Search PubMed⌕ Search

Biomedical subjects

Michael Tomasello

Publications and source records attributed to Michael Tomasello.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Shared intentionality.

We argue for the importance of processes of shared intentionality in children's early cognitive development. We look briefly at four important social-cognitive skills and how they are transformed by shared intentionality. In each case, we look first at a kind of individualistic version of the skill -- as exemplified most clearly in the behavior of chimpanzees -- and then at a version based on shared intentionality -- as exemplified most clearly in the behavior of human 1- and 2-year-olds. We thus see the following transformations: gaze following into joint attention, social manipulation into cooperative communication, group activity into collaboration, and social learning into instructed learning. We conclude by highlighting the role that shared intentionality may play in integrating more biologically based and more culturally based theories of human development.

Animals↗

Are apes really inequity averse?

Brosnan et al. (Brosnan, S. F. Schiff, H. C. & de Waal, F. B. M. 2005 Tolerance for inequity may increase with social closeness in chimpanzees. Proc. R. Soc. B272, 253-258) found that chimpanzees showed increased levels of rejection for less-preferred food when competitors received better food than themselves and postulated as an explanation inequity aversion. In the present study, we extended these findings by adding important control conditions, and we investigated whether inequity aversion could also be found in the other great ape species and whether it would be influenced by subjects' relationship with the competitor. In the present study, subjects showed a pattern of food rejection opposite to the subjects of the above study by Brosnan et al. (2005). Our apes ignored fewer food pieces and stayed longer in front of the experimenter when a conspecific received better food than themselves. Moreover, chimpanzees begged more vigorously when the conspecific got favoured food. The most plausible explanation for these results is the food expectation hypothesis - seeing another individual receive high-quality food creates the expectation of receiving the same food oneself - and not inequity aversion.

Animals↗

Reliance on head versus eyes in the gaze following of great apes and human infants: the cooperative eye hypothesis.

As compared with other primates, humans have especially visible eyes (e.g., white sclera). One hypothesis is that this feature of human eyes evolved to make it easier for conspecifics to follow an individual's gaze direction in close-range joint attentional and communicative interactions, which would seem to imply especially cooperative (mututalistic) conspecifics. In the current study, we tested one aspect of this cooperative eye hypothesis by comparing the gaze following behavior of great apes to that of human infants. A human experimenter "looked" to the ceiling either with his eyes only, head only (eyes closed), both head and eyes, or neither. Great apes followed gaze to the ceiling based mainly on the human's head direction (although eye direction played some role as well). In contrast, human infants relied almost exclusively on eye direction in these same situations. These results demonstrate that humans are especially reliant on eyes in gaze following situations, and thus, suggest that eyes evolved a new social function in human evolution, most likely to support cooperative (mututalistic) social interactions.

Animals↗

What's in it for me? Self-regard precludes altruism and spite in chimpanzees.

Sensitivity to fairness may influence whether individuals choose to engage in acts that are mutually beneficial, selfish, altruistic, or spiteful. In a series of three experiments, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) could pull a rope to access out-of-reach food while concomitantly pulling another piece of food further away. In the first study, they could make a choice that solely benefited themselves (selfishness), or both themselves and another chimpanzee (mutualism). In the next two experiments, they could choose between providing food solely for another chimpanzee (altruism), or for neither while preventing the other chimpanzee from receiving a benefit (spite). The main result across all studies was that chimpanzees made their choices based solely on personal gain, with no regard for the outcomes of a conspecific. These results raise questions about the origins of human cooperative behaviour.

Altruism↗

Altruistic helping in human infants and young chimpanzees.

Human beings routinely help others to achieve their goals, even when the helper receives no immediate benefit and the person helped is a stranger. Such altruistic behaviors (toward non-kin) are extremely rare evolutionarily, with some theorists even proposing that they are uniquely human. Here we show that human children as young as 18 months of age (prelinguistic or just-linguistic) quite readily help others to achieve their goals in a variety of different situations. This requires both an understanding of others' goals and an altruistic motivation to help. In addition, we demonstrate similar though less robust skills and motivations in three young chimpanzees.

Adult↗

Chimpanzees recruit the best collaborators.

Humans collaborate with non-kin in special ways, but the evolutionary foundations of these collaborative skills remain unclear. We presented chimpanzees with collaboration problems in which they had to decide when to recruit a partner and which potential partner to recruit. In an initial study, individuals recruited a collaborator only when solving the problem required collaboration. In a second study, individuals recruited the more effective of two partners on the basis of their experience with each of them on a previous day. Therefore, recognizing when collaboration is necessary and determining who is the best collaborative partner are skills shared by both chimpanzees and humans, so such skills may have been present in their common ancestor before humans evolved their own complex forms of collaboration.

Analysis of Variance↗

Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by hiding.

There is little experimental evidence that any non-human species is capable of purposefully attempting to manipulate the psychological states of others deceptively (e.g., manipulating what another sees). We show here that chimpanzees, one of humans' two closest primate relatives, sometimes attempt to actively conceal things from others. Specifically, when competing with a human in three novel tests, eight chimpanzees, from their first trials, chose to approach a contested food item via a route hidden from the human's view (sometimes using a circuitous path to do so). These findings not only corroborate previous work showing that chimpanzees know what others can and cannot see, but also suggest that when competing for food chimpanzees are skillful at manipulating, to their own advantage, whether others can or cannot see them.

Animals↗

Apes' use of iconic cues in the object-choice task.

In previous studies great apes have shown little ability to locate hidden food using a physical marker placed by a human directly on the target location. In this study, we hypothesized that the perceptual similarity between an iconic cue and the hidden reward (baited container) would help apes to infer the location of the food. In the first two experiments, we found that if an iconic cue is given in addition to a spatial/indexical cue - e.g., picture or replica of a banana placed on the target location - apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, gorillas) as a group performed above chance. However, we also found in two further experiments that when iconic cues were given on their own without spatial/indexical information (iconic cue held up by human with no diagnostic spatial/indexical information), the apes were back to chance performance. Our overall conclusion is that although iconic information helps apes in the process of searching hidden food, the poor performance found in the last two experiments is due to apes' lack of understanding of the informative (cooperative) communicative intention of the experimenter.

Animal Communication↗

Comparing different accounts of inversion errors in children's non-subject wh-questions: 'What experimental data can tell us?'.

This study investigated different accounts of children's acquisition of non-subject wh-questions. Questions using each of 4 wh-words (what, who, how and why), and 3 auxiliaries (BE, DO and CAN) in 3sg and 3pl form were elicited from 28 children aged 3;6-4;6. Rates of noninversion error (Who she is hitting?) were found not to differ by wh-word, auxiliary or number alone, but by lexical auxiliary subtype and by wh-word+lexical auxiliary combination. This finding counts against simple rule-based accounts of question acquisition that include no role for the lexical subtype of the auxiliary, and suggests that children may initially acquire wh-word + lexical auxiliary combinations from the input. For DO questions, auxiliary-doubling errors (What does she does like?) were also observed, although previous research has found that such errors are virtually non-existent for positive questions. Possible reasons for this discrepancy are discussed.

Analysis of Variance↗

Making inferences about the location of hidden food: social dog, causal ape.

Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and great apes from the genus Pan were tested on a series of object choice tasks. In each task, the location of hidden food was indicated for subjects by some kind of communicative, behavioral, or physical cue. On the basis of differences in the ecologies of these 2 genera, as well as on previous research, the authors hypothesized that dogs should be especially skillful in using human communicative cues such as the pointing gesture, whereas apes should be especially skillful in using physical, causal cues such as food in a cup making noise when it is shaken. The overall pattern of performance by the 2 genera strongly supported this social-dog, causal-ape hypothesis. This result is discussed in terms of apes' adaptations for complex, extractive foraging and dogs' adaptations, during the domestication process, for cooperative communication with humans.

Animals↗

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) conceal visual and auditory information from others.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) competed with a human for food. The human sat inside a booth, with 1 piece of food to her left and 1 to her right, which she could retract from her chimpanzee competitor's reach as needed. In Experiment 1, chimpanzees could approach either side of the booth unseen but then had to reach through 1 of 2 tunnels (1 clear, 1 opaque) for the food. In Experiment 2, both tunnels were clear and the human was looking away, but 1 of the tunnels made a loud noise when it was opened. Chimpanzees preferentially reached through the opaque tunnel in the first study and the silent tunnel in the second, successfully concealing their taking of the food from the human competitor in both cases. These results suggest that chimpanzees can, in some circumstances, actively manipulate the visual and auditory perception of others by concealing information from them.

Animals↗

Apes' and children's understanding of cooperative and competitive motives in a communicative situation.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) (Study 1) and 18- and 24-month-old human children (Study 2) participated in a novel communicative task. A human experimenter (E) hid food or a toy in one of two opaque containers before gesturing towards the reward's location in one of two ways. In the Informing condition, she attempted to help the subject find the hidden object by simply pointing to the correct container. In the Prohibiting condition, E held out her arm toward the correct container (palm out) and told the subject firmly 'Don't take this one.' As in previous studies, the apes were at chance in the Informing condition. However, they were above chance in the new Prohibiting condition. Human 18-month-olds showed this same pattern of results, whereas 24-month-olds showed the opposite pattern: they were better in the Informing condition than in the Prohibiting condition. In our interpretation, success in the Prohibiting condition requires subjects to understand E's goal toward them and their behavior, and then to make an inference (she would only prohibit if there were something good in there). Success in the Informing condition requires subjects to understand a cooperative communicative motive - which apparently apes and young infants find difficult.

Animal Communication↗

Two-year-olds grasp the intentional structure of pretense acts.

Twenty-two- and 27-month-old children were tested for their understanding of pretending as a specific intentional action form. Pairs of superficially similar behaviors - pretending to perform an action and trying to perform that action - were demonstrated to children. The 27-month-olds, and to some degree the 22-month-olds, showed in their responses that they understood the intentional structure of both kinds of behaviors: after pretense models, they themselves performed appropriate inferential pretense acts, whereas after the trying models they properly performed the action or tried to perform it with novel means. These findings are discussed in the light of recent debates about children's developing understanding of pretense and theory of mind.

Child Behavior↗

Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use a physical marker to locate hidden food.

Dogs can use the placement of an arbitrary marker to locate hidden food in an object-choice situation. We tested domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) in three studies aimed at pinning down the relative contributions of the human's hand and the marker itself. We baited one of two cups (outside of the dogs' view) and gave the dog a communicative cue to find the food. Study 1 systematically varied dogs' perceptual access to the marker placing event, so that dogs saw either the whole human, the hand only, the marker only, or nothing. Follow-up trials investigated the effect of removing the marker before the dog's choice. Dogs used the marker as a communicative cue even when it had been removed prior to the dog's choice and attached more importance to this cue than to the hand that placed it although the presence of the hand boosted performance when it appeared together with the marker. Study 2 directly contrasted the importance of the hand and the marker and revealed that the effect of the marker diminished if it had been associated with both cups. In contrast touching both cups with the hand had no effect on performance. Study 3 investigated whether the means of marker placement (intentional or accidental) had an effect on dogs' choices. Results showed that dogs did not differentiate intentional and accidental placing of the marker. These results suggest that dogs use the marker as a genuine communicative cue quite independently from the experimenter's actions.

Animals↗

Gestural communication in subadult bonobos (Pan paniscus): repertoire and use.

This article aims to provide an inventory of the communicative gestures used by bonobos (Pan paniscus), based on observations of subadult bonobos and descriptions of gestural signals and similar behaviors in wild and captive bonobo groups. In addition, we focus on the underlying processes of social cognition, including learning mechanisms and flexibility of gesture use (such as adjustment to the attentional state of the recipient). The subjects were seven bonobos, aged 1-8 years, living in two different groups in captivity. Twenty distinct gestures (one auditory, eight tactile, and 11 visual) were recorded. We found individual differences and similar degrees of concordance of the gestural repertoires between and within groups, which provide evidence that ontogenetic ritualization is the main learning process involved. There is suggestive evidence, however, that some form of social learning may be responsible for the acquisition of special gestures. Overall, the present study establishes that the gestural repertoire of bonobos can be characterized as flexible and adapted to various communicative circumstances, including the attentional state of the recipient. Differences from and similarities to the other African ape species are discussed.

Adaptation, Psychological↗

Human-like social skills in dogs?

Domestic dogs are unusually skilled at reading human social and communicative behavior--even more so than our nearest primate relatives. For example, they use human social and communicative behavior (e.g. a pointing gesture) to find hidden food, and they know what the human can and cannot see in various situations. Recent comparisons between canid species suggest that these unusual social skills have a heritable component and initially evolved during domestication as a result of selection on systems mediating fear and aggression towards humans. Differences in chimpanzee and human temperament suggest that a similar process may have been an important catalyst leading to the evolution of unusual social skills in our own species. The study of convergent evolution provides an exciting opportunity to gain further insights into the evolutionary processes leading to human-like forms of cooperation and communication.

Animal Communication↗

Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition.

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

Aging↗

Unwilling versus unable: infants' understanding of intentional action.

Infants experienced a female adult handling them toys. Sometimes, however, the transaction failed, either because the adult was in various ways unwilling to give the toy (e.g., she teased the child with it or played with it herself) or else because she was unable to give it (e.g., she accidentally dropped it). Infants at 9, 12, and 18 months of age reacted with more impatience (e.g., reaching, looking away) when the adult was unwilling to give them the toy than when she was simply unable to give it. Six-month-olds, in contrast, showed no evidence of this differentiation. Because infants' behavioral responses were appropriately adapted to different kinds of intentional actions, and because the adult's actions sometimes produced results that did not match her goal (when having accidents or failed attempts), these findings provide especially rich evidence that infants first begin to understand goal-directed action at around 9 months of age.

Aptitude↗