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Biomedical subjects

Patrick Haggard

Publications and source records attributed to Patrick Haggard.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources
PubMed2004

Consistent chronostasis effects across saccade categories imply a subcortical efferent trigger.

Saccadic chronostasis refers to the subjective temporal lengthening of the first visual stimulus perceived after an eye movement, and is most commonly experienced as the "stopped clock" illusion. Other temporal illusions arising in the context of movement (e.g., "intentional binding") appear to depend upon the volitional nature of the preceding motor act. Here we assess chronostasis across different saccade types, ranging from highly volitional (self-timed saccades, antisaccades) to highly reflexive (peripherally cued saccades, express saccades). Chronostasis was similar in magnitude across all these conditions, despite wide variations in their neural bases. The illusion must therefore be triggered by a "lowest common denominator" signal common to all the conditions tested and their respective neural circuits. Specifically, it is suggested that chronostasis is triggered by a low-level signal arising in response to efferent signals generated in the superior colliculus.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

The relative effects of external spatial and motoric factors on the bimanual coordination of discrete movements.

The ability to coordinate the two hands effectively is a fundamental requirement for many everyday tasks. To investigate how bimanual coordination is achieved we asked subjects to perform discrete bimanual key-press responses under conditions in which the motoric (i.e., muscles employed) and external spatial (i.e., direction of movement in external space) relationships between the actions of the left and right index fingers were systematically varied. Subjects made simultaneous right and left index finger key-presses in response to an auditory tone. The right finger always made downward flexion movements whilst the left finger either flexed in a downward/upward direction, or extended in a downward/upward direction. Unimanual control trials of each movement type for both hands were also performed. Reaction times for each hand (RTs) and the inter-response interval (IRI) were recorded. Right hand RTs were significantly affected only when the left finger performed motorically different actions, but were unaffected by the external spatial direction in which the left hand's actions were made. The IRI results followed a similar pattern with the worst coordination (highest IRI) occurring when the left finger performed different motor actions to the right finger regardless of the direction of the left hand movement. In contrast to other recent results from experiments examining oscillatory tasks (e.g., Mechsner et al. 2001), our results suggest that in discrete tasks there is a dominance of the motor relationship between the hands over the external spatial relationship.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Altered awareness of voluntary action after damage to the parietal cortex.

A central question in the study of human behavior is the origin of willed action. EEG recordings of surface brain activity from human subjects performing a self-initiated movement show that the subjective experience of wanting to move follows, rather than precedes, the 'readiness potential'--an electrophysiological mark of motor preparation. This raises the issue of how conscious experience of willed action is generated. Here we show that patients with parietal lesions can report when they started moving, but not when they first became aware of their intention to move. This stands in contrast with the performance of cerebellar patients who behaved as normal subjects. We thus propose that when a movement is planned, activity in the parietal cortex, as part of a cortico-cortical sensorimotor processing loop, generates a predictive internal model of the upcoming movement. This model might form the neural correlate of motor awareness.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

The role of execution noise in movement variability.

The origin of variability in goal-directed movements is not well understood. Variability can originate from several neural processes such as target localization, movement planning, and movement execution. Here we examine variability resulting from noise in movement execution. In several experiments, subjects moved their unseen hand to visual targets, under conditions which were designed to minimize the variability expected from localization and planning processes. We tested short movements in 32 directions in a center-out reaching task. The variability in the movement endpoints and in the initial movement direction varied systematically with the movement direction, with some directions having up to twice the variability of others. In a second experiment we tested four movements in the same direction but with different extents. Here, the longer movements were systematically curved, and the endpoint ellipses were not aligned with the straight line between starting and end position, but they were roughly aligned with the last part of the trajectory. We show that the variability observed in these experiments cannot be explained by planning noise but is well explained by noise in movement execution. A combination of both signal-dependent and signal-independent noise in the amplitude of the motor commands and temporal noise in their duration can explain the observed variability. Our results suggest that, in general, execution noise accounts for at least a large proportion of movement variability.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2003

Visual enhancement of touch in spatial body representation.

Perception of our own bodies is based on integration of visual and tactile inputs, notably by neurons in the brain's parietal lobes. Here we report a behavioural consequence of this integration process. Simply viewing the arm can speed up reactions to an invisible tactile stimulus on the arm. We observed this visual enhancement effect only when a tactile task required spatial computation within a topographic map of the body surface and the judgements made were close to the limits of performance. This effect of viewing the body surface was absent or reversed in tasks that either did not require a spatial computation or in which judgements were well above performance limits. We consider possible mechanisms by which vision may influence tactile processing.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Awareness of action in schizophrenia.

An abnormal sense of agency is among the most characteristic yet perplexing positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Schizophrenics may either attribute the consequences of their own actions to the intentions of others (delusions of influence), or may perceive themselves as causing events which they do not in fact control (megalomania). Previous reports have often described inaccurate agency judgements in schizophrenia, but have not identified the disordered neural mechanisms or psychological processes underlying these judgements. We report the perceived time of a voluntary action and its consequence in eight schizophrenic patients and matched controls. The patients showed an unusually strong binding effect between actions and consequences. Specifically, the temporal interval between action and consequence appeared shorter for patients than for controls. Patients may overassociate their actions with subsequent events, experiencing their actions as having unusual causal efficacy. Disorders of agency may reflect an underlying abnormality in the experience of voluntary action.

Acoustic Stimulation↗
PubMed2003

The effect of attentional cueing on conscious awareness of stimulus and response.

Attending to a cued location in space leads to faster reaction times when a stimulus is presented there. The reasons for this attentional effect, and its specific locus in the information-processing chain between stimulus and response, remain unclear. One suggestion is that attention speeds the conscious detection of stimuli. Surprisingly, this possibility appears not to have been tested directly. To resolve this question, we asked subjects to make simple responses to lateralised targets that followed either a valid, invalid or neutral cue, and to judge the perceived time of the target onset, or of their response, by delayed report of the position of a clock hand. Our results showed that only a small and non-significant part of the attentional effect is due to delayed conscious awareness of the stimulus. The greater part of the attentional effect is localised either subsequent to conscious detection of stimuli or occurs in a separate, parallel processing stream from that which generates the motor response.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Awareness of somatic events associated with a voluntary action.

How does the brain distinguish actions that we perform from movements imposed on us? To study links between the representations of actions and their somatosensory consequences, we compared the perceived times of voluntary actions or involuntary movements and of a subsequent somatic effect (a TMS-induced twitch of the right index finger). Participants perceived voluntary actions as occurring later and their bodily effects as occurring earlier in the agency context, compared to single-event baseline conditions. When the voluntary action was replaced by a passive, involuntary movement this attraction effect reversed. In a second experiment, subjects rated the intensity of the same TMS-induced somatic effect, again following a voluntary action or a passive movement. When the somatic effect was caused by a voluntary action, it was perceived as significantly less intense than when it followed a passive movement. Our results suggest a binding mechanism integrating awareness of somatic consequences occurring in voluntary action. This 'intentional binding' mechanism might underlie the way in which the mind constructs a strong association between intentions, actions and consequences so as to generate the unique and private phenomenological experience of self-agency.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Intentional action: conscious experience and neural prediction.

Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that "I" am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its internally predicted effects. However, it remains unclear whether our conscious experience of action depends on a precise matching process, or a retrospective inference that "I" must have been responsible for a particular event. We report an experiment in which normal subjects judged the perceived time of either intentional actions, involuntary movements, or subsequent effects (auditory tones) of these. We found that the subject's intention to produce the auditory tone produced an intentional binding between the perceived times of the subject's action and the tone. However, if the intention was interrupted by an imposed involuntary movement, followed by the identical tone, no such binding occurred. The phenomenology of intentional action requires an appropriate predictive link between intentions and effects, rather than a retrospective inference that "I" caused the effect.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2003

Intentionality as a constituting condition for the own self--and other selves.

Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one's own and to other's intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. First we could infer the intentions of others from their actions. Second and more radically, we could equally infer our own intentions from the actions we perform rather than sense them. We present two new experiments which investigate the role of action effects in the awareness of self- and other-generated actions by means of measuring the estimated onset time. The results show that the presence of action effects is necessary for the similarity of awareness of self- and other-generated actions.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

The perceived onset time of self- and other-generated actions.

Awareness of actions is partly based on the intentions accompanying them. Thus, the awareness of self- and other-generated actions should differ to the extent that access to own and other's intentions differs. Recent studies have found a brain circuit (the mirror-neuron system) that represents self- and other-generated actions in an integrated fashion. This system does not respond to actions made by nonagents, such as machines. We measured the estimated onset time of actions that subjects either executed themselves or observed being executed by someone else or by a machine. In three experiments, the estimates of the machine actions always differed from those of self- and other-generated actions, whereas the latter two were indistinguishable. Our results are consistent with the view that intentions are attributed to others but not to machines. They also raise the interesting possibility that people attribute intentions to themselves in the same way as they do to others.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Who knows best? Awareness of divided attention difficulty in a neurological rehabilitation setting.

OBJECTIVE: To explore whether patients relearning to walk after acquired brain injury and showing cognitive-motor interference were aware of divided attention difficulty; whether their perceptions concurred with those of treating staff. DESIGN: Patients and neurophysiotherapists (from rehabilitation and disabled wards) completed questionnaires. Factor analyses were applied to responses. Correlations between responses, clinical measures and experimental decrements were examined. RESULTS: Patient/staff responses showed some agreement; staff reported higher levels of perceived difficulty; responses conformed to two factors. One factor (staff/patients alike) reflected expectations about functional/motor status and did not correlate with decrements. The other factor (patients) correlated significantly with dual-task motor decrement, suggesting some genuine awareness of difficulty (cognitive performance prioritized over motor control). The other factor (staff) correlated significantly with cognitive decrement (gait prioritized over sustained attention). CONCLUSIONS: Despite some inaccurate estimation of susceptibility; patients and staff do exhibit awareness of divided attention difficulty, but with a limited degree of concurrence. In fact, our results suggest that patients and staff may be sensitive to different aspects of the deficit. Rather than 'Who knows best?', it is a question of 'Who knows what?'

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Changing patterns of cognitive-motor interference (CMI) over time during recovery from stroke.

OBJECTIVE: To explore the extent and nature of change in cognitive-motor interference (CMI) among rehabilitating stroke patients who showed dual-task gait decrement at initial assessment. DESIGN: Experimental, within-subjects, repeated measures design. SETTING: Rehabilitation centre for adults with acquired, nonprogressive brain injury. SUBJECTS: Ten patients with unilateral stroke, available for reassessment 1-9 months following their participation in a study of CMI after brain injury. MEASURES: Median stride duration; mean word generation. METHODS: Two x one-minute walking trials, two x one-minute word generation trials, two x one-minute trials of simultaneous walking and word generation; 10-metre walking time; Barthel ADL Scale score. RESULTS: Seven out of ten patients showed reduction over time in dual-task gait decrement. Three out of ten showed reduction in cognitive decrement. Only one showed concomitant reduction in gait and word generation decrement. CONCLUSION: Extent of CMI during relearning to walk after a stroke reduced over time in the majority of patients. Effects were more evident in improved stride duration than improved cognitive performance. Measures of multiple task performance should be included in assessment for functional recovery.

Activities of Daily Living↗
PubMed2003

A cross-modal interference effect in grasping objects.

The aim of the present paper was to investigate how the kinematics of a hand reaching toward a visual target would be influenced by haptic and proprioceptive input from an unseen distractor actively grasped in the other, nonreaching hand. The main results were that the amplitude of maximum grip aperture was smaller and the time to maximum grip aperture was earlier when the distractor was smaller than the target. The interference effect from the distractor was similar for both hands as they reached. Furthermore, results from a vibrating-distractor condition for passive tactile input revealed that the interference effects were evident only when the distractor was actively grasped. We suggest that neural processing of proprioceptive and tactile information relevant to distractor size produced the observed interference effects. We also emphasize the importance of active manipulation of the distractor stimulus in eliciting such interference effects.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

Imitation without awareness.

Imitation is a characteristic but little-understood function of the human brain and of some higher animals. The direct matching hypothesis suggests that a specialised brain circuit is able to extract and directly copy the motor commands of another person's observed actions. Here we investigate how conscious people are of this kind of imitation. We first showed that imitation reactions are faster than simple visual reaction times, consistent with a direct matching circuit in the CNS. We next compared the perceived time of imitation reactions in 17 healthy subjects with other kinds of actions. We found a significant delay in subjects' awareness of their own imitation reactions. Thus, while imitation reactions are unusually fast, subjects are not aware of this. The brain's direct-matching circuit for imitation partly bypasses conscious awareness.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

Action and awareness in pointing tasks.

Subjects' awareness of motor corrections was investigated in a double-step pointing task. An unpredictable lateral target displacement of 10 cm, either left or right, during an ongoing reaching movement led to corrections of the trajectory. Subjects were required either to follow the target (pointing) or move in the opposite direction (anti-pointing). The target jump elicited rapid corrections to the movement in the direction of the target shift. These corrections were in some sense involuntary as they sometimes occurred in anti-point trials, when subjects were instructed to correct in the opposite direction to the target jump. The instructed correction away from the target in anti-point trials occurred later than the correction towards the target in standard pointing. Subjects were also asked to report their awareness of the motor correction they had just made by immediately reproducing each movement. In normal pointing, subjects showed reduced and delayed awareness, suggesting that the corrections were at least partly automatic. Anti-pointing corrections did not show this dissociation between performance and awareness. We suggest that anti-point corrections, but not standard pointing corrections, involve an additional supervisory system. This system is characterised by its slow operation and its access to conscious awareness.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

When feeling is more important than seeing in sensorimotor adaptation.

Perception and action are based on information from multiple sensory modalities. For instance, both vision and proprioception provide information about hand position, and this information is integrated to generate a single estimate of where the hand is in space. Classically, vision has been thought to dominate this process, with the estimate of hand position relying more on vision than on proprioception. However, an optimal integration model that takes into account the precision of vision and proprioception predicts that the weighting of the two senses varies with direction and that the classical result should only hold for specific spatial directions. Using an adaptation paradigm, we show that, as predicted by this model, the visual-proprioceptive integration varies with direction. Variation with direction was so strong that, in the depth direction, the classical result was reversed: the estimate relies more on proprioception than on vision. These results provide evidence for statistically optimal integration of information from multiple modalities.

Adaptation, Physiological↗