Biomedical subjects

Jonathan A Fugelsang

Publications and source records attributed to Jonathan A Fugelsang.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2006

Frontopolar cortex mediates abstract integration in analogy.

Integration of abstractly similar relations during analogical reasoning was investigated using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Activation elicited by an analogical reasoning task that required both complex working memory and integration of abstractly similar relations was compared to activation elicited by a non-analogical task that required complex working memory in the absence of abstract relational integration. A left-sided region of the frontal pole of the brain (BA 9/10) was selectively active for the abstract relational integration component of analogical reasoning. Analogical reasoning also engaged a left-sided network of parieto-frontal regions. Activity in this network during analogical reasoning is hypothesized to reflect categorical alignment of individual component terms that make up analogies. This parieto-frontal network was also engaged by the complex control task, which involved explicit categorization, but not by a simpler control task, which did not involve categorization. We hypothesize that frontopolar cortex mediates abstract relational integration in complex reasoning while parieto-frontal regions mediate working memory processes, including manipulation of terms for the purpose of categorical alignment, that facilitate this integration.

Adult↗

PubMed2006

Dissociating response conflict from numerical magnitude processing in the brain: an event-related fMRI study.

Functional neuroimaging studies of numerical cognition have repeatedly associated activation of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) with number processing. During number comparison, the IPS has been found to be modulated by the numerical distance. This has lead to the contention that the IPS houses the internal representation of numerical magnitude. However, this theory has been challenged by the argument that IPS activation may reflect domain-general response selection. In the present study, we used the numerical size congruity paradigm to further elucidate the role played by the IPS in number comparison. In an event-related, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, participants judged which of two number words was numerically larger. In addition to the numerical distance, physical stimulus size was varied such that physical size and numerical magnitude were either (a) congruent (e.g., numerically smaller number printed in smaller font) or (b) incongruent (e.g., numerically larger number printed in smaller font). This allowed for the study of both the main effects and the interaction of numerical distance and stimulus congruency. A main effect of numerical distance was found in bilateral regions of the IPS. However, these parietal areas were not significantly modulated by congruency or the interaction of distance and congruency. Instead, the main effect of congruency and an interaction of distance and congruency were observed in anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortices. These findings suggest some degree of independence between the processing of numerical distance and size congruity, lending support for the hypothesis that distance effects in IPS reflect the underlying representation of numerical magnitude.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2005

Brain mechanisms underlying perceptual causality.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to examine the neural correlates of perceptual causality. Participants were imaged while viewing alternating blocks of causal events in which a ball collides with, and causes movement of another ball, versus non-causal events in which a spatial or a temporal gap precedes the movement of a second ball. There were significantly higher levels of relative activation in the right middle frontal gyrus and the right inferior parietal lobule for causal relative to non-causal events. Furthermore, when the differential effects of spatial and temporal incontiguities were subtracted from the contiguous stimuli, we observed both common (right prefrontal) and unique (right parietal and right temporal) regions of activation as a function of spatial and temporal processing of contiguity, respectively. Taken together, these data provide a means to help determine how the visual system extracts causality from dynamic visual information in the environment using spatial and temporal cues.

Adult↗

PubMed2005

Dissociating processes supporting causal perception and causal inference in the brain.

An understanding of relations between causes and effects is essential for making sense of the dynamic physical world. It has been argued that this understanding of causality depends on both perceptual and inferential components. To investigate whether causal perception and causal inference rely on common or on distinct processes, the authors tested 2 callosotomy (split-brain) patients and a group of neurologically intact participants. The authors show that the direct perception of causality and the ability to infer causality depend on different hemispheres of the divided brain. This finding implies that understanding causality is not a unitary process and that causal perception and causal inference can proceed independently.

Chi-Square Distribution↗

PubMed2004

Brain-based mechanisms underlying complex causal thinking.

We use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and behavioral analyses to study the neural roots of biases in causal reasoning. Fourteen participants were given a task requiring them to interpret data relative to plausible and implausible causal theories. Encountering covariation-based data during the evaluation of a plausible theory as opposed to an implausible theory selectively recruited neural tissue in the prefrontal and occipital cortices. In addition, the plausibility of a causal theory modulated the recruitment of distinct neural tissue depending on the extent to which the data were consistent versus inconsistent with the theory provided. Specifically, evaluation of data consistent with a plausible causal theory recruited neural tissue in the parahippocampal gyrus, whereas evaluating data inconsistent with a plausible theory recruited neural tissue in the anterior cingulate, left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and precuneus. We suggest that these findings provide a neural instantiation of the mechanisms by which working hypotheses and evidence are integrated in the brain.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2004

The emergence of consequential thought: evidence from neuroscience.

The ability to think counterfactually about the consequence of one's actions represents one of the hallmarks of the development of complex reasoning skills. The legal system places a great emphasis on this type of reasoning ability as it directly relates to the degree to which individuals may be judged liable for their actions. In the present paper, we review both behavioural and neuroscientific data exploring the role that counterfactual thinking plays in reasoning about the consequences of one's actions, especially as it pertains to the developing mind of the adolescent. On the basis of assimilation of both behavioural and neuroscientific data, we propose a brain-based model that provides a theoretical framework for understanding the emergence of counterfactual reasoning ability in the developing mind.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2004

A cognitive neuroscience framework for understanding causal reasoning and the law.

Over the past couple of decades, there have been great developments in the fields of psychology and cognitive neuroscience that have allowed the advancement of our understanding of how people make judgements about causality in several domains. We provide a review of some of the contemporary psychological models of causal thinking that are directly relevant to legal reasoning. In addition, we cover some exciting new research using advanced neuroimaging techniques that have helped to uncover the underlying neural signatures of complex causal reasoning. Through the use of functional imaging, we provide a first-hand look at how the brain responds to evidence that is either consistent or inconsistent with one's beliefs and expectations. Based on the data covered in this review, we propose some ideas for how the effectiveness of causal reasoning, especially as it pertains to legal decision-making, may be facilitated.

Brain↗

PubMed2004

Theory and data interactions of the scientific mind: evidence from the molecular and the cognitive laboratory.

A number of researchers and scholars have stressed the importance of disconfirmation in the quest for the development of scientific knowledge (e.g., Popper, 1959). Paradoxically, studies examining human reasoning in the laboratory have typically found that people display a confirmation bias in that they are more likely to seek out and attend to data consistent rather than data inconsistent with their initial theory (Wason, 1968). We examine the strategies that scientists and students use to evaluate data that are either consistent or inconsistent with their expectations. First, we present findings from scientists reasoning "live" in their laboratory meetings. We show that scientists often show an initial reluctance to consider inconsistent data as "real." However, this initial reluctance is often overcome with repeated observations of the inconsistent data such that they modify their theories to account for the new data. We further examine these issues in a controlled scientific causal thinking simulation specifically developed to examine the reasoning strategies we observed in the natural scientific environment. Like the scientists, we found that participants in our simulation initially displayed a propensity to discount data inconsistent with a theory provided. However, with repeated observations of the inconsistent data, the students, like the scientists, began to see the once anomalous data as "real" and the initial bias to discount that data was significantly diminished.

Adult↗

PubMed2003

A dual-process model of belief and evidence interactions in causal reasoning.

In three experiments, we examined how reasoners' preexisting beliefs about causal relations constrained their evaluation of covariation-based empirical evidence. Reasoners were presented with causal candidates that were a priori rated to be either believable or unbelievable, as well as information regarding the degree to which the cause and the effect covaried. Several findings supported the conclusion that preexisting beliefs about causal relations reflect knowledge of both causal mechanisms and covariation relations, that these sources of knowledge are represented independently and contribute independently to causal judgments, and that the evaluation of new empirical evidence is influenced differently by mechanism-based and covariation-based beliefs. Finally, we observed that reasoners were relatively accurate in evaluating the degree to which their judgments were sensitive to empirical evidence but were less able to judge how much their judgments were influenced by their prior beliefs. We present a dual-process model that provides a descriptive account of the boundary conditions for belief and evidence interactions in causal reasoning.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2002

Effects of lexicality and distinctiveness on repetition blindness.

The repetition blindness (RB) paradigm developed by K. M. Arnell and P. Jolicoeur (1997) was used to examine effects of lexicality (word vs. nonword target pairs) and target distinctiveness on RB. Distinctiveness was manipulated by having both targets (Experiments 1 and 2) or only the first target (Experiment 3) brighter than nontarget items. All 3 experiments demonstrated strong RB for word targets but no RB for nonword targets. This confirms that RB depends on pre-existing memory representations. In fact, there was repetition facilitation for nonwords in Experiments 2 and 3. These experiments also demonstrated that RB is reduced when targets are distinctive. This finding is better understood interms of RB as a failure of memory rather than as a failure of perception.

Adolescent↗