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M McCloskey

Publications and source records attributed to M McCloskey.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Representing and using numerical information.

Issues of mental representation are central to cognitive psychology and indeed to psychology in general. This article synthesizes recent theoretical and empirical research concerning cognitive representations in one specific domain, that of numbers. First, several forms of cognitive numerical representation are defined, and the roles the various forms may play in numerical processing are considered. Then, two current representational issues that have generated some controversy are examined: In what form are arithmetic table facts (e.g., 4 x 7 = 28) stored in memory, and what forms of representation are involved in converting numerals from one form to another (as in reading 604 aloud as "six hundred four")? In the course of the discussion the major current theories of numerical cognition are described, with emphasis on how they differ in their assumptions about numerical representations and how these differences are reflected in the positions taken on various specific issues.

Cognition

Cognitive mechanisms in numerical processing: evidence from acquired dyscalculia.

This article discusses cognitive neuropsychological research on acquired dyscalculia (i.e., impaired numerical processing resulting from brain damage), surveying issues of current interest, and illustrating the ways in which analyses of acquired deficits can contribute to an understanding of normal processing. I first review the logic whereby inferences concerning normal cognition are drawn from patterns of impaired performance. I then consider research exploring the general functional architecture of the cognitive numerical processing mechanisms, and finally turn to studies aimed at probing the internal structure and functioning of individual processing components.

Brain Damage, Chronic

The organization of arithmetic facts in memory: evidence from a brain-damaged patient.

We report a single case study of a brain-damaged patient with impaired arithmetic performance. Three principal findings are presented: First, in a task involving production of answers to simple arithmetic problems, the patient's performance was far better for subtraction than for addition or multiplication. Second, in all arithmetic operations performance was generally much better for problems potentially solvable by rule (e.g., 5 + 0) than for problems requiring retrieval of specific facts (e.g., 5 + 3). Third, the dissociation between subtraction and the other arithmetic operations obtained in the production task was not observed in a verification task. The implications of these findings for claims concerning the organization of stored arithmetic facts are discussed.

Aged

Facts, rules, and procedures in normal calculation: evidence from multiple single-patient studies of impaired arithmetic fact retrieval.

This article presents results from multiple single-case studies of brain-damaged patients with impairments in retrieval of arithmetic facts (i.e., "table" facts such as 8 x 7 = 56). The results provide a basis for exploring the types of knowledge implicated in simple arithmetic performance, the internal representations for the various knowledge types, the processes operating upon these representations, and the ways in which the representations or processes may be disrupted by brain damage.

Adult

Theory-based assessment of acquired dyscalculia.

This article describes a theory-based approach to assessment of acquired dyscalculia. A model of the normal cognitive number-processing/calculation system is presented, and methods are discussed for characterizing number-processing/calculation deficits in terms of functional damage to the mechanisms specified in the model.

Adult

Cognitive representations and processes in arithmetic: inferences from the performance of brain-damaged subjects.

In this article, we present data from two brain-damaged patients with calculation impairments in support of claims about the cognitive mechanisms underlying simple arithmetic performance. We first present a model of the functional architecture of the cognitive calculation system based on previous research. We then elaborate this architecture through detailed examination of the patterns of spared and impaired performance of the two patients. From the patients' performance we make the following theoretical claims: that some arithmetic facts are stored in the form of individual fact representations (e.g., 9 x 4 = 36), whereas other facts are stored in the form of a general rule (e.g., 0 x N = 0); that arithmetic fact retrieval is mediated by abstract internal representations that are independent of the form in which problems are presented or responses are given; that arithmetic facts and calculation procedures are functionally independent; and that calculation algorithms may include special-case procedures that function to increase the speed or efficiency of problem solving. We conclude with a discussion of several more general issues relevant to the reported research.

Brain Damage, Chronic

Models of arithmetic fact retrieval: an evaluation in light of findings from normal and brain-damaged subjects.

Retrieval of basic arithmetic facts is a central aspect of almost any arithmetic performance. Furthermore, the arithmetic facts provide an opportunity to study memory processes in the context of a naturally occurring but circumscribed set of facts. This article examines current models of arithmetic fact retrieval in light of previously reported data from normal subjects, as well as the results from brain-damaged patients reported by Sokol, McCloskey, Cohen, and Aliminosa (1991) in the preceding article. The discussion serves to delineate the strengths and limitations of the models and, more generally, to identify important theoretical and empirical issues in the study of arithmetic fact retrieval.

Brain Damage, Chronic

In defense of a modular architecture for the number-processing system: reply to Campbell and Clark.

In several recent articles we have developed a model of the cognitive number-processing and calculation systems. Campbell and Clark (1988), commenting on one of these articles (McCloskey, Sokol, & Goodman, 1986), called into question our model's assumption of a modular functional architecture and a single form of internal numerical representation. Campbell and Clark proposed as an alternative a nonmodular encoding-complex view. In this reply we discuss the results offered by Campbell and Clark as evidence against our model, arguing that several of these results are in fact consistent with the model and that the remaining results, while raising significant issues, by no means justify abandonment of the modular framework and the constraints it imposes. We also point out that whereas our model provides specific, well-motivated interpretations for a substantial body of empirical findings, the encoding-complex view is so underspecified and unconstrained as to be vacuous.

Brain Damage, Chronic

Calcium and the production of interferon by human peripheral blood mononuclear cells.

We have studied the ability of human peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMC) to produce interferon-alpha (IFN-alpha) and IFN-gamma in the presence of pharmacologic agents known to influence calcium transport or calcium-dependent processes. We have found that the production of human (Hu) IFN-gamma is affected significantly by alterations in calcium flux; however, this influence is dependent upon the nature of the compound used to induce IFN. Inhibitors of protein kinase C decreased yields of IFN-gamma but inhibition of calmodulin did not. The presence of vitamin D3 reduced IFN-gamma titers when PHA and IL-2 were used to induce IFN, but not when ionomycin was used as the inducer. The production of IFN-gamma by PBMC was reduced by diminished concentrations in extracellular calcium but not extracellular magnesium. In contrast, neither the presence of any of the pharmacological agents tested above nor the reduction of the calcium concentration influenced the production of HuIFN-alpha by PBMC.

3-Pyridinecarboxylic acid, 1,4-dihydro-2,6-dimethy

Cognitive processes in verbal-number production: inferences from the performance of brain-damaged subjects.

This article presents a model of the cognitive processes involved in the spoken production of verbal numbers (e.g., thirteen thousand four hundred two). On the basis of single-case studies of two brain-damaged subjects with number production deficits, we argue that verbal-number production involves the generation of a syntactic frame that constitutes a plan for the production of the appropriate sequence of words. The syntactic frame specifies each to-be-retrieved word in terms of a number-lexical class (i.e., ones, teens, or tens) and a position within that class. These class/position-within-class specifications guide the retrieval of lexical representations from a production lexicon that is partitioned into functionally distinct ones, teens, and tens classes. We conclude with a brief discussion of the rationale for, and advantages of, using patterns of impaired performance as a basis for drawing inferences about normal cognition.

Adult

Cognitive mechanisms in number processing and calculation: evidence from dyscalculia.

This article presents a framework for the cognitive analysis of number processing and calculation. Within this framework the primary objective is the development of a model that is sufficiently detailed to serve as a basis for explaining the number-processing/calculation performance of both normal and cognitively impaired subjects. First a general model of the cognitive mechanisms for number processing and calculation is outlined. It is shown that patterns of impairments observed in brain-damaged patients support the major assumptions of the model and that the model provides a theoretically motivated framework for interpreting the deficits. A single case is then discussed in some detail, to demonstrate that through detailed analyses of impaired performance the preliminary model can be elaborated to specify not only the general architecture of the number-processing and calculation systems, but also the inner workings of specific components and the consequences of damage to these components. The article concludes with a discussion of several general issues arising from the presented arguments.

Anomia

Misleading postevent information and memory for events: arguments and evidence against memory impairment hypotheses.

The claim that a person's memory for an event may be altered by information encountered after the event has been influential in shaping current conceptions of memory. The basis for the claim is a series of studies showing that subjects who are given false or misleading information about a previously witnessed event perform more poorly on tests of memory for the event than subjects who are not misled. In this article we argue that the available evidence does not imply that misleading postevent information impairs memory for the original event, because the procedure used in previous studies is inappropriate for assessing effects of misleading information on memory. We then introduce a more appropriate procedure and report six experiments using this procedure. We conclude from the results that misleading postevent information has no effect on memory for the original event. We then review several recent studies that seem to contradict this conclusion, showing that the studies do not pose problems for our position. Finally, we discuss the implications of our conclusions for broader issues concerning memory.

Attention

Naive physics: the curvilinear impetus principle and its role in interactions with moving objects.

Several recent studies in which subjects solved pencil-and-paper problems concerning the behavior of moving objects have shown that many people have incorrect beliefs about motion. The present study considers the question of whether these naive beliefs are manifested in situations where people observe and interact with moving objects. Several findings in the problem-solving literature suggest that abstract or unrealistic tasks may fail to tap knowledge and reasoning abilities that are routinely used in more concrete or realistic situations. Thus, most people may have accurate knowledge about the behavior of moving objects, knowledge that they use in their everyday interactions with objects in motion. However, this knowledge may not be activated in the context of abstract, static problems, and as a result people attempting to solve such problems may resort to naive beliefs. Three experiments examine this possibility in the context of one specific naive belief, the curvilinear impetus belief. Contrary to expectations, results suggest that the curvilinear impetus belief is used not only on pencil-and-paper problems but also in situations where people observe and interact with moving objects. Implications of these findings are discussed.

Female

Intuitive physics: the straight-down belief and its origin.

This study examines the nature and origin of a common misconception about moving objects. We first show through the use of pencil-and-paper problems that many people erroneously believe that an object that is carried by another moving object (e.g., a ball carried by a walking person) will, if dropped, fall to the ground in a straight vertical line. (In fact, such an object will fall forward in a parabolic arc.) We then demonstrate that this "straight-down belief" turns up not only on pencil-and-paper problems but also on a problem presented in a concrete, dynamic fashion (Experiment 1) and in a situation in which a subject drops a ball while walking (Experiment 2). We next consider the origin of the straight-down belief and propose that the belief may stem from a perceptual illusion. Specifically, we suggest that objects dropped from a moving carrier may be perceived as falling straight down or even backward, when in fact they move forward as they fall. Experiment 3, in which subjects view computer-generated displays simulating situations in which a carried object is dropped, and Experiment 4, in which subjects view a videotape of a walking person dropping an object, provide data consistent with this "seeing is believing" hypothesis.

Cognition