Biomedical subjects

Jeremy Sobel

Publications and source records attributed to Jeremy Sobel.

22 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

PubMed2003

Foodborne botulism in a six-month-old infant caused by home-canned baby food.

Previously reported cases of botulism in infants have been diagnosed as infant botulism; that is, botulism caused by intestinal colonization by Clostridium botulinum with intraluminal production and absorption of toxin. Foodborne botulism is caused by ingestion of preformed toxin. We describe an unusual case of foodborne botulism in a 6-month-old infant caused by the ingestion of improperly prepared home-canned baby food. This represents the youngest age of onset for foodborne botulism in the United States of which we are aware and illustrates the need to rule out foodborne botulism, which represents a public health emergency, regardless of the patient's age. The diagnosis could have been readily missed or delayed in this case because the weakness was rapidly progressive rather than insidious, as is typical of infant botulism.

Age of Onset↗

PubMed2003

Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis spores.

After the intentional release of Bacillus anthracis through the U.S. Postal Service in the fall of 2001, many environments were contaminated with B. anthracis spores, and frequent inquiries were made regarding the science of destroying these spores. We conducted a survey of the literature that had potential application to the inactivation of B. anthracis spores. This article provides a tabular summary of the results.

Bacillus anthracis↗

PubMed2002

Threat of a biological terrorist attack on the US food supply: the CDC perspective.

Deliberate contamination of food with biological agents has already been perpetrated in the USA. The US food supply is increasingly characterised by centralised production and wide distribution of products. Deliberate contamination of a commercial food product could cause an outbreak of disease, with many illnesses dispersed over wide geographical areas. Dependent on the biological agent and contaminated food, such an outbreak could either present as a slow, diffuse, and initially unremarkable increase in sporadic cases, or as an explosive epidemic suddenly producing many illnesses. Preparedness for a bioterrorist event affecting the food supply, therefore, entails augmentation of the traditional public-health infrastructure to enhance disease surveillance, accelerate capacity of laboratory detection, rapidly investigate and control outbreaks, and develop capacity for response to mass-casualty disasters.

Bioterrorism↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Investigation of multistate foodborne disease outbreaks.

The U.S. food supply is characterized increasingly by centralized production and wide distribution of products, and more foodborne disease outbreaks are dispersed over broad geographic areas. Such outbreaks may present as a gradual, diffuse, and initially unapparent increase in sporadic cases. Recognition and reporting by clinicians and local public health officials and the ordering of laboratory tests by clinicians continue to be cornerstones of detecting all outbreaks. New methods--such as active laboratory-based surveillance, automated algorithms for detecting increases in infection rates, and molecular subtyping--facilitate detection of diffuse outbreaks. Routines have evolved for the investigation of multistate outbreaks; they are characterized by rapid communication between local, state, and federal public health officials; timely review of epidemiologic data by expert panels; collaboration on tracebacks with food safety regulatory agencies; and communication with the public and media. Rapid, efficient investigation of multistate outbreaks may result in control of acute public health emergencies, identification and correction of hazardous food production and processing practices, and consequent improvement in food safety.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S.↗