Biomedical subjects

Ian M Hamilton

Publications and source records attributed to Ian M Hamilton.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2005

Unrelated helpers will not fully compensate for costs imposed on breeders when they pay to stay.

Unrelated subordinates may invest in costly help to avoid being evicted from groups (the 'pay-to-stay' hypothesis). However, the effectiveness of eviction to enforce help should depend on its being applied accurately and on the costs it imposes on both dominants and subordinates. The relative cost of being evicted is a function of the population frequency of eviction when population growth is limited by density-dependent factors. We describe a stage-structured pay-to-stay model incorporating density-dependent population growth, costly eviction and occasional errors. Breeders demand some amount of help and evict subordinates that do not provide it. Helpers decide on the amount of help they will provide. The threat of eviction alone is sufficient to enforce helping. However, helping will not be favoured if helpers do not impose costs on breeders. The amount of help provided is less than the cost that subordinates impose upon breeders, when any help is provided. Thus, the net fitness effect of a helper under pay-to-stay alone is negative, even if it is investing in cooperative behaviour. Constraints on dispersal have no effect on the amount of help, although they may influence the tolerance threshold of breeders and group stability, depending on the mechanism of density dependence.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

Distraction sneakers decrease the expected level of aggression within groups: a game-theoretic model.

Hawk-dove games have been extensively used to predict the conditions under which group-living animals should defend their resources against potential usurpers. Typically, game-theoretic models on aggression consider that resource defense may entail energetic and injury costs. However, intruders may also take advantage of owners who are busy fighting to sneak access to unguarded resources, imposing thereby an additional cost on the use of the escalated hawk strategy. In this article we modify the two-strategy hawk-dove game into a three-strategy hawk-dove-sneaker game that incorporates a distraction-sneaking tactic, allowing us to explore its consequences on the expected level of aggression within groups. Our model predicts a lower proportion of hawks and hence lower frequencies of aggressive interactions within groups than do previous two-strategy hawk-dove games. The extent to which distraction sneakers decrease the frequency of aggression within groups, however, depends on whether they search only for opportunities to join resources uncovered by other group members or for both unchallenged resources and opportunities to usurp.

Aggression↗

PubMed2000

Recruiters and Joiners: Using Optimal Skew Theory to Predict Group Size and the Division of Resources within Groups of Social Foragers.

I apply skew theory to the division of resources within multimember social foraging and antipredator groups. Resource division is modeled as a game between an individual controlling resources (recruiter) and a potential joiner to the group. If a recruiter benefits from the presence of a joiner, it will allocate sufficient resources to the joiner so that the joiner gains as much from group foraging as it would from foraging alone. Joiners should receive a greater proportion of resources controlled by the recruiter when benefits to grouping are low. If group success is a concave-down function of group size, this framework can be used to predict the stable group size. The stable group size is larger than the optimal group size, given equal division of resources, and smaller than the stable group size, given equal division of resources. Furthermore, both current group members and potential joiners agree on the stable group size, so long as the recruiter is able to control resource division. If the recruiter cannot control resource division, there may be conflict over group size and the opportunity for group members to contribute less to group success than they are able.

dominance↗