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M S Marquis

Publications and source records attributed to M S Marquis.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2001

Health insurance: tradeoffs revisited.

In two recent papers, [Journal of Health Economics 18(2), 141-152, Journal of Health Economics 18(6), 811-824] Nyman raised some questions about the welfare calculations and conclusions in our earlier paper [Manning and Marquis, Health insurance: the tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard, Vol. 15, 1996]. This note discusses the erroneous criticisms in his papers. First, although, we estimated a Marshallian demand curve, our calculations are based on compensating variations that incorporate the gains from risk pooling. Second, our estimates of second best insurance plans indicate that some cost sharing is optimal, in contradiction to his assertion that our results raise questions about the desirability of insurance coverage. The comment also deals with other issues raised by Nyman.

Cost Sharing↗
PubMed2001

Low-wage workers and health insurance coverage: can policymakers target them through their employers?

Many policy initiatives to increase health insurance coverage would subsidize employers to offer coverage or subsidize employees to participate in their employers' health plans. Using data from the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health Insurance Survey, we contrast "low-wage employers" with all other employers. Employees in low-wage businesses have significantly worse access to employment-based insurance than other employees do; they are less likely to work for an employer that offers insurance, less likely to be eligible if working in a business that offers insurance, and less likely to be enrolled if eligible. Low-wage employers contribute lower shares of premiums and offer less generous benefits than other employers do. Policies that would target subsidies to selected employers to increase insurance offers to low-wage workers are difficult to design, however, because several commonly mentioned employer characteristics (including firm size) are found to be poor indicators of low-wage worker concentration. Programs that would set minimum standards for employer plans to be eligible for "buy-ins" need to base these standards on the less generous terms offered by low-wage employers in order to effectively reach low-wage workers and their dependents.

Eligibility Determination↗
PubMed2001

To offer or not to offer: the role of price in employers' health insurance decisions.

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the effect of changes in price on employers' decisions to offer health insurance. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: A 1993 survey of 22,347 private employers in ten states was used. STUDY DESIGN: Probit regression was used to estimate the probability of offering insurance as a function of the price and employer characteristics. For employers who did not offer insurance, a price cannot be directly observed. We estimated price for nonofferors using reported quotes received by recent shoppers and a selection model to correct for differences between recent shoppers and nonshoppers. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Changes in price affect decisions to offer insurance; however, even a 40 percent reduction in premiums would lead to only a 2 to 3 percentage point increase in the share of employers offering insurance. Employers of low-wage workers are substantially less likely to offer health insurance than other employers. CONCLUSIONS: Policies to reduce the number of uninsured that focus on increasing the supply of employment-based insurance are unlikely to have the intended effect unless coupled with policies to help low-wage workers afford insurance.

Data Collection↗
PubMed1999

The intensity of physicians' work in patient visits--implications for the coding of patient evaluation and management services.

BACKGROUND: Clinicians use visit codes to bill for services involving the evaluation of patients and the management of their care. The existing guidelines for coding and documenting these services, as well as proposed revisions, have been criticized as complex, clinically irrelevant, and costly. We investigated whether easily measured characteristics of physician-patient visits accurately reflect differences in the amount of work performed. Such characteristics might provide the basis for a simple and equitable physician-payment scheme. METHODS: We collected information about the amount of physicians' work, the time spent in encounters with patients, and characteristics of patients and visits for 19,143 physician-patient visits in the practices of 339 urologists, rheumatologists, and general internists. Physicians recorded the actual time involved in evaluating the patient and managing his or her care during each visit and estimated the work involved in relation to a standardized, hypothetical visit. We used multivariate linear regression to identify factors related to differences in the total amount of work and to calculate work and work intensity (work per minute) for different types of visits. RESULTS: The duration of the face-to-face encounter with the patient or family (encounter time) was strongly predictive of the total amount of work. Total work, however, did not increase in direct proportion to encounter time. Visits with shorter encounter times were more intense than longer ones, in part because the work involved in providing fixed services, such as review of records and entry of information, did not vary in direct proportion to the length of the face-to-face encounter. Work intensity was greater for new patients than for established patients, for patients referred by other physicians than for those who were not, and for patients with new rather than previously existing problems. CONCLUSIONS: A simple coding scheme based on time spent by the physician in the face-to-face encounter and a limited set of characteristics of the visit would accurately reflect total work in actual practice. A fee structure based on these factors and the inverse relation between work per minute and the encounter time would provide equitable payment while encouraging efficiency and discouraging "upcoding" of services.

Data Collection↗
PubMed1999

Geographic variation in physician visits for uninsured children: the role of the safety net.

CONTEXT: Although an extensive literature exists comparing national access to health care for uninsured vs insured children, few data exist regarding differences in access across states. OBJECTIVE: To examine variation in access to physician services for uninsured children in 10 states, the safety net's role in explaining this variation, and the potential effects of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) on insurance coverage and access. DESIGN AND SETTING: The population-based Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Family Health Insurance Survey, conducted between summer 1993 and spring 1994 in 10 states (Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington), with a response rate of families by state ranging from 61% to 83%. PARTICIPANTS: A total of 8565 children who were uninsured (1586), covered by Medicaid (2723), or covered by employer-sponsored private insurance (4256) for 1 full year prior to the survey. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Percentage of low-income children who are uninsured and predicted annual physician visits by state if insurance was provided to uninsured children in families with incomes of less than 200% of poverty level. RESULTS: In the 10 study states, low-income children ranged from 61% to 86% of all uninsured children and the uninsured rate for low-income children varied from 9% to 31%. On average, providing public coverage would increase annual physician visits from 2.3 to 4.6 (a 105% increase), but the increase would range from 41% to 189% across states. The annual physician visit rate in the 3 states with the highest access for the uninsured was 160% of that in the 3 lowest-access states. Safety net capacity in the high-access states ranged from 120% to 220% of that in the low-access states. CONCLUSIONS: Our data suggest that the potential effects of CHIP vary substantially across states. Notably, improvements in access to health care by uninsured low-income children should be greater in states with the fewest safety net resources.

Child↗
PubMed1999

Who gains and who loses with community rating for small business?

This paper compares community rating with experience rating for small businesses using a microsimulation model to determine what firms offer and who within these firms purchases insurance. We generate four years of data and find that our results are remarkably stable through time. Both offer and purchase rates are about five percentage points higher under experience rating, but community rating leads to more stable offerings. Under community rating, high-risk firms and families purchase insurance, whereas under experience rating, it is the low-risk firms and families who are the purchasers. Young families and poor families have the lowest purchase rates, with these rates being disproportionately low under community rating.

Age Factors↗
PubMed1999

Simulating the effects of employer contributions on adverse selection and health plan choice.

OBJECTIVE: To investigate the effect of employer contribution policy and adverse selection on employees' health plan choices. STUDY DESIGN: Microsimulation methods to predict employees' choices between two health plan options and to track changes in those choices over time. The simulation predicts choice given premiums, healthcare spending by enrollees in each plan, and premiums for the next period. DATA SOURCES: The simulation model is based on behavioral relationships originally estimated from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). The model has been updated and recalibrated. The data processed in the simulation are from the 1993 Current Population Employee Benefits Supplement sample. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: A higher fraction of employees choose a high-cost, high-benefit plan if employers contribute a proportional share of the premium or adjust their contribution for risk selection than if employees pay the full cost difference out-of-pocket. When employees pay the full cost difference, the extent of adverse selection can be substantial, which leads to a collapse in the market for the high-cost plan. CONCLUSIONS: Adverse selection can undermine the managed competition strategy, indicating the importance of good risk adjusters. A fixed employer contribution policy can encourage selection of more efficient plans. Ironically, however, it can also further adverse selection in the absence of risk adjusters.

Consumer Behavior↗
PubMed1999

Lifetime costs and compensation for injuries.

Little is known about how well individuals are compensated for injuries. This study uses data from a 1989 survey to estimate both the lifetime costs and compensation for injuries. Our findings show that about 55% of the cost is compensated by public or private programs. Compensation rates are lower for disabling injuries and those of long duration. The results also suggest that compensation system reforms that would place stricter limits on maximum compensation might not be a distributionally fair solution. The reasons are that costs are highly skewed, and the share of costs recovered by compensation programs is currently lowest for injuries that are long term, disabling, and the most expensive.

Chronic Disease↗
PubMed1999

Effects of changing Medicaid fees on physician participation and enrollee access.

This paper assesses the effects of Medicaid fee changes on physician participation, enrollee access, and shifts in the site of ambulatory care using several natural experiments in Maine and Michigan. We use Medicaid claims and enrollment data to measure these outcomes. The reimbursement changes included substantial percentage changes in fees, however the value of the Medicaid fee improvements relative to the private market eroded very rapidly in the months following the interventions. Although the fee increases did not improve the outcome measures, they might have prevented conditions from worsening.

Health Care Costs↗
PubMed1999

State health expenditure accounts: purposes, priorities, and procedures.

This article reports on the State Health Expenditure Account (SHEA) project which developed procedures States can use in tracking their health care expenditures. The purposes, priorities, and concepts of SHEAs were designed to meet the needs of State policymakers. The resulting methods are discussed and illustrated using calculations of SHEAs for California. Contrasts with the National Health Expenditure (NHE) framework are provided. Recommendations for cooperation between the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and the States that would facilitate the adoption and estimation of SHEAs are offered. Details of the methods used for the California estimates can be found in the Technical Note of this article.

Accounting↗
PubMed1998

Do people shift their use of health services over time to take advantage of insurance?

This paper provides a test of the hypothesis that people shift their consumption of health services to time periods when they have more generous insurance coverage, in order to take advantage of third-party payment. We use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation to compare utilization rates for people in transition between being insured and being uninsured to those of people who are continuously insured and continuously uninsured. We find little support for the hypothesis that people anticipate changes in their insurance status and arrange their health care consumption accordingly.

Data Collection↗
PubMed1998

The effects of Florida's Medicaid eligibility expansion for pregnant women.

OBJECTIVES: This is a study of the effects on prenatal care and birth outcomes of Florida's July 1989 expansion in the Medicaid income eligibility threshold for pregnant women. METHODS: Concurrent and longitudinal comparisons were performed with matched birth and death certificates, hospital discharge data, Medicaid eligibility records, and records from county health departments for women giving birth from July 1988 to June 1989 (n = 56,101) or in calendar year 1991 (n = 78,421). Measures included amount and timing of prenatal care and rates of low birthweight and infant deaths. RESULTS: The Medicaid expansion led to greater access and improved birth outcomes. For example, the rate of low-birthweight infants among low-income women without private insurance fell from 67.9 to 61.8 per 1000, while it remained unchanged for low-income women with private insurance. Women in the expansion group who used county health departments had fewer low-birthweight infants than those using other delivery systems. CONCLUSIONS: The benefits from the Florida expansion appear to be greater than those reported for other states. The role of the public health delivery system may account for some of Florida's success.

Eligibility Determination↗
PubMed1997

Federalism and health system reform. Prospects for state action.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the prospect that the states, acting independently, would undertake health insurance coverage expansions that together would result in meaningful reductions in the extent of uninsurance nationally. DESIGN: We use microsimulation methods to contrast the federal income tax payments needed to finance a national program covering the uninsured with the state income tax payments needed to finance a state-specific program for the same purpose. The contrast reveals the effects on the tax burdens of differences among states in uninsured rates and tax capacity. SETTING: Continental United States. PATIENTS OR OTHER PARTICIPANTS: Observations from the 1990 through 1993 Current Population Survey (N =305 477 families), weighted to represent the population of each state. INTERVENTION: Illustrative public health insurance program for families with incomes below 250% of poverty, not covered by current public or employer-sponsored health insurance. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Change in percent uninsured, change in per capita total tax payments. RESULTS: The per capita cost of a state-specific program is directly related to current uninsured rates, $130 in states with low uninsured rates (10%) to $230 in states with high uninsured rates (21%). This would represent increases in state total tax effort of 10% to 19%, respectively. In contrast, equal tax effort to finance a national program would imply per capita yields of about $200 in the low-uninsured states and about $150 in the high-uninsured states. CONCLUSIONS: Substantial state tax effort would be necessary to cover the low-income uninsured-especially in states with the highest uninsured rates, which also have the lowest tax capacity. Targeted federal financial assistance may be necessary, if policymakers wish to induce many states to provide health insurance coverage for their uninsured.

Health Care Reform↗
PubMed1996

Health insurance: the tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard.

Choosing optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between the gain from risk reduction and the deadweight loss from moral hazard. This paper examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of cost-sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, non-elderly population.

Actuarial Analysis↗