Lyme disease testing.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Paul Mead.
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BACKGROUND: Despite a decreasing incidence of listeriosis in the United States, molecular subtyping has increased the number of recognized outbreaks. In September 2000, the New York City Department of Health identified a cluster of infections caused by Listeria monocytogenes isolates with identical molecular subtypes by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and ribotyping. METHODS: To determine the magnitude of the outbreak and identify risk factors for infection, we notified state health departments and conducted a case-control study. A case was defined as a patient or mother-infant pair infected with Listeria monocytogenes whose isolate yielded the outbreak PFGE pattern. Controls were patients infected with Listeria monocytogenes whose isolate yielded a different PFGE pattern. Patients were asked about food and drink consumed during the 30 days before the onset of illness. RESULTS: Between May and December 2000, there were 30 clinical isolates of Listeria monocytogenes with identical PFGE patterns identified in 11 US states. Cases of infection caused by these isolates were associated with 4 deaths and 3 miscarriages. A case-control study implicated sliced processed turkey from a delicatessen (Mantel-Haenszel odds ratio, 8.0; 95% confidence interval, 1.2-43.3). A traceback investigation identified a single processing plant as the likely source of the outbreak, and the company voluntarily recalled 16 million pounds of processed meat. The same plant had been identified in a Listeria contamination event that had occurred more than a decade previously. CONCLUSIONS: Prevention of persistent L. monocytogenes contamination in food processing plants presents a critical challenge to food safety professionals.
A multistate outbreak of listeriosis occurred in the United States in 1998 with illness onset dates between August and December. The outbreak caused illness in 108 persons residing in 24 states and caused 14 deaths and four miscarriages or stillbirths. This outbreak was detected by public health officials in Tennessee and New York who observed significant increases over expected listeriosis cases in their states. Subsequently, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) began laboratory characterization of clinical isolates of Listeria monocytogenes by serotyping and restriction fragment length polymorphism analysis using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE). For the purpose of this investigation, outbreak-related isolates were defined as those that had a specific AscI-PFGE pattern and indistinguishable or highly similar (no more than 2 band difference in 26 bands) ApaI-PFGE patterns when their DNA was restricted by AscI and ApaI restriction enzymes. Timely availability of molecular subtyping results enabled epidemiologists to separate outbreak cases from temporally associated sporadic cases in the same geographic areas and facilitated the identification of contaminated hot dogs manufactured at a single commercial facility as the source of the outbreak. During the investigation of this outbreak, a standardized protocol for subtyping L. monocytogenes by PFGE was developed and disseminated to public health laboratories participating with CDC's PulseNet network; these laboratories were requested to begin routine PFGE subtyping of L. monocytogenes.
On November 20, 2001, inhalational anthrax was confirmed in an elderly woman from rural Connecticut. To determine her exposure source, we conducted an extensive epidemiologic, environmental, and laboratory investigation. Molecular subtyping showed that her isolate was indistinguishable from isolates associated with intentionally contaminated letters. No samples from her home or community yielded Bacillus anthracis, and she received no first-class letters from facilities known to have processed intentionally contaminated letters. Environmental sampling in the regional Connecticut postal facility yielded B. anthracis spores from 4 (31%) of 13 sorting machines. One extensively contaminated machine primarily processes bulk mail. A second machine that does final sorting of bulk mail for her zip code yielded B. anthracis on the column of bins for her carrier route. The evidence suggests she was exposed through a cross-contaminated bulk mail letter. Such cross-contamination of letters and postal facilities has implications for managing the response to future B. anthracis-contaminated mailings.
In the summer of 1998, a large outbreak of Escherichia coli O157:H7 infections occurred in Alpine, Wyoming. We identified 157 ill persons; stool from 71 (45%) yielded E. coli O157:H7. In two cohort studies, illness was significantly associated with drinking municipal water (town residents: adjusted odds ratio=10.1, 95% confidence intervals [CI]=1.8-56.4; visitors attending family reunion: relative risk=9.0, 95% CI=1.3-63.3). The unchlorinated water supply had microbiologic evidence of fecal organisms and the potential for chronic contamination with surface water. Among persons exposed to water, the attack rate was significantly lower in town residents than in visitors (23% vs. 50%, p<0.01) and decreased with increasing age. The lower attack rate among exposed residents, especially adults, is consistent with the acquisition of partial immunity following long-term exposure. Serologic data, although limited, may support this finding. Contamination of small, unprotected water systems may be an increasing public health risk.
On November 11, 2001, following the bioterrorism-related anthrax attacks, the U.S. Postal Service collected samples at the Southern Connecticut Processing and Distribution Center; all samples were negative for Bacillus anthracis. After a patient in Connecticut died from inhalational anthrax on November 19, the center was sampled again on November 21 and 25 by using dry and wet swabs. All samples were again negative for B. anthracis. On November 28, guided by information from epidemiologic investigation, we sampled the site extensively with wet wipes and surface vacuum sock samples (using HEPA vacuum). Of 212 samples, 6 (3%) were positive, including one from a highly contaminated sorter. Subsequently B. anthracis was also detected in mail-sorting bins used for the patient's carrier route. These results suggest cross-contaminated mail as a possible source of anthrax for the inhalational anthrax patient in Connecticut. In future such investigations, extensive sampling guided by epidemiologic data is imperative.