, in lieu of the lexicographic heuristic, most participants spontaneously integrate cues. In contrast to single-system views, exemplar memory appeared to dominate when the feedback was poor, but when the feedback was rich enough to allow the participants to discern the task structure, it was exploited for abstraction of explicit cue-criterion relations.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2003

Can attentional theory explain the inverse base rate effect? Comment on Kruschke (2001).

In J. K. Kruschke's (2001; see record 2001-18940-005) study, it is argued that attentional theory is the sole satisfactory explanation of the inverse base rate effect and that eliminative inference (P. Juslin, P. Wennerholm, & A. Winman, 2001; see record 2001-07828-016) plays no role in the phenomenon. In this comment, the authors demonstrate that, in contrast to the central tenets of attentional theory, (a) rapid attention shifts as implemented in ADIT decelerate learning in the inverse base-rate task and (b) the claim that the inverse base-rate effect is directly caused by an attentional asymmetry is refuted by data. It is proposed that a complete account of the inverse base-rate effect needs to integrate attention effects with inference rules that are flexibly used for both induction and elimination.

Association Learning↗