Search PubMed⌕ Search

Biomedical subjects

F M Kamm

Publications and source records attributed to F M Kamm.

13 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2001

Ronald Dworkin on abortion and assisted suicide.

In the first part of this article, I raise questions about Dworkin's theory of the intrinsic value of life and about the adequacy of his proposal to understand abortion in terms of different ways of valuing life. In the second part of the article, I consider his argument in "The Philosophers' Brief on Assisted Suicide", which claims that the distinction between killing and letting die is morally irrelevant, the distinction between intending and foreseeing death can be morally relevant but is not always so. I argue that the killing/letting die distinction can be relevant in the context of assisted suicide, but also show when it is not. Then I consider why the intention/foresight distinction can be morally irrelevant and conclude by presenting an alternative argument for physician-assisted suicide.

Abortion, Induced↗
PubMed1992

Non-consequentialism, the person as an end-in-itself, and the significance of status.

Recently, several outstanding discussions of the structure of non-consequentialism have appeared. Two of these are Shelly Kagan's The Limits of Morality and a pair of articles by Warren Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing" and "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect." I would like to examine several related issues discussed by these authors. Another outstanding work to which I will refer in this article, but not discuss at great length, is Judith Jarvis Thomson's The Realm of Rights. The general topic with which I shall be concerned is the structure of a non-consequentialist moral theory. Non-consequentialism has two important features. In a non-consequentialist moral theory, (1) there is a permission not to maximize overall best consequences (this is sometimes referred to as an option), and (2) there are constraints on promoting overall best consequences (for example, we must not kill one innocent, non-threatening person for his organs to save five others). I shall use the works by Kagan, Quinn, and Thomson to help characterize further the elements of the non-consequentialist structure and to justify them.

Double Effect Principle↗
PubMed1991

The doctrine of double effect: reflections on theoretical and practical issues.

The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Principle of Do No Harm raise important theoretical and practical issues, some of which are discussed by Boyle, Donagan, and Quinn. I argue that neither principle is correct, and some revisionist, and probably nonabsolutist, analysis of constraints on action and omission is necessary. In making these points, I examine several approaches to deflection of threat cases, discuss an argument for the permissibility of voluntary euthanasia, and present arguments relevant to medical contexts which justify intentionally harming some to aid others, with and without the consent of those harmed.

Bioethical Issues↗
PubMed1990

The philosopher as insider and outsider.

Philosophers may play the role of insider, e.g., serving as advisor to government commissions, or of outsider, commenting on the work of such commissions. Each role may raise dilemmas. It is argued that as insider the philosopher's primary duties should be to clarify and inform, as well as philosophize with the commissioners, and help them stay on a course in which moral considerations are given their proper weight. Fulfilling these duties means that the philosopher will sometimes have to help produce a weaker intellectual document than he would prefer, or lose a chance to directly promote the public good. The insider philosopher will also have to consider whether it is appropriate for a policy proposal from a commission to differ from much current government policy, and how morally appropriate compromise can be reached among commissioners. Given his understanding of how an insider philosopher should function and how commission reports are constructed, the outsider philosopher can comment both on how close a report comes to being perfect of its type, and how far short of an ideal philosophical analysis even a perfect government report is. It may be appropriate for him to give greater weight to the public good, if his comments are very likely to affect it, than the insider philosopher. Examples for discussion are drawn from government reports on organ transplantation, embryo research, terminating care, and compensation for research subjects.

Advisory Committees↗
PubMed1989

The report of the U.S. Task Force on Organ Transplantation: criticisms and alternatives.

This article discusses the recommendations for the acquisition and distribution of organs in the Report of the U.S. Task Force on Organ Transplantation. It first considers several possible means of acquiring organs and offers a conception of the relations which a person, his or her family, and the state have to the bodily remains. The article then examines the idea of need for organs and considers certain principles for weighing outcome and need in distribution decisions. It also criticizes the report's recommendations for the distribution of blood type O material, offers a proposal for line-jumping, and criticizes the report's arguments for federal subsidy of organ transplantation.

Advisory Committees↗
PubMedDate not supplied

To whom?

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

Decision Making, Organizational↗