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Biomedical subjects

J H Flavell

Publications and source records attributed to J H Flavell.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2001

Development of children's understanding of connections between thinking and feeling.

Two studies assessed the development of children's understanding that thoughts and feelings are closely interlinked. These studies showed that, unlike 8-year-olds and adults, 5-year-olds seldom explained a sudden change in emotion that had no apparent external cause by appeal to the occurrence of a thought. They also tended not to recognize that a person who is feeling sad is probably also thinking sad thoughts, or that people may be able to make themselves feel happy just by thinking of something happy. These results are consistent with evidence that young children tend to be unaware of the stream of consciousness and have poor introspective skills. A possible developmental sequence leading to an understanding of these thought-feeling links is proposed.

Adult↗
PubMed1999

Cognitive development: children's knowledge about the mind.

This chapter reviews theory and research on the development of children's knowledge about the mental world, focusing especially on work done during the past 15 years under the rubric of theory-of-mind development. The three principal approaches to explaining this development--theory theory, modular theory, and simulation theory--are described first. Next comes a description of infant precursors or protoforms of theory-of-mind knowledge in infancy, including a beginning awareness of the intentionality and goal-directedness of human actions. This discussion is followed by a summary of the postinfancy development of children's understanding of visual perception, attention, desires, emotions, intentions, beliefs, knowledge, pretense, and thinking. Briefly considered next are intracultural, intercultural, and interspecies differences in theory-of-mind development. The chapter then concludes with some guesses about the future of the field.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1997

Preschoolers' understanding of the link between thinking and feeling: cognitive cuing and emotional change.

In 3 studies we investigated 3- through 6-year-olds' knowledge of thinking and feeling by examining their understanding of how emotions can change when memories of past sad events are cued by objects in the current environment. In Study 1, 48 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds were presented with 4 illustrated stories in which focal characters experience minor sad events. Later, each story character encounters a visual cue that is related to one of his or her previous sad experiences. Children were told that the character felt sad, and they were asked to explain why. Study 1 suggested considerable competence as well as substantial development in the years between 4 and 6 in the understanding of the influence of mental activity on emotions. Studies 2 and 3 more systematically explored preschoolers' understanding of cognitive cuing and emotional change with different types of situations and cues. Across these 2 studies, 108 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds listened to illustrated stories that featured story characters who each experienced a sad event and who were later exposed to a related cue. Children were not only asked to explain why the characters suddenly felt sad, but in some stories, they were also asked to predict and explain how another character, who was never at the past sad event, would feel. Results of Studies 2 and 3 showed an initial understanding of cognitive cuing and emotion in some children as young as 3, replicated and extended the evidence for significant developmental changes in that understanding during the preschool years, and revealed that the strength and consistency of preschoolers' knowledge of cognitive cuing and emotion was affected by whether cues were the same, or only similar to, parts of the earlier events.

Arousal↗
PubMed1997

The development of children's knowledge about inner speech.

Two studies demonstrated that preschool children have little knowledge and awareness of inner speech. Study 1 showed that, in contrast to 6- to 7-year-olds and adults, 4-year-olds usually did not infer that a person silently engaged in such intrinsically verbal mental activities as reading, counting, or recalling items from a shopping list was saying things to herself. They also tended to deny that covert speech is a possible human activity. Study 2 demonstrated that 4- and 5-year-olds are much poorer than adults at detecting their own inner speech. Children seem to acquire this sort of knowledge and awareness during the early school years, perhaps through experiencing their own inner speech while reading, writing, adding, and subtracting.

Adult↗
PubMed1994

Young children's understanding of "remember" and "forget".

3 studies examined young children's understanding that if one "remembers" or "forgot," one must have known at a prior time. In Study 1, 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood the prior knowledge component of "forgot"; both groups understood that a character with prior knowledge was "gonna remember." Study 2 controlled for the possibility that good performance on "remember" might be due to a simple association of remembering with knowledge. A significant number of 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that when 2 characters currently knew, the one with prior knowledge remembered, and that when neither character currently knew, the one with prior knowledge forgot. Study 3 made prior knowledge more salient by making the remembered or forgotten item visible to the subjects throughout. 4-year-olds performed near ceiling on both verbs, whereas 3-year-olds' performance did not differ from chance. The results are discussed in relation to children's developing understanding of the mind.

Age Factors↗
PubMed1993

Young children's understanding of forgetting over time.

2 studies investigated young children's understanding that as the retention interval increases, so do the chances that one will forget. In Study 1 (24 3-year-olds and 24 4-year-olds), 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that of 2 characters who simultaneously saw an object, the character who waited longer before attempting to find it would not remember where it was. In study 2 (24 3-year-olds and 24 4-year-olds), 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that of 2 objects seen by a character, the object that was seen a "long long time ago" would be forgotten and the object seen "a little while ago" would be remembered. The findings are discussed in relation to research on young children's understanding of the acquisition, retention, and retrieval of knowledge over time.

Awareness↗
PubMed1993

Children's understanding of the stream of consciousness.

Children and adults were tested for their understanding that there is a virtually continuous flow of mental content in a waking person, a "stream of consciousness" that continues to run even when the person is not examining stimuli perceptually or trying to solve a problem. There was a marked increase with age from preschool to adulthood in subjects' tendency to say that a person who was just waiting quietly was having "some thoughts and ideas" rather than "a mind empty of thoughts and ideas." 4-year-olds also tended to say that the mind of a waiting person was "not doing anything," whether that person was another individual or themselves, and that a person who wanted to could keep his or her "mind completely empty of all thoughts and ideas" for 3 min. These results suggest that preschoolers' conceptions of people's mental lives may be quite different from those of older children and adults.

Adult↗
PubMed1992

Young children's understanding of different types of beliefs.

The purpose of this investigation was to see whether children's understandings of different types of beliefs develop concurrently. Children of 3, 4, and 5 years of age were told or shown that child story characters held beliefs different from their own or from one another, not only concerning matters of physical fact ("false beliefs"), but also concerning morality, social convention, value, and ownership of property. In contrast to the older subjects, most 3-year-olds had difficulty in attributing to others deviant beliefs of all types, except perhaps ownership, sometimes even after having been told repeatedly what the other child believed. In addition, intercorrelations among different belief tasks were positive and substantial. It was suggested that an emerging representational conception of the mind is what enables older preschoolers to understand the possibility of belief differences of all these types.

Aggression↗
PubMed1992

Young children's understanding of the role that sensory experiences play in knowledge acquisition.

3 studies investigated whether young children understand that the acquisition of certain types of knowledge depends on the modality of the sensory experience involved. 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children were exposed to pairs of objects that either looked the same but felt different, or that felt the same but looked different. In Study 1, 36 children were asked to state, when one of these objects was hidden inside a toy tunnel, whether they would need to see the object or feel it in order to determine its identity. In Study 2, 48 children were asked to state which of 2 puppets knew that an object hidden inside a tunnel possessed a given visual or tactile property, when one puppet was looking at the object and the other was feeling it. In Study 3, 72 children were asked, in a scenario similar to Study 2, to state for each puppet whether he could tell, just by looking or by feeling, that the hidden object possessed a certain visual or tactile property. Children were also asked what was the best way to find out whether a given object possessed a certain visual or tactile property. Results of all 3 studies suggest that an appreciation of the different types of knowledge our senses can provide (i.e., modality-specific knowledge) develops between the ages of 3 and 5. The results are discussed in relation to young children's developing understanding of the role that informational access plays in knowledge acquisition.

Age Factors↗
PubMed1990

Understanding and remembering: children's knowledge about the differential effects of strategy and task variables on comprehension and memorization.

Developmental changes in knowledge about the differences between the mental processes of comprehension and memory were investigated in 3 studies using first graders, third graders, and undergraduates as subjects. 2 types of knowledge were assessed: (a) knowledge about the types of strategies appropriate to achieving the goals of comprehension, memorization, or a combination of the 2; (b) knowledge about how different task variables differentially affect comprehension and memorization tasks. With respect to the former, only the 2 older groups showed some understanding of the differential effectiveness of rehearsal and word familiarity for memory versus comprehension and thus showed some understanding of the comprehension-memory distinction with respect to strategy knowledge. As for the latter, only undergraduates correctly differentiated between the 2 mental processes with respect to the task variables of list length, item familiarity, and the categorical organization of the items.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1990

Young children's understanding of fact beliefs versus value beliefs.

Recent research on the development of children's knowledge about the mind has shown that young 3-year-olds have difficulty inferring that another person holds a false belief about a matter of verifiable fact, even when provided with considerable help. 4 studies tested the hypothesis that they would have less difficulty inferring that another person holds an odd, nonnormative belief about a matter of taste or value--one which, like the false fact belief, they themselves do not hold. On fact-belief tasks, an experimenter acted as if, or even explicitly stated that, she believed that the contents of a container were other than what the children knew to be the case. On value-belief tasks, she behaved as if she believed that a stimulus had a good or bad taste, smell, or appearance, whereas they thought it had the opposite. The results of all 4 studies confirmed the hypothesis.

Attention↗
PubMed1990

Inferring false beliefs from actions and reactions.

Current evidence suggests that young children have little understanding of false belief. Standard false belief tasks, however, may underestimate children's ability for 2 reasons. First, the only cue to belief in these tasks is a protagonist's lack of perceptual access to some critical event, and this may not be a very salient cue for young children. Second, the standard tasks require children to make forward-looking predictions from the causes of a belief (e.g., from what a protagonist has or has not perceived) to either the protagonist's belief or the protagonist's action, and children may not be very skilled at making such predictions. In 2 experiments we investigated whether 3-year-olds would do better on tasks in which the belief cues were stronger, and in which they could reason backward to the belief from its effects (e.g., from a protagonist's actions and reactions). Even on these easy tasks, however, they did not perform well. These findings provide strong support for the view that children of this age do not fully understand the representational nature of belief.

Attention↗
PubMed1990

Young children's preference for mental state versus behavioral descriptions of human action.

Young children have traditionally been conceived of as little behaviorists who focus on the external and lack knowledge of internal states. In contrast, some recent research suggests that they do have a fundamentally correct understanding of mental life. Children may often focus on the external, not because they are unaware of the internal but because in test situations the external has been more cognitively available to them. Our studies asked whether 3-year-olds prefer to describe human action in behavioral terms when a mental state description is made equally available and salient. 3-year-olds were presented with 3 differently colored photocopies of the same picture. The first copy was described with reference to the mental state of the person in the picture, and the second copy was described with reference to the person's behavior, or vice versa. Then the third copy was presented, and the child was asked to tell a puppet about this picture--effectively, to choose between the mental state description and the behavioral description. In each of 2 studies, 20 3-year-olds made 12 such choices. In both studies, children tended to choose mentalistic descriptions significantly more often than behavioral ones, even when there was better pictorial support for the behavioral ones. These findings suggest that, given equally available options, young children may prefer to describe people in terms of their mental states rather than their behaviors.

Child Behavior↗
PubMed1989

Young children's ability to differentiate appearance-reality and level 2 perspectives in the tactile modality.

A key acquisition in the child's developing knowledge of the mind is the subjective-objective distinction, which includes a clear understanding that things may appear to be other than the way they really are (appearance-reality distinction) and may present different appearances to self and others (Level 2 perspective-taking). Previous studies using tasks involving visual appearances have found that most children do not show such understanding until 4 or 5 years of age. However, a conceptual analysis of tactile as compared to visual and other perceptual experiences suggested the hypothesis that this understanding might appear earlier if the appearances the child must identify are tactile rather than visual. This hypothesis was supported by the results of 3 studies. In Studies 1 and 2, 3-year-old subjects could correctly indicate, for example, that an ice cube they were feeling with a heavily gloved finger did not feel cold to that finger (tactile appearance for the self), did feel cold to the experimenter's ungloved or thinly gloved finger (tactile appearance for another person), and was a cold ice cube, really and truly (reality). In contrast, and consistent with previous research findings, they were much poorer at distinguishing between real and visually apparent object identity, number, and color. Similarly, in Study 3 they tended to perform better on tactile appearance-reality tasks involving the properties of number, wetness, and intactness than on visual appearance-reality tasks that involved these same properties.

Attention↗
PubMed1986

Young children's knowledge about visual perception: projective size and shape.

Although recent research indicates that an increased sensitivity to visual appearances develops around 4 or 5 years of age, evidence from perceptual studies suggests that certain types of appearances, that is, projective size and shape, are not noticed or understood until at least 7. 4 experiments investigated preschool children's knowledge of the projective size--distance and projective shape--orientation relationships. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were asked whether an object should be moved farther or nearer in order to increase or decrease its apparent size. 4-year-olds performed significantly better than chance, but 3-year-olds did not. Experiment 2 showed that 3-year-olds are able to perceive projective size changes, indicating that although they do not fully understand the projective size-distance relationship, the necessary perceptual information is potentially available to them. In Experiment 3, 3- and 4-year-olds were asked to indicate how a circular object should be rotated to make it appear either circular or elliptical. Again, 4-year-olds performed significantly better than chance, but 3-year-olds did not. Again also, the results of Experiment 4 indicate that although 3-year-olds are not aware of the projective shape-orientation relationship, they are capable of attending to changes in projective shape. Thus, the constraints on children's knowledge of the projective size-distance and projective shape-orientation relationships seem to be at least partly cognitive rather than wholly perceptual. These results are interpreted as further evidence for the acquisition of level 2 percept knowledge during early childhood.

Child Development↗
PubMed1986

Development of knowledge about the appearance-reality distinction.

7 studies of the acquisition of knowledge about the appearance-reality distinction suggest the following course of development. Many 3-year-olds seem to possess little or no understanding of the distinction. They fail the simplest Appearance-Reality (AR) tasks and are unresponsive to efforts to teach them the distinction. Skill in solving simple AR tasks is highly correlated with skill in solving simple perceptual Perspective-taking (PT) tasks; this suggests the hypothesis that the ability to represent the selfsame stimulus in two different, seemingly incompatible ways may underlie both skills. Children of 6-7 years have acquired both skills but nevertheless find it very difficult to reflect on and talk about such appearance-reality concepts as "looks like," "really and truly," and "looks different from the way it really and truly is." In contrast, children of 11-12 years, and to an even greater degree college students, possess a substantial body of rich, readily accessible, and explicit knowledge in this area.

Auditory Perception↗