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Biomedical subjects

E H Morreim

Publications and source records attributed to E H Morreim.

11 recordsLinked to original sources

Gaming the system. Dodging the rules, ruling the dodgers.

Although traditional obligations of fidelity require physicians to deliver quality care to their patients, including to utilize costly technologies, physicians are steadily losing their accustomed control over the necessary resources. The "economic agents" who own the medical and monetary resources of care now impose a wide array of rules and restrictions in order to contain their costs of operation. However, physicians can still control resources indirectly through "gaming the system," employing tactics such as "fudging" that exploit resource rules' ambiguity and flexibility to bypass the rules while ostensibly honoring them. Physicians may be especially inclined to game the system where resource rules seriously underserve patients' needs, where economic agents seem to be "gaming the patient," with needless obstacles to care, or where others, such as hospitals or even physicians themselves, may be denied needed reimbursements. Though tempting, gaming is morally and medically hazardous. It can harm patients and society, offend honesty, and violate basic principles of contractual and distributive justice. It is also, in fact, usually unnecessary in securing needed resources for patients. More fundamentally, we must reconsider what physicians owe their patients. They owe what is theirs to give: their competence, care and loyalty. In light of medicine's changing economics, two new duties emerge: economic advising, whereby physicians explicitly discuss the economic as well as medical aspects of each treatment option; and economic advocacy, whereby physicians intercede actively on their patients' behalf with the economic agents who control the resources.

Beneficence

The new economics of medicine: special challenges for psychiatry.

The ongoing economic overhaul of medicine creates two basic imperatives--boosting profits and containing costs--that pose special ethical and philosophical challenges for psychiatry. Because insurance coverage still favors inpatient care, pressures to raise revenues translate into a corresponding pressure on psychiatry as a whole to expand its diagnostic categories, and on individual psychiatrists to ascribe these diagnoses liberally and to hospitalize as many patients as possible. Reciprocally, cost containment requires all physicians to justify their care as clearly as possible and to eliminate those interventions that are not of demonstrable value. Scientific outcome studies are markedly more difficult in psychiatry than elsewhere in medicine, particularly for psychotherapeutic as opposed to pharmacologic modes of care. An emphasis on biological over psychological conceptions of mental illness and treatment might result, not because it is more likely to be correct, but because it is easier to document in conventional ways and less expensive to deliver. An economics-driven reorganization of psychiatry therefore poses serious philosophical challenges, not only for the profession and its future, but for the clinical care of patients.

Cost Control

Physician investment and self-referral: philosophical analysis of a contentious debate.

A new economic phenomenon, in which physicians refer their patients to ancillary facilities of which they themselves are owners or substantial investors, presents a 'laboratory' for assessing philosophers' potential contributions to public policy issues. In this particular controversy, 'prohibitionists' who wish to ban all such self-referral focus on the dangers that patients and payers may receive or be billed for unnecessary or poor-quality care. 'Laissez-fairists', in contrast, argue that self-referral should be freely permitted, with a reliance on personal ethics and internal professional monitoring to guard against abuse. Undue government regulation, they argue, infringes providers' and patients' economic freedom, and stifles the competition that can yield better quality care at lower prices. As this debate features basic values and large amounts of money, it has been marked by rancorous rhetoric, shallow argument, and muddled reasoning. The philosopher's first contribution, therefore, is to expose simplistic and fallacious arguments, whether empirical, conceptual, moral, or legal. Beyond this the philosopher can help to identify the important values at stake and, perhaps, to identify resolutions that honor those values better than the more simplistic answers proffered previously. For abusive self-referral, as distinguished from kickbacks, the author recommends that civil remedies be favored over criminal prohibitions. She suggests that the doctrine of 'bad faith breach of contract' might appropriately be extended into this new area to provide a powerful means by which aggrieved patients and payers can hold physicians personally accountable for abusive self-referrals.

Conflict of Interest

Fiscal scarcity and the inevitability of bedside budget balancing.

Until recently, generous third-party reimbursements enabled physicians to pursue each patient's interests with little regard to costs. Conscious rationing was required only episodically as some particular commodity, eg, transplant organs, was too scarce to meet demand, or as some patients lacked basic access to the health care system. Cost containment and the economic reorganization of medicine introduce a new sort of scarcity, requiring a different sort of rationing. "Fiscal scarcity," the general contraction of health care dollars, means that because every medical decision has its cost, every decision is now subject to scrutiny for its economic as well as its medical wisdom. Therefore, every detail of medicine is an allocation problem. Many observers argue that physicians can nevertheless avoid directly trading patients' interests against economic considerations: through "efficiency protocols" that eliminate marginal benefits, through turning economic rationing decisions over to outside parties, through avoiding cost constraints until society has established a just health care allocation system. This article shows that none of these proposals permits the physician to escape cost-cutting at the bedside.

Cost Control